

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA APARTHEID AND THE
U.S. MEXICO SECURITY FENCE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

TYLER JAMES THORNTON

Norman, Oklahoma

2015

COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA APARTHEID AND THE
U.S. MEXICO SECURITY FENCE

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION

BY

Dr. Eric Mark Kramer, Chair

Dr. Sean O'Neill

Dr. Clemencia Rodriguez

Dr. Elaine Hsieh

Dr. Justin Reedy

Acknowledgements

Elder Todd Christofferson of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints described how I feel about finishing this project. He said, “Anything I may achieve will be by virtue of the power and the grace and the gift of God. I am not, in Isaiah’s words, the axe that shall “boast itself against him that heweth therewith”; I am not the saw that shall “magnify itself against him that shaketh it.” (Isaiah 10:15.) With Nephi, I know in whom I have trusted. (Book of Mormon, 2 Nephi, 4:19).

God and I knew that I would need amazing guidance. That guidance came from Dr. Eric Mark Kramer. I will never forget when we studied chivalry as described by Joseph Campbell. Eric shared a unique insight about his relationship with his dad, and shed a few tears. Dr. Kramer provided me with the same kind of unconditional love that his father showed him. Where I had my doubts along the way, Dr. Kramer listened and offered great insight. Like any great mentor, Dr. Kramer pushed me in the right direction, but let me struggle to forge a path that is uniquely mine. Eric: thank you for your hard work and friendship on my behalf.

I also appreciate the teaching and editorial reviews from committee members Dr. Hsieh, Dr. Rodriguez, and Dr. O’Neil. To Dr. Reedy, thank you for stepping in at the last minute to provide important feedback on the project. I also must thank the late Dr. Michael Pfau for his strong influence on my doctoral work. Dr. Pfau prepared us for academic rigor, and expected us to be excellent communication scholars. Dr. Pfau taught an extremely difficult Introduction to Graduate Studies course. I passed the course, but more importantly, I obtained Dr. Pfau’s respect and a recommendation to become a full time doctorate student with the department in 2006.

I would like to thank a close colleague, Kevin Blake who started his studies at the same time in 2005. Kevin can attest to the love Dr. Kramer has for his students, and that Dr. Pfau's class was indeed incredibly difficult! Kevin: Thanks for being there every step of the way buddy! This journey was not possible without your encouragement, long talks, and many visits to O'Connell's and the Library!

This project was finished due to the wonderful support of family and friends. McKaylee Elizabeth Dreher Thornton watched me struggle through meetings, edits, and many weekends of hard work. She supported me like an angel! Thank you for your love and companionship. Thank you also to Lucy Adele for your love and smiles that make life a joy! Thanks Dad and Mom. Your love and sacrifices for me are overwhelming. Thank you. Thank you to Tad and Katie, my closest friends, and your families for supporting me no matter what life brought on! Thank you to my other family everywhere! Thank you Ron and Faith for your incredible support and your permission to marry McKaylee! Thank you to the Draytons, the Norman University Ward, and the Holmgrens, Hughes, and Helms families. Thank you to the college debate world and many dedicated teachers and students at several universities who helped me succeed.

Finally, I would like to thank the brave people in the FBI and the U.S. Intelligence Community. I have the great privilege to work with you in protecting everything this nation stands for. One friend gave me extra encouragement that pushed me to finish the job in the right way. I will not forget your support! Last, but certainly not least, I thank the staff of the FBI Academy Library. You had what I needed the minute I needed it, every time, without fail. You are an amazing resource to this organization and I cannot thank you enough!

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Abstract

Powerful semiotic signs like the Great Wall of China and the Berlin Wall served significant communicative functions. The modern culture of nation state wall building continues despite the fact that the security fences are obsolete. Wall advocates argue that security fences deter undocumented immigrants from trying to cross the border illegally. The walls also function to stop terrorism or other criminal threats. This paper applies semiotic and hermeneutic methods to examine and compare the communication functions of South African apartheid with the U.S. Mexico border wall. Structuration Theory (ST),and Dissociation and Dimensional Accrual (DAD) are applied to discuss the consequences to communication from such barriers.

Communication functions of South Africa Apartheid and the U.S. Mexico Security Fence

Throughout time, humans have created enormous physical structures such as walls, dams, buildings, and cultural artifacts for a variety of reasons. Some of these may include showing ingenuity, creativity, and skill of an individual or group. Nations have used these structures to show off new technologies, gain political advantage over rival nations, or attempt to control the mobility of peoples. Other structures illustrate the need to overcome and control nature. All of these structures are signs and/or messages that gain cultural meaning through social interaction. Without such interaction, they would be nothing more than concrete, steel, dirt, and stone. The presence of these walls says something about the individuals, communities, or nations that built them.

Historically humans have built all kinds of walls that came in many shapes and sizes, using everything from stones and mud to metal, wood, and concrete. Walls serve a variety of purposes including providing safety from the elements, providing security from attacking enemies, separating people from communities or serving as an ideologically or symbolically powerful symbol. Beyond the physical structures themselves, walls communicate social and cultural meanings. Walls define a friend, a criminal, an illegal alien, or a terrorist. They can potentially have political, social, economic, and other meanings depending on the context in which people build them, and the other circumstances surrounding them. They help define our identities, cultures, nations, and the world.

Some of the most iconic, symbolic, walls are the Great Wall of China and the Berlin Wall. Rojas (2010) described how the Great Wall has manifested the “power,

unity, and longevity” (p. 2) of China throughout history. The Great Wall was further described as, “A defensive barricade spanning China’s northern frontier and linking contemporary China back to its first unified dynasty, the Wall symbolizes the nation’s geographic integrity and historical continuity” (p. 2-3). Regardless of historical debates, Rojas (2010) concluded that the Great Wall remains an iconic symbol for China and the world. The Berlin Wall is another easily recognized symbolic icon. The physical wall divided the city, but the ideological Berlin Wall was a symbol of the Cold War that divided the world between two superpowers through much of the 20th century.

Globalization is pushing nations closer together than ever before. Brown (2010), Jones (2012), and Nevins (2012) argue that this closeness increases the number of conflicts along borders forcing nations to build massive “security” walls to protect themselves from threats. For a short time after the Berlin Wall fell, there was hope that nations could create a new era of cooperation and communication (Alvarez, 2012; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Houtum, 2012; Jones, 2012; Obama, 2013; Smith-Sivertsen, 2012). Instead, Jones (2012) indicates that from 2000-2011, countries built or heavily renovated at least 25 major border barriers. Wall building has been ongoing since the U.S. won the war with Mexico in 1848. The Secure Fence Act in 2006 called for a border extending across the entire U.S. Mexico (USMX) border. The Mexican government contemplated building a wall on the southern border between Chiapas and Guatemala, all while complaining that the USMX fence was unnecessary (Valladares, 2010). Brown (2010), Nevins (2002, 2006, 2012), Romero (2008), and Rojas (2010) highlight that major fences were constructed between Israel and Palestine, South Africa and Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, India and Pakistan,

India and Bangladesh, Morocco and Spain, and China and North Korea. Egypt built a controversial separation wall along the Gaza Strip (Fleishman & Hassan, 2009; Rojas, 2010). Malaysia and Thailand have a security agreement to build a fence line in an attempt to reduce human, drug, and firearms smuggling (Electronic Fence, 2013). The list of barriers continues growing at a steady pace.

Wall building defines what it means to be a citizen, a legal immigrant, an alien, an undocumented immigrant, a terrorist, a criminal, and so forth. In the U.S., we could ask, what does it mean to be an immigrant? This is similar to the Berlin Wall. What did it mean to be a citizen or a stranger in a divided Berlin? In intercultural communication terms, walls help determine individual and collective cultural identities. It is important to study walls, as they are a reflection of how people see their fears, ambitions, and themselves. The security fence debate across North and Central America is comparable to the historical experience of apartheid in South Africa (Coplan, 2010; Nevins, 2002, 2006, 2012; Spencer, 2009). This dissertation presents the case that apartheid in South Africa and the walls on the USMX border serve a variety of communication functions to many audiences. South African apartheid and the USMX Security Fence are examples of communication failures and extreme sovereignty.

Two Justifications for the Dissertation

1. The U.S. Wall is a National Security Issue

Security walls and particularly the USMX border fence are the center point of scholarship, media and political attention, and social significance. The first reason to study the USMX security fence in a communication context is that it is a major national

security issue. Scholars across the social sciences explain that the fence is symbolic of post 9/11 nationalist fears such as the fear of “the other” (undocumented immigrants, terrorists, drug criminals, and other perceived threats) (Alvarez, 2012; Brown, 2010; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Chavez 2012; Dunn, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2012). As an analyst in national security issues at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and as member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC or IC)¹, I am highly interested in comprehending the communicative functions of border walls.

After the terrorist attacks on the New York City World Trade Center Twin Towers and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001 (9/11), it became necessary for the USIC to re-organize counterterrorism efforts that included reforming border protection (9/11 Commission, 2004; Kean & Hamilton, 2014; Nevins, 2002; Romero, 2008; Brunet-Jailly, 2007). A difficult conundrum was that most of the 48 terrorists who conducted attacks on the homeland between 1993 and 2001 entered the U.S. legally (Camarota, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004). The Patriot Act created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 consolidating 17 agencies to increase information sharing and other kinds of cooperation with the Intelligence Community. DHS merged the Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Border Patrol into three units: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services. The FBI is the primary

¹ I take personal responsibility for all expressions, views, opinions, analysis, and/or conclusions found throughout this dissertation. I am not speaking on behalf of the FBI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), or any agency or military portion of the U.S. government. The FBI does a security prepublication check

agency that investigates terrorism acts and cooperates with immigration agencies to investigate other federal crimes.

The Intelligence Community considers border security to be an important national security concern due to the significant number of people crossing the border every year. On September 17, 2014, President Obama informed Congress that the U.S. is still under a national emergency caused by terrorist acts that occurred in September 2001 (Message to Congress, 2014). President Obama (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014) outlined that border enforcement was a priority to protect the American people from terrorism and other threats. The most significant threat identified in intelligence hearings with Congress in 2011 and 2012 was Hezbollah and Iranian resources developing an attack plan in an allied country in the western hemisphere, and then conducting the attack on the American homeland (Clapper, 2012; Levitt, 2012). In 2012, Border Patrol Chief Fisher stated, “The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against our Nation defined U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s national security mission: nothing less than preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States” (CBP, 2012, p. 6). The 2014 mission statements for the FBI and the DHS indicate that a top priority continues to be preventing future terrorist attacks by securing the border and regulating/enforcing immigration laws (Core Missions, 2014; ‘What We Investigate, 2014). Politicians and intelligence agencies are not the only parties that have a strong interest in immigration as it relates to terrorism national security issues. Many scholars across the social sciences disciplines note that a national security culture has been resilient over the last thirteen years and continues to manifest itself in American culture (Alvarez, 2012;

Brown, 2010; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Chavez 2012; Dunn, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2012).

Immigration is a ubiquitous social, political, and U.S. national security issue. There must be a discussion about immigration policies in order to better comprehend the communicative functions of walls. According to the 9/11 Commission (2004), the terrorist attackers used a variety of legal immigration policies and illegal means to travel, plan and create a safe haven for themselves prior to carrying out their attacks. The Commission (2004) also noted that millions of people cross U.S. borders every year, and more than 500,000 people do so illegally. The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) reported that from 1999-2006, they apprehended just over one million people per year along the Southwest border (Apprehension Statistics, 2013). From 2007-2013 the apprehension rate reduced to around 500,000 people per year (Apprehension Statistics, 2013).

After 9/11, politicians and media groups argue that the Southern border is unsecure as evidenced by the fact that thousands of undocumented immigrants and criminals continue to cross. In order to ensure the security of the Southwest borders, in 2006, President George W. Bush and Congress (including then Senator Barak Obama) passed the Secure Fence Act of 2006. The law provides the DHS with the statutory authority and almost unlimited resources to increase border security with smarter technologies and a vast infrastructure of physical fencing in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas (Nevins, 2006; Romero, 2008; Secure Fence Act, 2006). Immigration was a major election issue in the 2008 and 2012 President Elections (Carter, Ellis, Hossain & McLean, 2008; Cisneros, 2014; Maril, 2011a). In 2012,

President Obama won 71% of the Latino vote, with a promise that immigration reform would be part of his legislative agenda (Brown, Sherman, & Raju, 2012). The Boston Bombing in April 2013 also raised questions about loopholes, keeping immigration at the forefront of national security concerns. In 2013 and 2014, both political parties engaged in the rhetoric of immigration reform in numerous settings.

Immigration is not the only national security concern resulting from the 9/11 attacks. The Department of Transportation (DOT) noted in 2012 that 224 million people crossed the Canada or Mexico border by train, bus, personal vehicle, or by walking across an international bridge. Eleven million trucks crossed a border with over seven million loaded containers, and almost 40,000 trains crossed with about two million loaded containers (Transportation Statistics, 2012). In the new security culture, the U.S., Mexico, and Canada had to re-imagine how they could function together in immigration policies, economics, and national security concerns (Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Meyers, 2003; Romero, 2008). Meyers (2003) noted that in December 2001 and March 2002 Canada and Mexico signed new “smart border” agreements with the U.S. to sustain the precedents of NAFTA while protecting each nation’s borders. Furthermore, Brunet-Jailly (2012) indicated that Canada passed a similar form of the American Patriot Act in 2004 to increase border enforcement with a specific emphasis on stopping terrorists and increasing intelligence sharing with foreign partners. As long as the post 9/11 national security culture of xenophobia exists, the border fence and immigration will continue to play a significant role in American culture and politics.

2. *Contribute to the Field of Communication Studies*

In 1985, the President of the World Communication Association Dr. Jeffrey Auer speaking at the International Communication Convention in a keynote address stated:

Ironically, it has been the nuclear achievements of our scientists, made at the behest of our militarists that have created a potential barrier which may in the long run force us to relate instead of annihilate....The essential means of relating is communicating....Communication is the critical instrument for working on the walls, tearing them down, stone by stone, pulling out each brick of prejudice, chauvinism, isolationism, and cultural elitism....We can each contribute by understanding, and applying, and teaching human communication. Working on the walls that separate us from our fellow men and women is....the great cause of our time. And each of us....must in our own way devote some part of our life and life's work to that cause, for it is the cause of developing understanding and securing peace among the peoples of the world. (p. 80)

Communication scholars have started to participate more in borderlands research, but there are still many opportunities to help influence both disciplines. *Borderland* is a key term introduced by Asiwaju (1983) in African border studies. Anzaldúa (1987) used the term to describe the USMX border, “*Es una herida abierta* where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds. And before a scab forms it hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds merging to form a third country – a border culture” (p. 3). Asiwaju (1983) and Anzaldúa (1987) argue that borderlands research encompasses both sides of physical borders, and expands the concept in a sociological sense to include anywhere people of different cultures, races, and classes overlap. Asiwaju (1983) and Anzaldúa (1987) encourage scholars to deal with the paradox of borders in that they keep certain people out while at the same time force others to stay inside a particular area. Communication research could provide have a positive impact on how politicians and people view the borderlands.

Communication research on the borderlands is scattered across the discipline. Research areas included speeches calling for more attention to walls (Auer, 1985; Chavez & Salmon, 2010; Rodriguez, 2008); the Berlin Wall (Bruner, 1989; Passey, 1973; Rowland 2006); territory/proxemics (Hall, 1966); architecture (Jackson, 2006); TV, film, and globalization issues (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 2003; Miller, 2002; Lee 2002), media framing (Martinez 2004, Carroll 2006, Rodriguez Escobar 2010); the Israel/Palestine Wall (Bars and Renterghen, 2004); dissemination of health information through community networks (Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 2009); balancing human rights with conservation principles (Shellabarger, Peterson, Sills, & Cubbage, 2012); vigilantism, surveillance, and security (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and McHendry, 2012); and rhetorical analysis of citizenship, identity politics and social movements (Cisneros, 2012, 2014; Flores, 2003; DeChaine, 2009, 2012; Klipp, 2011). None of the communication scholarship currently available has examined the physical fence as a communication artifact. This study offers a unique step in the direction of examining walls as a semiotic artifact with essential communication functions.

I propose to study walls as the primary unit of analysis by employing two theoretical perspectives, *Structuration Theory* (ST), and *Dissociation and Dimensional Accrual* (DAD), to answer questions about the semiotic nature of walls. Organizational communication scholars McPhee, Poole, and Iverson (2014) abbreviated Giddens (1980, 1993) Structuration Theory as ST (p. 75). McPhee et al. acknowledge that ST has been slow to develop in communication research; scholars have applied it almost exclusively to the organizational communication context. Banks & Riley (1993) argue that ST has received limited attention in communication research that is surprising

given the richness of communication concepts within the theory. Banks and Riley (1993) suggest one reason for its lack of use is that, “structuration requires a careful introduction for the uninitiated, since a number of key concepts have unconventional meanings” (, p. 169) including the Hermeneutic Circle, Phenomenology, and Semiotics.

One common theme in organizational communication literature meta-reviews was that ST has potential to explain communication phenomenon, but communication scholars rarely apply the theory in their research (Heracleous, 2013; McPhee, Pool, & Iverson, 2014). Olufowote (2003) argues that there is no framework for “reviewing and evaluating communication scholarship informed by structuration” (p. 4). Heracleous (2013) only found six communication studies conducted from 1997 to 2013 that employed ST as a main theoretical framework to analyze data or interpret results. Finally, McPhee, et al. (2014) highlights the various ways ST is applied in the organizational communication context, but ST is still limited in other communication scholarship. I am employing ST in my study because it has the potential to identify agents and their motives for building walls in South Africa and along the U.S. Mexico Border. People tend to see walls as physical rather than ideological. The ideological aspect of walling is often implied rather than visible. ST can also help me discover larger social structures that helped make physical and ideological fence building possible. McPhee, et al. (2014) explained that early versions of ST denied the possibility that collective organizations or groups had agency but later backed off from this uncompromising view.

Dissociation and Dimensional Accrual or “DAD” as Kramer (1997, 2013) abbreviated it, began developing in 1993 but has limited use in communication

scholarship. Callahan (2004) suggested that scholars avoid using DAD theory possibly due to its perceived philosophical complexities in theory and method. DAD's basis is in hermeneutics, and the theory is not interested in one particular outcome or desire, but rather tries to provide a space for as many perspectives as possible. This allows scholars to acquire a holistic view of the phenomenon under study. Some examples include how Kim (2002) applies DAD theory to criticize the modern culture of technology that heavily influences human communication. Jafri (2003) examines the cultural practice of honor killings in Pakistan through the lens of the magic, mythic, and perspectival dimensions that DAD describes. Igiel (2014) and Thornton (2008, 2009) analyze how national symbols are interpreted through the various viewpoints that DAD theory discusses. Applying DAD could identify cultural motivations or other explanations for why people communicated with apartheid discrimination and/or the USMX walls. Furthermore, assessing and strengthening DAD theory could provide a new contribution to communication scholarship.

This dissertation consists of the following parts: Chapter 2 is a literature review. Chapter 3 describes ST and DAD theory and presents research questions. Chapter 4 explains the method including the use of semiotics, hermeneutics, and phenomenology to analyze the apartheid and the security fence. Chapters 5 and 6 are comprehensive investigations of apartheid and the USMX Security Fence. The investigation in each chapter develops a semiotic historical context for the artifact, and analyzes numerous binary oppositions found therein. I also apply the theories to answer the research questions. Chapter 7 concludes my arguments with a comparison of the two artifacts and recommendations for future research. Throughout this dissertation process in

analyzing these two subjects, I expect to find eidetic meanings of walls from historical and current sources.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The literature review is comprised of scholarship that concludes international borders and border walls are part of a regional identity and culture. The research further concludes that walls symbolically represent the modern nation state geopolitical ideology where the interests of the sovereign take precedent over local or international concerns. This dissertation will analyze walls that communicate intercultural, international messages. In the literature review, I make five arguments that justify the salient, timely need for this project.

First, communication scholarship has been limited in borderlands studies, despite several calls to pay more attention to this subject. Second, throughout the social sciences, scholars recognize borders and boundaries are shifting all across the globe. They, like communication scholars, are calling for more research to account for the social and cultural consequences of new border landscapes. Third, Borderlands scholars (Alvarez, 1995; Anzaldúa, 1987; Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Baud & van Schendal, 1997; Coplan, 2010; Donnan & Wilson 1999; Martinez, 1989; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Sibling, 1995; Strassoldo, 1989) recognize the diversity of definitions and perspectives about borders. They call for cross comparisons both between local regions within countries and between international borders (Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Coplan, 2010; Nevins, 2006, 2012; Spencer, 2009). Fourth, local border communities are challenging the geopolitical power or policies of the nation state

(Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Pickles, 1992; O'Tuathail, 1996, O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Toal & Agnew, 2003). Finally, the physical structures of the border fences change landscapes by the way nation states build fences. In modern media, pictures of the fences are messages creating a semantic landscape that we need to examine because they have consequences for individual and group identities, and local, regional, national, and international policies.

Communication Research

Communication research in borderlands has been somewhat limited and scattered across many areas in the discipline. Research areas include speeches calling for more attention to walls (Auer, 1985; Chavez & Salmon, 2010; Rodriguez, 2008); the Berlin Wall (Bruner, 1989; Passey, 1973; Rowland 2006); territory/proxemics (Hall, 1966); architecture (Jackson, 2006); TV, film, and globalization issues (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 2003; Miller, 2002; Lee 2002), media framing (Martinez 2004, Carroll 2006, Rodriguez Escobar 2010); the Israel/Palestine Wall (Bars and Renterghen, 2004); dissemination of health information through community networks (Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 2009); balancing human rights with conservation principles (Shellabarger et al. 2012); vigilantism, surveillance, and security (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and McHendry, 2012); and rhetorical analysis of citizenship, identity politics and social movements (Cisneros, 2012, 2014; Flores, 2003; DeChaine, 2009, 2012; Klipp, 2011). Some of the authors mention there is a fence, but none of the communication scholarship currently available has extensively examined the physical fence as an influential communication artifact. This study offers unique communication

research by examining the communication functions of the walls of South African Apartheid and the USMX border fence.

There is a unique opportunity to for new communication scholars to expand our research into Borderland Studies due to the rapidly increasing number of fences and barriers countries or groups built in recent years. Communication continues to play a central role in the creation, destruction, and recreation of borders (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Cisneros, 2014; DeChaine, 2009, 2012). Security fences by their nature are a communication artifact serving two purposes. First, they are a literal message to limit and/or stop the physical movement of people. Second, they are a highly symbolic message regarding powers between nation-states (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). Walls characterize intergroup relations. Communication scholars should contribute to the growing body of interdisciplinary literature that exemplifies many dynamic messages at the borderlands. The following review of communication literature first discusses how humans use architecture to communicate about themselves. Next, the review discusses communication and the Berlin Wall through the 1990's. Finally, the review discusses the new security culture that flourished after the terrorist attacks in September 2001.

Architecture and Communication

One of the essential ways humans communicate is through their architecture. Scholars in semiotics (Noth, 1985/1990; Saussure, 1972/1983), anthropology, (Hall, 1966; Levi-Strauss, 1963; Rapoport, 2011), intercultural communication (Gebser, 1949/1985; Kramer, 1997 & 2013; Jackson, 2006), sociology (Gutman, 2011) and non-verbal communication (Knapp & Hall, 2002; Poyatos, 2002; Richmond & McCroskey,

2004) document how architecture is a part of any message environment. Hall (1966) stated that studying the way humans construct, divide, and otherwise use and define space can "reveal hidden cultural frames that determine the structure of a given peoples perceptual world" (Hall, 1966, p. 163-164). Furthermore, Hall (1966) explains that we have "different sensory worlds" (p. 2) and selectively screen information, so that two people may experience the "same" space, but never in the same way. This is certainly the case when experiencing the USMX border wall. Citizens, immigrants, business people, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, *coyotes* (nickname for human smugglers), drug smugglers, and tourists may be in the same space viewing the fence, but they have vastly different horizons on what the fence means. Since the security fence is a piece of architecture with communication implications, there are some questions to consider in researching it. Who is building the wall and why? How does the location of the fence architecture affect cultural and social life?

Unfortunately, Jackson (2006) criticized communication scholars for neglecting to study architecture as part of message context stating:

Architecture's presence or absence shapes and affects human interaction. Architecture is part of what is perceived in a situation. It is absorbed and interpreted and consequently affects communication....As an important part of the environment, architecture plays a role in the conditions of communication which take place around, against, near, or inside the build form. Architecture is perceived through the senses – visual, auditory, touch, smell, and kinesthetic. Architecture is everywhere people live. (p. 34)

Jackson (2006) was particularly critical on non-verbal communication textbooks (Knapp & Hall, 2002; Richmond & McCroskey, 2004) since non-verbal scholars claimed that physical context was important, but provided very little guidance on architecture, which is a main non-verbal characteristic of a message. Jackson also

criticized rhetorical scholars explaining, “traditionally, rhetoricians focus on analysis and criticism of speeches and language based texts....Because architecture provides physical context for communication interaction, the need to understand its role is a crucial part of any rhetorical analysis, yet it is rarely mentioned” (p. 36). In the review of communication literature, there were two rhetorical pieces analyzing the Berlin Wall. Bruner (1989) analyzed the symbolism of the Wall. Rowland (2006) analyzed President Reagan’s speech in Berlin but failed to provide an adequate context that included the architectural or historical context that surrounded the event.

Recently, Latino communication scholars have ignored the architecture of walls that play a large role in the chronic borderland problems. The scholars do acknowledge that the U.S. government continues to militarize borders because of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but ignore further analysis of how the border architecture influences their studies. For example, DeChaine (2009) analyzed the rhetoric of alienation tactics of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) based in Arizona. The original purpose of the MCDC was to start building a privately owned border fence, but DeChaine (2009) chose not to discuss this important goal in the rhetorical analysis. Moreover, Cisneros (2014) analyzes the rhetoric of citizenship mostly for undocumented immigrants already in the states but does not include how the border wall architecture influences that discussion.

The Berlin Wall and Pre 9/11 Communication Research

Borderlands research was generally limited prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall (Stoddard, 1989). Therefore, it was not surprising to find that communication

scholarship was even more limited in the same area prior to 9/11. I conducted searches for borders and walls scholarship in academic journal databases including Communication and Mass Media Complete, Communication Abstracts, ABI/Inform, the EBSCO Collection, and JSTORE. I conducted additional queries on the National Communication Association website that houses 11 prominent communication journals. Search terms included words and phrases such as “communication scholar” “communication”, “borderlands”, “rhetoric”, “fence”, “wall”, “border”, “security”, “U.S. Mexico Border”, “Mexico”, and other project relevant combinations. These searches revealed four journal articles: a speech from the President of the World Communication Association (Auer, 1985), and three articles related to the Berlin Wall (Bruner, 1989; Passey, 1973; Rowland 2006). I found additional research in books from the fields of international, mass media, and intercultural communication studies (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 2003; Lee 2002; Miller, 2002).

Auer (1985) gave a speech about walls and their consequences for communication professionals. Auer discussed historic environmental barriers, and some famous historic walls including great mountain ranges, deserts, oceans, rivers, outer space, the Great Wall of China, and Hadrian’s Wall. Auer (1985) then highlighted three wall barriers built along borders since 1945 including the North Korea/South Korea Demilitarized Zone, the Gaza Strip, and the Berlin Wall. Auer went on to suggest that these barriers and others like them were symbolic of silence and selfishness that permeated the world in 1985. Auer (1985) then compared these physical walls with metaphorical barriers faced by intercultural communication scholars. The goal according to Auer was to fight against cultural and political barriers that scholars faced

throughout the world. Auer then proceeded to discuss how communication associations could be successful. Even though Auer (1985) had a theme on walls and even spoke about specific physical barriers, the speech was not an analytical research product.

Bruner (1989) suggests that the Berlin Wall was a political and rhetorical tool used by politicians for various symbolic reasons from 1961-1990. Bruner chose to analyze the first week of the wall in 1961, President Kennedy's speech in 1963, President Reagan's speech in 1987 and media coverage and comments by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. There was very little historic context provided throughout the article. The only justification Bruner provided for choosing these events was that more information was available on them at the time of writing. In addition, Bruner did not identify scholarly rhetorical criticism methods used to analyze the events. Rather, Bruner insisted that analyzing the wall was a continuing dialectic process thus assuming a rhetorical model was unnecessary. I derived three conclusions from Bruner's (1989) analysis. First, the wall was dynamic with changing meaning over time. Second, there are many contexts to consider when studying the symbolism of the Berlin Wall. It is not enough to discuss some brief history and then move to analysis. Third, people on both sides of the Wall had differing narratives and perspectives. Specific messages included that humans suffered, espionage and political treachery were very active regardless of the Wall's existence. For the West, the Wall was a symbol of failure to communicate. For the East, the wall was a symbol of solidarity for the collective cause of maintaining the Communist ideology. Bruner's article was very limited in the help it could provide future researches for analyzing the Berlin Wall or other modern wall barriers.

Similar to Bruner, Passey (1973) did not identify a particular theory or rhetorical criticism used to analyze the speech of West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt in 1961 just prior to the beginning of construction. Passey (1973) analyzed the audience and the international effects of Brants speech in a very general, broad way. Again, this was a criticism of a speech, where the Berlin Wall was little more than a historic backdrop, not the artifact central to the criticism even though it was because of the Wall that Brandt had to give the speech. Passey (1973) concludes that scholars could record individual responses to the speech, but in order to discuss international consequences, scholars would need to conduct much more research.

Rowland (2006) analyzed President Reagan's 1987 Speech at the Brandenburg Gate where he used the famous phrase, "tear down this wall". The criticism is about the character and persona of President Reagan, his writing staff, and his policies. The only reason the Berlin Wall is in the speech is that President Reagan chose to speak there. While there is repeated use of the line and the concept of tearing down the wall, there is no analysis on how the Berlin Wall functioned as a rhetorical tool, and there is no historical context provided for President Reagan's speech.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, some scholars, political leaders, and the media expected wall building to decline (Alvarez, 2012; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Houtum, 2012; Jones, 2012; Obama, 2013; Smith-Sivertsen, 2012). Instead, Jones (2012) indicated that from 2000-2011, countries built or heavily renovated at least 25 major wall barriers. In the U.S., the Secure Fence Act in 2006 called for a border extending across the entire Southern U.S. border. In 2010, the Mexican government contemplated building a wall on the southern border between Chiapas and Guatemala

(Valladares, 2010). Other countries currently involved in wall building include Israel, Palestine, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Spain, China, North Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Egypt (Brown 2010; Electronic Fence, 2013; Fleishman & Hassan, 2009; Nevins, 2002 & 2006; Romero, 2008).

Intercultural, international, and mass media communication scholars recognize that globalization affects communication across borders (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 2003; Lee 2002; Miller, 2002). For example, in Africa, there are between 47-53 countries with an innumerable host of ethnic groups, national governments, or quasi-national groups competing, often violently, for limited resources across the continent (Asiwaju, 1989 & 1993; Bonchuk, 2013; Donnan & Wilson, 1999). Chan and McIntyre (2002) ask how boundaries, increasingly rising out of globalization, affect nation states, cultures, and identities. Through communication, humans create their identity and culture, so it is imperative that communication scholars investigate these concerns. Gitlin (2002) criticizes the Hollywood film and TV industry for exporting American culture to other countries resulting in the destruction of their own cultures. Kramer (2003) argues that “global cities” are rapidly increasing their populations, depleting natural resources, and creating a monoculture that destroys indigenous languages and cultures. Miller (2002) examines the consequences of globalization and sovereignty on the film industry. Lee (2002) analyzes the theory of acculturation recognizing that even when you cross a border, your culture continues with you. We adopt new values and add them to what we already have. Although Chan

& McIntyre (2002) encourage communication research, the effects of wall building on communication is largely still absent in the literature.

Chan & McIntyre (2002) explain that one of the complexities of dealing with this subject is that "boundaries can be tangible, visible, spatial, and physical as in the case of territorial borders, or intangible, invisible, temporal and virtual, as in the case of social categorization and symbolic representation" (p. xv). In the case of South Africa, the apartheid ideology was intangible but colonial leaders and later political leaders used laws to make the walls of racism visible for almost three centuries. The USMX border fence has both visible, tangible, purposes as well as intangible consequences. With every fence scholars study, there are going to be multifaceted perspectives to review on each side of the fence.

Chan and McIntyre (2002) propose examining narratives through discourse analysis to comprehend how boundaries affect identity. Discourse is a part of power structures so the discourse about boundaries is a sociopolitical act worth examining. Their research focuses on how even in a globalizing world, the discourse of national identity is still a relevant discussion. Other interdisciplinary research (Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Nevins, 2002) demonstrates that the discourse of nationalism is critical for garnering support to build and maintain the USMX security fence. Wall building continues despite all criticism against it.

Communication Research after the September 2001 Terrorist Attacks

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. created a fundamental change in how governments, the public, and borderlands scholars

comprehend border security (Brown, 2010; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Dunn, 2009; Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2006; Romero, 2008). I conducted searches for communication research from 2000-2014 that accounts for the new national security culture. I used the same search terms, databases, books, and other resources that I used in the previous inquiry prior to 2000. Search terms included “communication scholar”, “communication”, “borderlands”, “rhetoric”, “fence”, “wall”, “border”, “security”, “U.S. Mexico Border”, “Mexico”, and other project relevant combinations. Communication scholarship is still limited, rarely accounting for the security culture or wall building, and its influences on communication.

Rodriguez (2008) called for a greater focus on border research in the National Communication Association's (NCA) Newsletter, *Communications Currents*. Rodriguez (2008) asked a timely question:

What is the value of devices.... that limit and even end communication between different peoples--especially in our....multicultural world where our distances and spaces are collapsing and pushing us to reckon with all manner of diversity?.... what is ultimately the usefulness of walls and fences in an increasingly plural, global, and multicultural world? (p. 1)

Despite the 2008 call, communication research is limited. Mass Communication scholars concentrated on the USMX wall, and the Israel security wall by developing alternative perspectives from the Palestinian and Mexican viewpoints (Bars & Renterghen, 2004; Carroll, 2006; Martinez, 2004; McGreal, 2004, 2011; Rodriguez Escobar 2010). Health Communication scholars research how community networks disseminate medical information to immigrants (Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 2009). Environmental Communication research is interested in balancing human rights with

conservation efforts (Shellabarger, Peterson, Sills, & Cabbage, 2012). Rhetorical studies and Latino Communication scholars emphasize that the government should recognize that many undocumented immigrants are citizens. These scholars study various forms of citizenship, the national identity, and immigration social movements (Cisneros, 2012, 2014; Flores, 2003; DeChaine, 2009, 2012; Klipp, 2011). Other communication research analyzes the overzealous role of some U.S. citizens who act as vigilante police at the border. These groups, often referred to as militia groups, do not believe the U.S. government is doing enough to stop illegal immigrants or other criminals from entering the U.S. illegally (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and McHendry, 2012). At the Association for Borderland Studies 2011 Quebec conference entitled, "Fences, Walls, and Borders State of Insecurity", there were only three presentations by communication scholars in journalism, and a fourth presentation about communication technology crossing/ignoring borders. There were 71 presenters at the conference, so the fact that only four presenters even touched on walls is significant. Finally, Chavez and Salmon (2010) draw attention to the fact that areas such as international and intercultural communication have much to offer when discussing border communication, especially when it comes to increasing border technology. Communication scholarship is still noticeably absent from the borderlands research. This dissertation contributes to the academic fields of Communication and Borderland studies.

The Israel Security Fence is not of primary concern in this project but a large body of interdisciplinary literature makes comparisons between the Israeli and USMX walls. Bars and Renterghen (2004) describe the dichotomy between what Israel defines

as a security fence, and Palestine argues is an apartheid wall. It is a glaring example of how border walls create a binary opposition with diverging perspectives on either side. Israel unilaterally built the fence in 2002 to protect its people from Palestinian suicide bombings that occurred from 1993-2004 (Bars & Renterghen, 2004; Yom & Saleh, 2004). On the Palestine side, the wall literally divides villages and families. Bars and Renterghen (2004) explain that the village of Kaffin in the West Bank separates farmers from their olive groves and fields. McGreal (2003) describes one family experience:

From the backyard, Khadija Bdarat can point out the roof of her children's school a few hundred metres up the hill in the Palestinian village of Ras. The problem is how to get there. In the way stands Israel's 'security fence', which runs across the back of the Bdarats' home, cutting it off from the village. When the motion detectors are switched on and the latest section of the fence is declared operational on Friday, the house will fall inside a 'closed military zone'. After that, the Bdarats' adult children will need a permit to visit their parents, and at night the family will be under curfew and not allowed to use the only road from the house. (p. 10)

This experience is the norm across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the U.S., there are cities, families, businesses, and friends along the USMX border that face similar issues (McGreal, 2011). However, due to the much longer history, conflict, and limited geography in the Israel/Palestine region, broad comparisons of the two walls are difficult to assess.

Journalism Literature

Journalism scholars (Martinez, 2004; Carroll, 2006) share opinion pieces regarding the history of violence at the USMX border fence. Martinez (2004) explains that in 1848 the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo designated the Rio Grande as the boundary between the U.S. and Mexico. Prior to the September 2001 terrorist attacks,

people moved across both sides of the border without problems. In the new security culture, the Border Patrol clamped down on immigration because "presumably, Al-Qaida was about to smuggle dirty bombs across the Rio Grande" (Martinez, 2004, p. 49). Martinez (2004) argues that U.S. citizens are the problem since they do not see the wall from the side of the developing nation of Mexico. U.S. citizens are tourists that like to visit the border to get a quality view of the "other", but then return to their safe homes to be separate from it. Conversely, Martinez (2004) states, "from the migrant point of view, borders are permeable rather than solid, moving rather than fixed; politically expedient rather than morally imperative" (p. 50). According to Martinez, American citizens rely on the "Great Wall of America" to protect the country from terrorists or perceived threats such as undocumented immigrants. Martinez (2004) concludes that the border fence is an obvious failure that contributes to human deaths since people have to find other places to cross such as dangerous geographical terrain or travel with Coyotes often at a higher price. Even while complaining about the U.S. border, Valladares (2010) explains that the Mexican government is considering building their own security wall along the border with Guatemala. The Mexican government argues that the Southern wall is necessary to stop the rising violence from gangs, increasing narcotics smuggling, and migrants from several countries in Central and South America who want to reach the U.S. by crossing through Mexico (Valladares, 2010).

Carroll (2006) is a journalist writing stories of immigrants who die on the border. Carroll explains that writing these stories can be difficult for several reasons. The stories require great cooperation from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Agents, and the Mexican government and/or people. Readers sometimes consider the

stories overly sympathetic to immigrants who break the law to get into the states. The numbers of undocumented immigrant deaths was not fully recorded by the CBP until 1998-1999 fiscal years so the true number of deaths is likely much higher than reported (Carroll, 2006; No More Deaths, 2014). Carroll (2006) concludes that with the rising interest in immigration and border control throughout the late 1990s, it has become easier to share the economic story driving the massive migration movement. There is no further context or references to wall building in the article.

The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) statistics (USBP Profile, 2013) revealed that in 2013, 445 people died in the nine Southwest Sectors that span from California to Texas. Alternatively, there were NO deaths recorded along the Coastal Sector (Miami, New Orleans, Ramey) or the Northern Sectors (eight sections that include the entire Canadian border). According to the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson Ministry “No More Deaths – No Mas Muertes” (No More Deaths, 2014), there were 2666 deaths in Arizona from 2000 to 2013. No More Deaths Ministry explains that an estimated 5000 to 6000 people died crossing the USMX border over the same 13-year period depending on which private or public agency is recording the statistics. No More Deaths Ministry (2014) highlights a major problem in collecting, analyzing, and publicizing an accurate number of people who have died:

When large numbers of people are dying in remote wilderness conditions, the number of bodies recovered gives an indication, but only an indication, of the true loss of life. No one knows how many are not found. Moreover, many that are found are not identified. A complete list of people who have died while crossing the border does not exist. (§ 5)

No More Deaths Ministry has the same problem as other organizations and academics who are trying to conduct borderlands research. Undocumented immigrants who cross

the border are unable or unwilling to share their experiences due to fear of reprisal from the U.S. law enforcement agencies or their own governments. If returned to their country of origin, immigrants could face any number of dire consequences (Coleman, 2008; Coplan, 2010; Ettinger, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Ruben Garcia, personal communication, November 9, 2013; Graham, 1991; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011a; Martinez, 1989; Massey, 1981; North, 1987; Petition for Mexican Nationals, 2014; USMX IRB, 2010; Rivera-Batiz, 2000).

Environmental and Health Communication

Scholars in health and environmental communication studies also recognize that collecting data can be a precarious process due to similar fears with their “marginalized” target population. Ford, Crabtree, and Hubbell (2009) analyze how friends use communication networks to disseminate important health messages to communities. Although the research team worked in border cities, they did not make any connections to the security fence, and the target population was limited to only people on the U.S. side of the border. There was no exploration about expanding the study to the Mexican side of the border. Ford et al. (2009) found that community networks are essential when disseminating health information to the marginalized borderland peoples. However, before the researchers could gather information, they had to work with the target communities for several years before receiving the trust of the people.

Environmental communication scholars Shellabarger et al. (2012) discuss conservation efforts, protecting human rights and perceived law enforcement abuses

across the borderlands. Shellabarger et al. (2012) note that communication scholarship related to borderlands issues is still rare as recently as 2012. The research efforts did not discuss fence building, but rather community interactions with ecological concerns. Shellabarger et al. (2012) indicate that environmental degradation is increasing since security fences force immigrants to cross the border in more dangerous geographical locations. This has also upset the relationship some cultures such as the O'odham have with their environment. Shellabarger et al. (2012) also suggested that the government appears to care more about the national security narrative than local opinions from community members and leaders.

Latino Communication Scholarship

The Latino communication scholar's body of research is primarily concerned with events that take place after people are already living in the U.S. My research differs in the fact that it is dealing with communication functions of the physical fence line at the USMX border. Latino scholars discuss the rhetoric of citizenship, immigration reform, racism, feminism, and nationalism discourse (Cisneros, 2011, 2012, 2014; Holling & Calafell, 2011; DeChaine, 2012). A handful of Latino communication scholars also examine vigilante groups who patrol the borderlands in lieu of government agents that have failed to protect the U.S. (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and McHendry, 2012).

DeChaine (2012), Cisneros (2011, 2012, 2014), and Holling and Calafell (2011) examine immigrant involvement in civic engagement practices regardless of whether they are formally recognized by other citizens or the U.S. government. Cisneros (2014)

briefly acknowledges that physical borders and the laws create the status that distinguishes aliens from citizens. However, regardless of their status, Cisneros's (2011) research finds that many 'aliens' are highly patriotic because they consider themselves citizens already no matter how the government branded them. Cisneros argues that the discourse of citizenship matters more than how a nation legally and institutionally defines what a citizen should be. Cisneros (2011) theorizes:

Civic belonging is [conceptualized].... in individual and group performances of citizenship. Individuals enact citizenship [by]....consuming information, displaying the flag, engaging in public discussions, participating in public ceremonies, demonstrating, and even voting....Viewing citizenship as performance entails shifting focus from the [institutional] category of citizen....to the individual and situated articulation of citizenship. (p. 30).

Cisneros (2014) further confirms that language and actions communicate citizenship well beyond how laws or institutions define it. The argument focuses on figurative and rhetorical borders of people living around the U.S. while choosing to exclude a discussion of the critical influences that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have on citizenship discourse. Similarly, Holling and Calafell (2011) offer a collection of essays examining rhetoric of Latino communities, but do not discuss the influential effects of wall building. Holling and Calafell (2011) explain, "Latin@ vernacular discourse' refers to Latin@s' self-produced texts and performances that interact with and against the prevailing discourses about and/or concerning Latin@s" (p. xvii). Like other communication research, Latino scholars are not researching wall building. Rather, they emphasize studying the rhetorical practices of people. Although there is some overlap particularly in alienation discourse, Latino communication research rarely examines borderland issues even though there have been more calls to do so.

Rhetoric of Border Vigilante Groups

A few communication scholars examine extremist vigilante groups who patrol the borderlands in lieu of government agents who fail to protect the U.S. border (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and McHendry, 2012). DeChaine (2009), and Hasian and McHendry (2012) explore the rhetoric of two popular vigilante groups: The Minutemen Project in California led by Jim Gilchrist; and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) formed by Chris Simcox. According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2005), the two projects joined forces in Arizona in 2005 to bring attention to the issue of illegal immigration. Over 1000 volunteers came to Arizona including several White Supremacist groups like the neo-Nazi National Alliance. The ADL (2005) notes that, “Before the project began, National Alliance fliers, describing illegal immigration as an “invasion” that will cause white people to be “a minority within the next 50 years,” were circulated in several communities along the Arizona border” (¶ 6). The ADL (2006) describe that the 2005 movement mainly focused on people of Hispanic descent but emphasized that all illegal immigrants are criminals. The ADL (2006) states: “More than 400 anti-immigration activists gathered at the event to hear speakers describe illegal immigrants as “the enemy within” and “illegal barbarians,” while suggesting that America was “at war” with illegal immigrants and urging people to “take America back” (p. 14). The ADL (2006) further describes how several anti-immigration groups racially profiled Latino or Hispanic people, and how the vigilante rhetoric became increasingly confrontational and violent.

Hasian & McHendry (2012) explain that this rhetoric brought attention to the illegal immigration issue and the vigilante groups. For example, by the end of 2005, the

Minuteman Project was mentioned in at least 1700 national media stories, praised by some congressional leaders, and was highlighted in several popular prime time television shows including *Law and Order*, and *The West Wing*. At its peak, the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) claimed to have more than 350,000 private American Citizens helping build a private fence in Arizona (DeChaine, 2009). DeChaine (2009) argues that the MCDC built a wall because "[Walls] perform both division and containment functions, differentiating the self from others, one culture from another, desirable elements from undesirable ones, and, often enough, "us" from "them" (p. 44-45). Brown (2011) explains that the MCDC membership numbers are vastly inflated, noting that there are 40,000 members in 76 chapters. Beirich (2014), with the Southern Poverty Law Center reports that there are 173 anti-immigrant chapters scattered across the country, including several White Supremacist and other extremist groups.

Communication Research Summary

In the review of communication literature, first, I discussed the influence of architecture on a message. Second, I examined rhetorical criticism research about the Berlin Wall and noted a lack of research on the subject of international wall building. Finally, I argued that communication scholars made limited contributions to borderlands research from 2001-2014. Few studies, including those in the Latino communication scholarship emphasize wall building or the new security culture that resulted out of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Social Science Research

In other fields, scholars recognized the importance of borderlands research, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007). In the 1980's, Asiwaju (1983) pioneered comparative borders research in Africa and Europe. Anzaldúa's (1987) graphic description of the USMX border was a rallying cry for scholars to pay more attention to consequences of the borderlands, border fence culture. In the 1990's, the collapse of the Soviet Empire led to the rise of 20 sovereign states with many new borders and questions of national identity (Brubaker, 1994). Other notable events also caused major geopolitical shifts that created new countries with new borders (Newman & Paasi, 1998; O'Tuathail, 1996). Some of these events included include the dissolution of Yugoslavia; the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans; the first Gulf War in the Middle East; the formation of the European Union (EU); and the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Newman & Paasi, 1998). By the end of the 1990's, Donnan and Wilson (1999) explained that there were 185 United Nations members and 313 shared borders. Joining world organizations did not stop countries from building new walls to keep neighbors out or to keep their own citizens in. Beyond the communication studies, four areas of the social science research are most relevant to this dissertation. First, I examine the history, current state, and limitations of Borderlands research. Second, I review definitions used by various academic disciplines that conduct Borderlands research. Third, I present geopolitical concepts that have an important symbolic role in developing and sustaining state border walls. Fourth, I examine the relationship between landscapes, visual rhetoric, and Borderlands research.

History, Development, and Limitations of Borderlands Research

Borderlands research is still a relatively new academic field internationally, not taking off until after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007). Previously, borders research fell into other categories such as history (Baud & van Schendal, 1997; Sibling, 1994), geography (Martinez, 1989; Newman & Paasi, 1998; O'Tuathail, 1996, O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992), anthropology (Alvarez, 1995; Donnan & Wilson, 1999), sociology (Coplan, 2010; Stoddard, 1989), international relations (Brubaker, 1994) and comparative international studies (Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Strassoldo, 1989). Social science scholars in these fields recognized the deficiency, and began to focus more directly on the borders themselves as a social and cultural actor, rather than a traditional object of state power. They called for more scholarship in this area to include theory, empirical and/or qualitative methods, and international, cross comparative research.

Stoddard (1989), the first president of *The Association for Borderlands Studies* (ABS), briefly described this history of the field. Borderlands research originated in the 1920's when the fields of agriculture, sociology, and anthropology came together to discuss the USMX border (Martinez, 1989). Stoddard (1989) described that during the Great Depression, scholars conducted some research in border towns, but the borders themselves were not a major variable affecting the research. From the 1940's through the 1970's borderlands research became more practically oriented rather than historic or theoretical. Scholars introduced an international model identifying the border as a transnational geopolitical problem that federal governments should work out. Stoddard

(1989) explained that the border was a dysfunctional barrier to the US and Mexico due to immense movement or "leakage" from both sides.

In 1954, Michigan State University brought together scholars from several disciplines and combined their borders research into a single report on border activities, which started to legitimize scientific research on borders (Stoddard, 1989). After Stoddard updated the work from the Michigan State study, the ABS formed, issuing the first journal in 1986. The geopolitical international border model was too ideologically rigid so scholars abandoned it in the 1970's for what Stoddard (1989) suggested was a more functional view of the border that has become the central concept in borderlands studies. A functional model was more capable in accounting for social variables such as cultural relationships, local conditions, and the dynamic movement constantly happening in the borderlands (Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Brunet-Jailly, 2007; Baud & van Schendal, 1997; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Newman & Paasi, 1998; & Stoddard, 1989).

Borderlands Research Development in Africa and Europe

Scholars in African nations and throughout Europe became part of the Association of Borderland Studies (ABS) movement, recognizing their border problems were similar to the USMX border issues (Stoddard, 1989). O'Tuathail (1996) argued that social science scholars conducted borders research using an outdated geopolitical, ideological definition. Asiwaju (1989, 1993) explained that this static demarcation resulted in one-sided, internal, nationalistic analysis and policy. Major-General Magoro of Nigeria (1985) explained that African borders had unique problems due to how they were artificially 'carved up' by European imperialist powers. Magoro argued that this

colonialist history caused innumerable border conflicts due to rivaling ethnic groups and economic tensions between competing African nations. Asiwaju (1993) pointed out that most of the legal instruments used to carve out territories by colonizing European powers continued to have legal force even into the 1990's.

Instead of static outdated ideological frameworks, Asiwaju (1989, 1993) urged scholars to embrace a functional view of borderlands research. Whether viewing from a national or a local functional perspective, Asiwaju argued that researchers could discuss social networks, cultural circumstances, socioeconomics, government controlled areas, and many types of immigration policies. Borderlands scholars started describing borders more as buffer zones than firm demarcations because there was no way to delineate a boundary line between most nations and ethnic cultures (Asiwaju, 1989; Anzaldúa, 1987; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Newman and Paasi, 1998). Asiwaju noted that the USMX border was a model for conducting cross comparison research. Coplan (2010), Nevins (2002, 2006, 2012) and Spencer (2009) expanded on Asiwaju's efforts by comparing the USMX border to the South Africa and Lesotho borders, and apartheid, illustrating that such research was not only possible, but necessary to better understand how borders function on a sociocultural level.

In reviewing the state of borders research throughout Europe, Strassoldo (1989) noted the similar problems found by Asiwaju and Stoddard. If borders were part of research at all, the focus was traditionally regional interpretive, descriptive research with no cross comparisons to other European nations or elsewhere. Strassoldo (1989) explained that the European border studies research faced similar concerns as African nations including ethnic divides and large socioeconomic gaps. This was especially true

when one country is richer/poorer than the other countries with which it shares borders, cultural differences, and environmental degradation. Strassoldo (1989) also explained that federal entities had geopolitical motives in conducting research. This motive made the research biased or unusable. Moreover, European nations claimed to display openness in their borders but all political power still resided in central governments. Interestingly, Luxemburg, Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands signed the Schengen Framework in 1985 that allowed for open borders between those countries, but the Schengen agreement was not actually implemented until 1995 due to the fall of the Berlin Wall as well as many internal government bureaucratic problems (Boer, 2011).

Challenges & Limits in Borderlands Research

Borderlands research has grown despite some academic, government, and legal hurdles that burden the discipline. These are particularly relevant to this dissertation topic since they required me to alter my research plan in two proposals and the final product. The problems severely limited my ability to use some qualitative research methods including interviewing and ethnography. Overcoming academic, government, and legal barriers to find and utilize the best information sources will open up paths for new research. Communication will play a vital role in overcoming institutional challenges that face Borderlands Studies scholars. The following section summarizes some of the barriers Borderlands scholars must overcome:

First, collecting accurate information through direct interviews and ethnography is difficult for a variety of reasons. For this dissertation, the Institutional Research

Board (IRB) at the University of Oklahoma highlighted multiple concerns about collecting information (University of Oklahoma IRB, personal communication, February 10, 2010). First, they argued that government officials could be at risk of losing their jobs or facing sanctions for sharing their opinions without formal permission from their agencies. Second, the IRB argued that interviewing undocumented immigrants who were in the U.S. illegally could result in their deportation or other consequences. Third, the IRB was concerned that law enforcement officials could subpoena my collected information to use against undocumented immigrants. Other scholars conducting similar Borderlands research have had mixed results in the kinds of information they collected, and what other IRB's allowed scholars to do, so institutional constraints are not a new phenomenon (Coleman, 2008; Coplan, 2010; Ettinger, 2009; Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 2009; Graham, 1991; USMX IRB, 2010; Martinez, 1989; Maril, 2011; Massey, 1981; No More Deaths, 2014; North, 1987; Rivera-Batiz, 2000).

The U.S. Mexico Border Health Commission in 2009 and 2010 found other concerns when dealing with their respective IRB's. The commission conducted a survey about IRB's to faculty members, practitioners, and staff members of medical institutions who conducted borderlands research. Interviewees concluded that finding Mexican university IRB's was more difficult than working with their U.S. counterparts. Furthermore, interviews suggested that IRB's informed consent policies were not culturally sensitive. In some cultures, signing a document where people distrust their governments or another institution could be problematic. The survey interviewees suggested that a voice recording of consent to participate might actually make people feel more comfortable than signing a written consent form. The survey concluded that

fixing some of the transnational IRB issues could lead to more productive, safe, social research (USMX IRB, 2010).

Borderlands scholars found a second constraint to effective research. They note that obtaining institutional access (governments, private corporations, university administrations, etc.) or government funding was very difficult. Sometimes the interdisciplinary nature of the work required the approval of two states (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Martinez, 1989). Donnan and Wilson (1999) pointed out that the national security concerns of governments are a normal part of the research process. In some cases, private corporations or universities are very restrictive in their regulations of social science projects they perceived as not being beneficial to their public image (Maril, 2011a, 2011b; University of Oklahoma IRB, personal communication, February 10, 2010). In some cases, Donnan and Wilson (1999) found that walls are such a normal part of society that some institutions do not consider them an artifact worthy of academic study. ST (Giddens, 1984; 1993) criticizes this kind of ignorance arguing that these type of entrenched social roles should be at the center of our social science research. This was especially true when considering the act of ignoring border walls means ignoring a very real, visible, sometimes violent, symbol of state power and social control.

Dr. Maril (2011b), an expert with 17 years' experience in borderlands research, shared his concerns regarding institutional access. In 1999, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) patrol agents were taking classes with Dr. Maril. The agents invited Maril to visit the border on an intimate basis. INS administrative concerns blocked Maril from obtaining approval for the work at that time (Maril,

2011b). It took five years for Maril to obtain the necessary permissions to work with the INS agents, or, the newly named Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents after September 2001. In 2004, Maril (2011b) finally conducted interviews, was a participant observer, and started collecting data for ethnographic descriptions. Maril (2011b) worked with CBP for two years which gave him access to exclusive, unique, government documents going back to the 1990's. Maril could not recall another social scientist obtaining access to so many institutional materials. Prior to 9/11, several scholars recorded there were no concerns when they met regularly with government officials or immigrants (Dunn, 2009; Hagan & Baker, 1993; Heyman, 2000; Nevins, 2002).

Furthermore, Maril explained that in the post 9/11 period, in order to obtain government documents related to the USMX border and related projects, a scholar must obtain information through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Even with FOIA requests, Maril (2011b) noted that the government was more secretive about documents and finances related to the Security Fence between 2004 and 2011 than they were prior to the 9/11 attacks. In some cases, agencies may deny requests based on national security or privacy concerns. Alternatively, private for profit corporations have no obligation to share any information with the public, and would not provide information that could damage their profits. Maril (2011) explained that Boeing would not release any information about the costs of the security fence they built for the Department of Homeland Security.

A third challenge to conducting borderlands research is that many of the available studies treat both sides border issues fairly. This could be due to the scope of a

project in focusing exclusively on one side of a border (Coplan, 2010). Further inequities occur with the lack of language capacity, knowledge of one or both nations under examination, or geographical limitations (Martinez, 1989). Martinez (1989) states that parochialism and ethnocentrism taint research when only one side of the border receives representation.

A fourth challenge in borderlands research is that scholars find it difficult to procure primary source materials. Along the USMX border, Martinez (1989) argues that there is an awkward power relationship between the U.S. "First World" nation next to Mexico, a "Third World" nation. Along the USMX border, Martinez (1989) argues that the U.S. side has plenty of academic rigor with the ability to find scholarly research and primary sources. On the Mexican side, Martinez notes that there is a lack of support for academic research at the border, but some better sources may be found in Mexico City where more funding for universities is available. In cross border comparisons between South Africa and Lesotho, Coplan (2010) explains that Lesotho has more immediate economic concerns to face and likely does not have resources to put towards academic rigor that South Africa does.

A fifth challenge facing borderlands research is that mapping data is often inaccurate, and if requested, does not have a uniform, comparable format for analysis. Typically, two nations at the border do not cooperate/coordinate in collecting and making demographic, topographical, or geographical data generally available due to many more immediate social concerns (Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Martinez, 1989).

A sixth difficult for borderlands scholars is a lack of cross comparison data between U.S. and Mexico cities, and an even larger gap in the comparative data

between other international borders. Although there have been calls for more of this type of research, it is an ongoing effort (Asiwaju, 1989; Coplan, 2010; Martinez, 1989). Despite interdisciplinary cooperation on scholarship across the international community, Borderlands Studies face a lack of support in critical areas. Due to the six difficulties facing borderlands research, it is becoming increasingly difficult to collect the best possible ethnographic data or conduct interviews for the most accurate, quality data. Although these difficulties exist, somewhat limiting the data collection in this type of dissertation, they also open up new possible avenues for future research.

Definitions in Borderlands Research

Many definitions and characteristics of 'border', 'boundary', 'borderlands', and 'frontier' open up a broad list of research options and interpretations including a path for communication scholarship. The borderlands body of literature indicates that they are highly dynamic, demographically diverse, sociocultural areas. (Astor, 2009; Alvarez, 1995; Anzaldúa, 1987; Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Baud & van Schendal, 1997; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Cisneros, 2014; Coplan, 2010; Darder, 2004; DeChaine, 2012; DeGenova, 2002, 2004; Donnan & Wilson 1999; Dunn, 2009; Holling & Calafell, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Ono, 2012; Romero, 2008; Rosas 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Sanchez, 2011; Sibler, 1995; Spencer, 2009)

Borderlands are made up of local, national, and global networks that compete for limited resources and conflicting needs. International and national laws have ever-expanding definitions for what constitutes a border. Borders are not only physical manifestations of communication and/or power, but they are also used increasingly as

metaphors for other social issues, which further expand their definitions. This dissertation will limit the focus of walls to the case study of South Africa apartheid and the USMX border security fence.

In the history literature, Baud and van Schendal (1997) explain that one complexity of these words comes from the etymology and resulting dissimilar connotations of the word 'frontier' in English, French, and Spanish. Another problem of interpretation arises when there are conceptual differences between government policy makers and local cultures. Baud and van Schendal (1997) explain that in history literature, the word boundary is used in political and diplomatic contexts to identify a dividing line between peoples; border is used when discussing psychological issues and regional emphasis; and frontier is preferred to discuss ungoverned regions of territory. The reality is that there are huge overlaps between these three terms.

In geography, Newman and Paasi (1998) explain that, "geographers....understand boundaries as expressions or manifestations of the *territoriality of states*....because geographic processes of socialization have taught us to acknowledge the state system within which we live - a spatial system which is characterized by more or less exclusive boundaries" (p. 187). Newman and Paasi emphasized that geography and landscape research focus on how nation states communicate within and across geopolitical boundaries. They recognize that borders are much more than a physical location. Rather, borders are highly social, dynamic, culturally diverse domains. The changing definition of borders in geography generated new research in geopolitics, cultural geography, and landscape studies.

From an anthropological perspective, Donnan and Wilson (1999) argue that scholars should be most concerned with how nation states or individuals use borders symbolically to create and maintain their identities. The borderlands provide an example where local and nation state identities clash. Donnan and Wilson (1999) clarify that developments in the borderlands are one way to "demonstrate the importance of culture in the mapping out of the progress of nations and states in the modern and postmodern worlds" (p. 13). Borderlands peoples constantly re-negotiate identities between living in local, national, and international cultures, so scholars should focus research efforts there. Finally, Donnan and Wilson (1999) conclude that interpretive methods are preferable so scholars can develop the historical and cultural construction of nations.

According to Alvarez (1995), the US-Mexico border is the icon and model for this kind of identity, culture, and community research, but more specifically, it is a useful model for conducting research on marginalized peoples for two reasons. First, it is the best example of a nation state using politics to regulate and constrict people where there should be a natural flow between two nations. Second, Alvarez contends that nowhere else in the world do we find a border with a more glaring example of the inequality between "First World" and "Third World" nations on so many levels. Alvarez (1995) further describes why the US-Mexico border is a unique model for research by stating:

The complexity and problems inherent in such a paradox go beyond everyday nation-state negotiations. This paradox reaches into the most local of contexts and affects the everyday life of border folk.... The massive exchange of commodities, both human and material, dramatically affects life and behavior....as does the continuous shifting and reconfiguration of people, ethnicity, sexual orientation and identity, and economic hierarchy and

subordination....Given the differing political economies and a history of conquest and domination, the Mexican-US border is the best example of how nation-states negotiate, marginalize, and influence people's ever-shifting local behavior....Indians, *fronterizos*, *nortehos*, Chicanos, Chicanas, Mexican Americans, Mexican(o)s, Anglos, Tejanos, *gringos* *and *agringados*, Texans, green carders, *pachucos*, *cholos*, commuters, and others represent distinct historical backgrounds and cultural behaviors. (p. 451)

Interdisciplinary critical scholars prefer a more vivid definition of the borderlands. The Chicano Studies critical scholar Anzaldúa (1987) offers a critical way to theorize life in the borderlands. In her youth, Anzaldúa was a woman of color trapped between the Mexican and U.S. racist, sexist borderlands culture. In order to take back her voice, Anzaldúa became a powerful writer and scholar. Anzaldúa (1987) explains, "I will no longer be made to feel ashamed of existing. I will have my voice: Indian, Spanish, White. I will have my serpent's tongue-my woman's voice, my sexual voice, my poet's voice. I will overcome the tradition of silence" (p. 59). As part of her voice, Anzaldúa (1987) outlines her definition of the borderlands:

A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. *Los atravesados* live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead; in short those who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the "normal." Gringos in the U.S. Southwest consider the inhabitants of the borderlands transgressors, aliens – whether they possess documents or not, whether they are Chicanos, Indians or Blacks. Do not enter, trespassers will be raped, maimed, strangled, gassed, shot. The only "legitimate" inhabitants are those in power, the whites and those who align themselves with whites. Tensions grip the inhabitants of the borderlands like a virus. Ambivalence and unrest reside there and death is no stranger. (p. 3-4)

Anzaldúa (1987) further describes that borderlands are physical, psychological, sexual, and spiritual. Moreover, borderlands exist wherever cultures, races, and classes occupy the same space. Other interdisciplinary critical scholars use Anzaldúa's definition to criticize U.S. immigration policy and provide a voice for millions of undocumented

immigrants and legal permanent residents who live in the U.S. (Anzaldúa, 1987; Cisneros, 2014; DeChaine, 2012; Holling & Calafell, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Rosas, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Spencer, 2009).

Geopolitics and Borderlands Research

Nation states utilize borders as geopolitical tools for many reasons.

Governments use borders as a means of security as well as an economic tool to control the flow of people and goods between countries (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Patrick, 2007; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007). Borders exclude people (Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003; Brown, 2010; Bruner, 1989; Dunn, 2009; Heyman, 2004; Jones, 2012; Nevins 2002, 2012; Spencer, 2009). Borders represent nationalistic propaganda (Brown, 2010; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Gulasekaram, 2012; Pickles, 1992). Borders are an identity marker limiting where sovereignty and citizenship begin/end (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). Borders create a dichotomy between “us” and “them”; between the welcome, and "the other" (Anzaldúa, 1987; Bars and Renterghen, 2004; Jones, 2012; Nevins, 2012; O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Spencer, 2009).

Governments have used several geopolitical justifications to build security fences across international borders. Bars and Renterghen (2004) explain that the state of Israel justified wall building to stop terrorist suicide bombings. Malaysia and Thailand agreed to build a fence line to reduce human, drug, and firearms smuggling (Electronic Fence, 2013). Both India and the U.S. justified building fences to stop terrorists from illegally entering their countries (Jones, 2012). Generally, the U.S. government cites terrorism as the primary geopolitical justification for wall building in the Southwest.

However, throughout the literature review, others argue that true purpose is to curtail the stem of illegal immigration. Furthermore, scholars argue that security fences are far more damaging to millions of people compared to their minimal law enforcement or national security success. People from other countries see a better life in the U.S. so they want to move here. The U.S. built walls to send a message to the governments and people of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, El Salvador, and elsewhere that their people should not attempt to cross the U.S. border. The message is DO NOT ENTER; trying to do so illegally results in dire consequences. Security walls and fences are profound geopolitical symbols that “determine who and what is granted legitimate territorial access” (Andreas, 2003, p.78.). In order to analyze security walls, it is essential to discuss some scholarly literature dealing with basic geopolitical principles. It is important to point out that geopolitics scholars rely mostly on historical analysis to conduct their work. They rarely discuss theory or outline their methods of research. This historical type analysis is semiotic and hermeneutic in nature, whether they acknowledge that or not. My dissertation using similar methods can strengthen the geopolitical literature base by explicitly identifying how I conduct my analysis.

Four Principles of Geopolitics

The principles of geography are not self-evident truths. Rather, they are powerful socially constructed tools of communication used by elites for centuries to define and enforce particular identities on communities and nations (O’Tuathail, 1996; Pickles, 1992). Walls, gates, and fences are the physical manifestation of that communication. O’Tuathail (1998) outlines several historical events that fundamentally

changed the way geopolitics function. Some of these were economic globalization, wider availability of media to a global audience through better telecommunication technologies like the Internet, and an increasing number of international state and non-state actors. Brown (2010) contends that borders are becoming increasingly relative; there is a greater need than ever to listen to the interpretation of local people rather than force an artificial state centric definition on them. Many walls and fences built along borders around the world today have serious geopolitical implications that opposing sides vigorously debate, often to the point of violence (Brown, 2010; Fleishman & Hassan, 2009; Jones, 2012; Nevins, 2002, 2006, & 2012; Romero, 2008; Valladares, 2010). Furthermore, regardless of which nations or peoples are directly involved in the wall building, there are third parties interested in the consequences of the projects that affect them as well. All of the discourse about walls communicates information about the people who built them, and their relationships with others.

O'Tuathail (1996, 1998), and O'Tuathail and Agnew (1992) identify four principles redefining geopolitics to fit in what they called a postmodern academic culture. First, anyone who works with foreign policy deals with geopolitics. Foreign policy decisions do not exist in a vacuum. O'Tuathail (1996) explains, "In critically investigating the textuality of geopolitics, we are engaging not only geopolitical texts, but also the historical, geographical, technological, and social contexts within which these texts arise and gain social meaning and persuasive force" (p. 73). Certainly, there are political foreign policies made by governments, but due to increasing communication technologies and other freedoms, there are many other voices than the government who are participating in the geopolitical process (Dittmer, 2010; Dittmer &

Dodds, 2008; O'Tuathail, 1998). Cultural values and beliefs are becoming a more critical component in trying to comprehend why governments and nations run by people make a particular geopolitical decision over another. Ignoring popular geopolitical cultural values and beliefs when evaluating decisions often leads to misunderstandings with devastating consequences (Dittmer, 2010; Toal & Agnew, 2003).

Second, O'Tuathail (1996) explains that there are two groups involved in geopolitical reasoning. The first group includes all practitioners involved with the many aspects of geography. The second group are critics who question the specializing practices of the practitioners (Moisio & Paasi, 2013; Toal, 2000). In academic circles, this includes scholars from several fields previously identified in this literature review. Later in the dissertation, I highlight individuals and groups who reject how the first group tries dictates the rules for how people should think about geopolitical policies.

O'Tuathail's (1996) third principle of geopolitical reasoning suggests that local geopolitical events have larger global consequences that we must consider on a holistic scale. Although the terrorist attacks on 9/11 happened in the U.S., the consequences of those attacks had ripple effects that fundamentally altered the meaning of national security for most countries across the world. Conflicts in 2014 in several regions of the world continue to illustrate that regional events have a global influence. For example, the Syrian Civil War and the crisis with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) moved beyond the borders of Syria into Iraq and elsewhere. This movement caused several governments to form a global coalition to fight the spread of ISIL. In the ongoing Ukraine/Russia conflict, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down killing 289 innocent people who had nothing to do with the fight on the ground (Fisher, 2014). A

body of borderlands scholarship argues that due to integrated relationships, nation states must recognize how decisions affect each other (Adamson, 2006; Alvarez, 1995; Asiwaju, 1989; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Coplan, 2010; Donnan & Wilson 1999; Dunn, 2009; Holling & Calafell, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Ono, 2012; Romero, 2008; Rosas 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Sanchez, 2011; Spencer, 2009).

The influx of young immigrants to the U.S. starting in October 2013 demonstrates how clearly the actions or inactions of countries have a profound effect on each other. According to Foreman (2014), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehended more than 60,000 undocumented children since the wave started which is drastic when only about 8000 children came across in prior years. Dinan (2014) reported that the government expects to apprehend another 30,000 by the end of 2014 and over 140,000 children in 2015. Dinan also points out that these estimates do not include the thousands of people who the CBP does not catch. The reason for the huge increase is that more and more families and children are applying for refugee status due to escalating threats of violence and death in their home countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador (Agular, 2014; Dinan, 2014; Foreman, 2014). According to Paterson (2014), the violence appears to be so bad that the activist group, Mesoamerican Migrant Movement (MMM) asked the U.N. to declare a refugee crisis. Antonio Guterres, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, explained that the U.S. border situation is not unique. Guterres states that globally there are more than 50 million displaced refugees. Guterres explains, “We are seeing a growing number of minors on all routes. We see them in the Mediterranean routes, through Mexico to the U.S., we see them everywhere” (Paterson, 2014, ¶ 18). In an increasingly globalized

society, local geopolitical events are having an ever-increasing impact on a larger national and global stage.

O'Tuathail's (1996) fourth principle of geopolitical reasoning argues that *hegemonic powers* write the rules. Blommaert (2005) explained that historically, hegemonic powers were leaders or governments that maintained a dominant ideology over society. In many cases, hegemonic powers tried to stifle opposition, often using great violence to do so. Pickles (1992) identified cartography as a hegemonic practice where ruling parties used maps for propaganda purposes. By manipulating the communication process of map making, hegemonic powers gained power, property, natural resources, or other items of interest/value. Evidence of this practice will be noted when I discuss the imperial/colonial history in South Africa and Mexico later in the dissertation.

Hegemony comes in many forms including the use of political and cultural domination over others to maintain or gain control (Blommaert, 2005). Modern events such as globalization and the rapid spread of information with powerful technologies are changing how political and cultural hegemony functions. As a result, who has political, economic, or social/cultural power over a particular group or nation is also changing. In 2014, hegemonic powers exist in the form of *clandestine transnational actors* (Andreas, 2003; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Nguyen, 2006). Nguyen (2006) describes, "In national security—speak...[it is] a catchall term for undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, drug and human smugglers, potential terrorists—all those who cross borders and transgress national boundaries without state authorization" (p XIV). Donnan and Wilson (1999) describes several other clandestine

actors that have frequently navigated heavily fortified borders at the risk of death, such as refugees, soldiers, nomads, ethnic, and indigenous groups. While these groups do not have a state, they have a very real influence on larger hegemonic powers. Andreas (2003) explains that regardless of how effective deterrents are, border enforcement by hegemonic powers has continued to be a valuable symbol of state power. Even small actions such as checking documents at ports, luggage inspections, and arresting perceived “unwanted” people are all part of a larger symbolic wall the hegemonic powers have used to define who belongs and who does not.

Geopolitics and National Security

The four geopolitical principles have laid the foundation for scholars to research immigration, border control, and other national security issues (Adamson, 2006; Andreas, 2003; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Jones, 2010; Maril, 2004, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Patrick, 2007). Given how nations perceive immigrants after 9/11, it is no surprise to see scholars and practitioners becoming more concerned about the walls that attempt to control borders. In addition to terrorism, drug war concerns, and rising immigration numbers, there is also a concern that walls are becoming more technologically complex. Mumford (1934) explains that humans create technologies to expand our abilities and potentially improve ourselves. It often requires great wealth and resources for governments or corporations to create those technologies. Hegemonic powers are likely to be the controlling factor in what they determine is improvement. Hegemonic powers currently employ *smart borders* technology making them more dangerous than ever before.

What secure actually means is a highly misunderstood and widely interpreted idea in the geopolitics literature (Ackleson, 2005). Adamson (2006) explains that there are over 180 million displaced peoples worldwide and 5 to 10 million people moved across international borders in a given year. The 9/11 Commission (2004) suggested that more than 330 million noncitizens were entering the U.S. each year. The government classified more than 500,000 immigrants as *illegal aliens*, not because they crossed the border, but rather, they stayed in the country long after their work visa expired. The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Apprehension Statistics (2013) indicate that illegal immigrants represent a security threat. From 1990 to 2006, USBP apprehended over one million people per year along the entire Southwest border. Those rates dropped significantly from 2007 to 2013 to around 500,000 people apprehended per year. CBP Commission Kerlikowske (2014) argues that the decrease was because President Obama greatly increased border enforcement efforts throughout his presidency, further confirming that the government perceived immigrants as a security concern. The 2014 influx of 60,000 unaccompanied minors, with many more on the way, continues to make immigration a geopolitical security concern (Dinan, 2014; Foreman, 2014).

One of the more recent geopolitical buzz terms for border management is *smart borders*. There have never been enough law enforcement personnel (also known in the Intelligence Community as Law Enforcement Officials or 'LEO') to monitor all the borders. Smart borders were supposed to be a way to increase LEO capabilities. In the 1990's the government tried to make efficient use of remote surveillance cameras and ground sensors but their efforts were unsuccessful (Haddal, 2010; Maril, 2004, 2011; Rudolph, 2005). In the post 9/11 security conscious environment, Patrick (2007)

explained, “this technology-oriented response to securing U.S. borders against terrorist incursions includes screening, biometrics, and information technology” (p. 197). In December 2001, the U.S. and Canada signed a smart border agreement with much of the plan supporting more security fencing over other kinds of technologies (Patrick, 2007; Press Secretary, 2002). A short time later President Bush and President Fox of Mexico met and discussed a similar agreement (Bush, 2002; Romero, 2008).

By 2006, Congress and President Bush made a huge geopolitical decision by signing the Security Fence Act that provided all the federal funding and support necessary for the DHS “to achieve and maintain control over international land and maritime borders of the United States.... [preventing] all unlawful entries....by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband” (Security Fence Act, 2006, p. 2). The main purpose of the law was to build a wall to secure the 1951 miles of the Mexican border, but it was broad enough to include support for smart border provisions. Despite all the rhetoric from politicians, federal contractors, government agencies, and the American people who supported the fence, by 2010 DHS had only built 700 miles of the busiest and most dangerous parts of the border. Maril (2011) explained that most of the smart technologies associated with border management has failed, usually when LEO need them the most.

National security on the borders has been a critical geopolitical issue throughout President Obama’s tenure. Immigration policies and border enforcement were major campaign issues in the 2008 and 2012 Presidential Elections (Carter, Ellis, Hossain & McLean, 2008; Cisneros, 2014; Maril, 2011a). Despite winning 71% of the Latino vote in 2012, President Obama was unable to produce meaningful immigration reform

(Brown, Sherman, & Raju, 2012). In 2013, the Republican controlled House of Representatives rejected the bipartisan Senate “Gang of Eight” immigration reform package (O’Keefe, 2013). In 2014, the DHS and the FBI are committed to the counterterrorism and border enforcement missions (Core Missions, 2014; ‘What We Investigate, 2014). With the latest failures to pass immigration reform or help the thousands of unaccompanied minors in the U.S., immigration and border security will continue to remain salient issues for geopolitical research and scholarship.

The consequences of poor geopolitical decisions by a few elites are becoming more obvious all the time. Building walls or using smarter technologies does not deter immigrants from trying to cross the border. Nevins (2002), Sheridan (2009) and Spencer (2009) indicate that these security strategies force many immigrants to make dangerous trips in desolate areas to cross the border. Sheridan (2009) describes that if something goes wrong during the trip, immigrants are less likely to receive help because fewer CBP agents are patrolling these desolate border sections. Sheridan (2009) and Spencer (2009) explain that immigrants have to pay higher prices to Coyote smugglers which is often more dangerous than if they move across treacherous terrain alone. Therefore, one of the unintended consequences of U.S. wall building is that it helps feed corruption by letting people make a profit from the helpless and destitute. While it is true that there are those who may cross the border to engage in illegal activities, there are also many honest people with good intentions. Rivera-Batiz (2000) argues that immigrants come to find work, or join families already naturalized in the States, or contrary to what people believe, they return home to their country of origin because they do not want to be in the states permanently. Border enforcement practices are an

excellent example of using geopolitics to try to control acceptable or unwanted people. Government officials and practitioners ought to reconsider whether walls provide security. They should listen to all stakeholders to provide better border management for everyone.

Landscapes, Visual Rhetoric, and Borderlands Research

The introduction of security walls on borders permanently altered landscapes. Borderlands scholars have called for more research on specific ways that walls physically and visually affected landscapes (Amilhat Szary, 2012; Barnes & Duncan, 1991; Daniels & Cosgrove, 1988; Duncan, 1990; Sheridan, 2009; Till, 2004; Toal & Agnew, 2003). Like geopolitical decisions, landscape studies do not exist in a vacuum. Till (2004) argues that context is necessary to understand and sometimes break away from various unquestioned traditional meanings of a landscape. Till (2004) concludes, “Such an approach would look critically at the ways the landscapes reinforce and have potential to disrupt dominant categories of belonging, including categories of political community” (p. 358). As an interdisciplinary field of study, landscape literature provides many broad interpretations on what a landscape can be. Because borders and security fences serve communication functions as part of landscapes, I review some landscape literature in this part of the dissertation.

We view landscapes in media form through photographs, films, and other social media formats. No matter how we view a landscape, they represent a visual argument somewhere along a spectrum. On one end of the spectrum, there are ideological images that become iconic due to an important event. On the other end of the spectrum, images

may be arguments based on individual perspective. Scholars have employed the Hermeneutic Circle to analyze images in order to find where they fit on the argument spectrum. Hermeneutics and semiotics have helped scholars uncover important meanings of how people perceive landscapes (Barnes & Duncan, 1991; Daniels & Cosgrove, 1988, Duncan, 1990; Toal & Agnew, 2003; Thornton, 2008, 2009; Till, 2004).

Hariman & Lucaites (2003) describe that all images have some ideological basis. Whether they are immediately recognizable or more hidden is a different story. Hariman & Lucaites (2001) clarify that *iconic* images are those that have an ideology that comes from specific historical meaning. Hariman & Lucaites (2001) stated:

It is not enough to say that the photo sums up or symbolizes a historic moment....We define iconic photos as those photographic images produced in print, electronic, or digital media that are recognized by everyone, are understood to be representations of historically significant event, activate strong emotional identification or response, and are regularly reproduced across a range of media, genres, or topics. (p. 7)

Hariman & Lucaites point out examples of iconic images, including the Kent State University riot shooting picture on May 4, 1970; the explosion of the Challenger Space Shuttle on January 28, 1986; and the Chinese student dubbed “Tank Man” squaring off with a line of tanks after the Tiananmen Square massacre on June 5, 1989. There are many other recent iconic images particularly related to the concerns of this dissertation such as the images of the attacks on 9/11, many iconic photos and video images of border fences, and 2014 iconic images of undocumented minor immigrants waiting to find out their fates while being housed wherever the government can find places for them.

Semiotics and hermeneutic scholars (Barthes, 1964/1973; Ikeda & Kramer, 1998; Mitchell, 1986; Noth, 1985/1990; Saussure, 1972/1983) fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. They believe that signs are arbitrary until a community or individual gives meaning to understand the sign. Hence, even if there is some communal consensus about how to interpret a sign such as a news photo, these scholars argue that each person's interpretation of that photo will be slightly or vastly different but equally real. Researchers using hermeneutics gather as many perspectives within historic contexts as they can to gain a more holistic context for why communities and individuals may see the same picture but interpret it so differently. In other words, what one community and/or culture thinks is an icon may have no relevance to another community/culture.

Finnegan and Kane (2004) expand the image argument spectrum to include extreme ends, from the *Iconoclast* who claims that every image has meticulous and perfectly clear meaning verses the *Iconophilic* who argues there is no meaning to an image. Rather than being fanatical, Finnegan and Kane (2004) suggest listening to discourse in the public sphere, and allowing everyone to have their opinion. Moreover, Finnegan (2005) establishes a middle ground on the argument spectrum referred to as *image vernacular*. This means that images are enthymemes that allow the individual looking at the picture to fill in the argument of the picture. For example, when the Associated Press prints pictures of border fences, it is possible a person could look at those pictures and make inferences about what the fence means (Thornton, 2008, 2009). By engaging in the study of image vernacular, Finnegan (2005) concludes, "the critic avoids the extremes of either assuming that peoples responses to images are....merely

eccentric, or....an inevitable product of ideology that leaves no room for the agency of the rhetorical actors” (italics added, p. 34).

Border security walls clearly have a significant impact on the landscapes of nations. Some borderlands scholars focused on how landscapes are changing through *border art*. This is where artists use the wall barriers as canvass to share their messages whether they are political or for some other purpose (Amilhat Szary, 2012; Durazo, 2013; Fox, 1994, 1995-96; Gomez-Pena, 1991; Sheridan, 2009). Fox (1995-96) found that border art is difficult to categorize since some artists use it for political messages while others use the canvass to celebrate borderlands diversity. Curators and museums cannot appropriately categorize border art due to disagreement on “whether ‘border art’ describes art about the border, art by people living on the border, or simply art located at the border” (p.58). Sheridan (2009) and Amilhat Szary (2012) pointed out that border art became a much more poignant geopolitical phenomenon after the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) built the security wall in 1990 in the San Diego-Tijuana area. On the Tijuana side, Sheridan (2009) describes, “The border wall at Tijuana has taken on its own identity and become a community bulletin board to discuss different facets of migration” (p. 112). Nevins (2002) argues that border art is influential because it is anonymous, so anyone can feel like they can communicate about important social issues without having negative government or other repercussions. Border art is clearly an important communication function on border security walls. This is an area of borderlands research where communication scholars could contribute more to the discussion in future studies.

Chapter Three: Structuration Theory, Dimensional Dissociation & Accrual

Structuration Theory

Communication plays a central role in structuration theory (ST) but communication scholars have generally avoided the theory due to its apparent complexities and ambiguities (Banks & Riley, 1993; Heracleous, 2013; McPhee, Poole, & Iverson, 2014; Olufowote, 2003). McPhee, Poole, and Iverson (2014) found that scholars apply ST most consistently in organizational communication and systems theory contexts. Within the corporate business context, scholars study formal communication structures and climate (Howard & Geist, 1995; McPhee, 1985; Poole, 1985), labor conflicts, (Keough, 1989), political culture (Riley, 1983), small group deliberation, leadership, and complaints (Brashers 1991; Brashers & Meyers, 1989; Canary, Brossman, & Seibold, 1987; Canary, & Weger, 1989; Garner & Poole, 2009; Poole, Seibold & McPhee, 1985). Scholars also apply ST in marketing strategies and news media coverage (Jaehee & Lee, 2009; Shimp, 1976; Zhu 2000). ST has limited use in contexts beyond organizational communication. One potential criticism of ST is that Giddens (1984, 1993) provides concepts and definitions, but does not offer guidance on how such concepts may be applied. This dissertation works on those ambiguities to offer new insights on how ST may apply to other areas of communication research. In this section, I will discuss the development and core concepts of ST and present research questions relevant to the dissertation.

ST came about due to Giddens' (1993) frustration with previous ideologies including Functionalism and Structuralism that tend to focus too broadly on the entire system of human production, or very narrowly on a particular area or social

phenomenon. After a critical review of prior philosophies, Giddens (1993) concludes, “Neither school of thought is able to grapple adequately with the constitution of social life as a production of active subjects” (p. 127). Regarding the reproduction of social structure, Giddens (1993) explains:

The production of society is a skilled performance, sustained and ‘made to happen’ by human beings. It is indeed only made possible because every (competent) member of society is a practical social theorist; in sustaining any sort of encounter he or she draws upon social knowledge and theories, normally in an unforced and routine way, and the use of these practical resources is precisely the condition of the production of the encounter at all. (20-21)

Giddens presumes the principles of phenomenology and hermeneutics in arguing that ST is a valuable research tool to analyze social structures. Giddens recognizes that scholars need to study actively reproducing social structures in their full context.

Giddens (1984) explains “to study structuration is to attempt to determine the conditions which govern the continuity and dissolution of structures or types of structure....[Or] to enquire into the process of reproduction is to specify the connections between structuration and structure” (p. 127). In other words, social structures reproduce because life and communication are, “active constituting process[es], accomplished by, and consisting in the doings of active subjects” (p. 127). This dissertation examines the reproduction of social structures in South Africa and the U.S. Mexico borderlands, and important physical artifacts of apartheid and the security wall that resulted because of those social structures.

Gebser (1949/1985) suggests that scholars use *systasis* to conduct the kind of holistic analysis for which Giddens was searching. Systasis is a Greek word that means “putting together” or “connecting” (Kramer, 1997; Murphy & Choi, 1992; Vitale 1992). Vitale (1992) explains that systasis, “describes the process of joining of parts to form a

whole while retaining the consistent presence of the origin” (p. 105). Kramer (1997), and Murphy and Choi (1992), suggest that systasis can account for differences between the parts while still maintaining they are all a part of a greater whole. This dissertation employs systasis to the social structures of South Africa and the U.S. Mexico border. I analyze individual concepts within each structure such as how agents applied power, rules, resources, and discourse to reproduce social structures. In addition, I examine how all the parts of the social structures interact and how they generate the conditions for the apartheid wall and the security wall on the border. The following section outlines the core concepts of ST.

Practical & Discursive Consciousness

Giddens (1984) defines practical consciousness as “circumstances in which people pay attention to events going on around them in such a way as to relate their activity to those events. In other words, it refers to the reflexive monitoring of conduct by human agents” (p. 44). Giddens suggests that humans as agents collect and maintain knowledge from a variety of sources then make intentional decisions based on that knowledge. We as agents discover intentions through the *discursive consciousness* (discourse or interactive communication). Sometimes as agents, we make intentional decisions knowing that they will have consequences. Often however, there are unintended consequences that may leave lasting damage from our decisions. ST is interested in both intentional and inadvertent or ignored actions that result from our practical consciousness.

Routinization

We develop routinization or routine in the practical consciousness and act it out through discourse (Giddens, 1984). Our daily individual routines combine to make up our social structures, from interpersonal to organizational to community relationships. Giddens (1984) explains, “Routine is integral both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily activities, and to the institutions of society, which are such only through the continued reproduction” (p. 60). Through routine, we establish our identities and communication practices. Sometimes we have small routines that often seem so invisible to us that we do not think about them at all, but ST asks researchers to consider why we do them. In addition, we have many interactions throughout any given day with any number of people that we consider nothing more than a “fleeting moment [or] brief and trivial interchanges” (Giddens, 1984, p. 72). However, Giddens argues that if we put these encounters in the context of repeating actions that are part of and continue to produce social life, these seemingly insignificant moments have an entirely new meaning.

Agents & Agency

All individuals act socially and are therefore agents able to interact to share mutual knowledge. Giddens (1984) states:

Every competent social actor is herself or himself a social theorist, who as a matter of routine makes interpretations of her or his own conduct, and of the intentions, reasons and motives of others as integral to the production of social life. (p. 160)

Much of the sharing relies on our connotative assumptions about each other. We assume other members of society are aware of shared social codes and we take it for granted in most of our communication. Giddens employs previous phenomenological ideas about intention to his own theory by suggesting that intention is the concept of agency.

Giddens (1993) explains “agency is any act which the agent knows (believes) can be expected to manifest a particular quality or outcome, and in which this knowledge is made use of by the actor in order to produce this quality or outcome” (p.83). Moreover, “agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place....agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequences of conduct, have acted differently” (Giddens, 1984, p. 9).

Thus, ST is interested in knowing how agents use their agency and knowledge to be motivated to act. What are the intended and unintended consequences of those actions that ultimately affect our social structures either on a personal level, or at a larger societal level? Giddens is interested in comprehending how we as agents can change focus from one thing to another, such as driving and communicating at the same time or choosing which subject to study at a particular time. Giddens uses the term *hierarchy of purpose* in the same manner as Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. We need social functioning after we meet our basic survival and security needs. Intention exists in the conscious part of the brain, therefore, philosophical methods that study consciousness and its various interpretations are very useful in the ST discussion.

Power

Another term closely related to agency is power or the ability to influence the actions and choices of others. Giddens (1993) explains the connection between action and power:

Action intrinsically involves the application of ‘means’ to achieve outcomes, brought about through the direct intervention of an actor in a course of events....power represents the capacity of the agent to mobilize resources to

constitutes those ‘means’. In this most general sense, ‘power’ refers to the *transformative capacity* of human action. (p. 116-117).

I should mention some characteristics of power here. Within the material I collect, different authors/creators have various kinds of power to create and interpret messages about walls. If I can identify which type of power an author/creator uses to make their artifact, it will help me comprehend why they interpret the wall the way they do, and how that has an impact their immediate social structure as well as the larger structure of which they are a part.

One important characteristic of power is that it acts as an immaterial commodity. This signifies that an agent who uses it can do so currently for an objective, or can collect and store it for later use. For example, in the political structure context, the President of the United States has a certain amount of influence or *political capital* he can use to get a bill passed or put a specific judge on the Supreme Court. If a policy is positive, the President receives more capital to push on more issues. Likewise, if a policy is negative, the President loses some ability to push other issues. Power in ST is the same idea; agents can use it now, store and use it later, or lose it as well.

Another characteristic of power is that it is contingent with conflict. Just because power exists in a situation does not mean a conflict will occur. However, if an agent individually, or an agent as a collective uses power to legitimize a controversial decision that a local community does not agree with, the likelihood that a conflict could occur is more likely. In the section on *forms of institutions*, there is further analysis of how *legitimization* functions to support the institutional use of power that creates and reproduces both positive and negative actions.

Rules & Resources

In order to interact in any social structure, we must know something about its rules and our abilities to act within that system. If one knows the rules and resources available to them, they may be able to align themselves to gain more power in that structure, as well as influence specific actions. Giddens notes that we find the foundation for this knowledge within the practical consciousness, which is a unique characteristic to human agents. Giddens (1984) clarifies, “resources....are structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction....[They] are media through which power is exercised” (p. 15-16). Media in this context refers to anything from tacit or expert knowledge on a subject that someone needs, from money and physical infrastructures, to anything someone can potentially use to influence others to act.

Giddens (1984) defines rules as, “techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices.... *formulated* rules....are thus codified interpretations of rules rather than rules” (p. 21). Therefore, rules serve as a general guideline within structural reproduction. Often, agents give them more than one interpretation rather than reading them in one concrete way. Formulated rules might include general legal laws for a country or very specific rules made for a specific purpose, such as building a wall to protect property, or a national border. However, even those rules are often open to interpretation based on the experience of a person construing their meaning. Moreover, there are characteristics of rules that are of interest to research in social analysis (See Table 2). As illustrated, we need to recognize that these characteristics are points on a large spectrum of interpretation. Because we are

always shifting in time and space, we adapt to new circumstances. Finally, while there are larger and more known rules in social life, we must remember the trivial rules as well, or what I previously described as the little routines we carry out on a day-to-day basis. Comprehending how we understand rules could provide us with more insights into a variety of human behaviors and choices.

Intensive	←————→	Shallow
Tacit	←————→	Discursive
Informal	←————→	Formalized
Weakly Sanction	←————→	Strongly Sanctioned

Table 1 - "Main characteristics of rules relevant to general questions of social analysis" (Giddens, 1984, p.22).

Rules come with more nuances than resources do. Giddens (1984) specifically discusses five elements of rules including distinctions that include social rules. First, sometimes when we think of rules, we think of games with which they are associated. However, whereas the rules of a game like baseball are more or less clear and not up for interpretation, the laws and other social rules we live by are debatable on a mass scale. Second, sometimes we think of rules separately, rather than collectively, which usually takes them out of context. Third, “*rules cannot be conceptualized apart from resources* [italics added], which refer to the modes whereby transformative relations are actually incorporated into the production and reproduction of social practices. Structural properties thus express forms of *domination and power*” (Giddens, 1984, p. 18). Fourth, rules imply that we should be methodical or act in a particular way in a given social

situation. Finally, rules have two conceptual frameworks. They provide meanings for social interaction and sanction social conduct. I should not conflate the two in research, so I must use extra caution in this area.

Agenda setting theory in the mass media is an example of how we can comprehend the connections between rules, resources, and agents that manipulate the rules and resources to influence decisions. We turn to the media for our information beyond our immediate social structure. We try to trust that the media will tell the truth and be ethical in reporting. This gives the media great power to dictate what ought to be important in our minds. They cannot dictate what we think, but the media definitely can influence what we think about (Cohen, 1963). The entire population of the world receives its news and information from roughly 10-20 transnational corporate media outlets (Thussu, 2006). Walter Lippman argued in 1922 that during World War 1 journalists on both sides of the war wrote a picture of victory. Essentially, the journalists lied to millions of people and the governments encouraged this propaganda so they could gain more support for the war. The propaganda was so powerful that it limited what people could read, see, and hear (McCombs & Bell, 1996). Assuming Lippmann's argument was correct, this gives a relatively few agents massive power from a critical resource, and any number of opportunities to prop up what they think is important over the wants and needs of audiences around the globe.

Duality of Structure

When agents act, they are making a small move that may have personal consequences, but many actions also have systemic repercussions as well. This brings

us to another important concept that Giddens (1984) defines as the *duality of structure*, which is viewing both micro and macro social interactions together as one larger system. Giddens identifies form and content as *structures* and *systems*. *Structuration* is the lens whereby researchers analyze the continuity and/or transformation of structures and systems to reproduce a currently existing one, alter it slightly, or transform it into a new system entirely. Giddens (1984) describes two ways agents integrate themselves into social life. First, we *socially integrate* ourselves in small groups and interpersonal relationships. Second, we *integrate* ourselves *systemically*, meaning we make up larger social networks in organizations, the mass media, communities, and other larger groups in the system. Giddens is critical of academics who create unnecessary dualities such as action verses structure, or individual verses society. This removes such events from the context that gives them meaning. It is unnecessary because each event helps produce and reproduce the same social structures in which we all operate.

Table 2 is an illustration of what the duality of a given structure might look like both from a micro and macro perspective. It includes structural behaviors called *Institutions*, which I cover in the next section. It also demonstrates *modalities* (logically necessary channels) that messages pass through to create different types of *interaction* that make up a social system. The table further embodies the great capacity humans have to monitor their own actions by obtaining and utilizing knowledge of the systems in which they participate as well as being able to describe them discursively to others. They can also monitor other humans doing the same thing at the same time (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1993). Giddens (1993) concludes, “This duality of structure is the most

integral feature of processes of social reproduction, which in turn can always be analyzed in principle as a dynamic process of structuration” (p. 133).

Structure (s)	Signification	Domination	Legitimization
Modality (ies)	Interpretive Scheme	Facility	Norm
Interaction (s)	Communication	Power	Sanction

Table 2 - "The Dimensions of the Duality of Structure" (Giddens, 1984, p. 29).

Using Table 2 as a guide, I can examine a micro process such as a norm an agent is living or a routine they conduct on a daily basis even if it may seem insignificant. Even though it may seem normal, trivial, and perhaps even invisible, those small routines still constitute pieces in the larger puzzle of a social system. Alternatively, I can examine the communication in a social network from a micro and macro view. At the micro level, I can examine specific facilities that are modes in a network and how they view their relationship to the larger system. At the macro level, I can look at how norms in one part of the system relate to sanctions in another part of the system. Another duality I could analyze would be a consequence of a personal action verses those of a group decision. They are dual parts of the same structure and tend to affect one another as part of a system.

Another excellent example of the duality of structure is a human body in action (Giddens, 1984). There are many biological functions in the human body that each have an individual identity and separate role to play to keep the body working properly. However, they also work as a coherent collective and have a unified identity as well. In addition to the micro verses macro duality, there are other types of dualities to consider. For example, in ST, I can look at the difference between rules that seem shallow verses others that are very intense.

Forms of Institutions

Giddens (1984) suggests that political, economic, and legal institutions are some of the most enduring features in social systems. Institutions provide two functions for agents. First, institutions help agents develop a social identity through meaningful interaction with other agents. Second, institutions help agents comprehend social rules and norms of the social structure. Many other institutions such as families, church groups, schools, and community organizations also influence agents. Institutions are comprised of three structures: *signification*, *domination*, and *legitimization* (see Table 3) (Giddens, 1979, 1984). Giddens argues that it might be possible to examine the intentions of agents when they act within these institutional structures.

Structure (s)	Theoretical Domain	Institutional Order
Signification	Theory of Coding	Symbolic orders/modes of discourse
Domination	Theory of resource authorization and allocation	Political/economic institutions
Legitimization	Theory of normative regulation	Legal Institutions

Table 3 – “Principles of Institutions” (Giddens, 1984, p. 31).

Signification

The way Giddens describes signification at both a theoretical and practical level, it appears at times in ST to be synonymous with the broader concepts of what makes up a culture. Giddens (1979, 1984) borrows the theoretical concept of ‘signification’ from semiotics, defining it broadly as a theory of coding. Semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure (1972/1983) explains that the first signification is language, and language is necessary to have culture that encompasses all other sign systems. Regarding the importance of language Hall (1966) explains:

Man's very perception of the world...is programmed by the language he speaks, just as a computer is programmed. Like the computer, man's mind will register and structure external reality only in accordance with the program. Since two languages often program the same class of events quite differently, no belief or philosophical system should be considered apart from language. (p. 1-2)

Kramer (2013) describes that, "Without language, gestures, and words that convey conventional meanings---communication---is impossible. This is the basic fact of human existence" (p. 132). Furthermore, Kramer (2013) explains that 'signification' or communication happens in the semantic field of culture that "enables humans to sustain and transfer knowledge, beliefs, values, motives, meanings, and identities from one generation to the next" (p. 123). According to Giddens (1979, 1984) signification is entrenched in how agents communicate, maintain social relationships, and how perceive their own identities. Barthes (1957/1987) demonstrates the prevalence of signification in many otherwise mundane areas of social life that agents often take for granted. For example, Barthes (1957/1987) demonstrates that signification is in soap used to wash clothes, or toys children played with, or in entertainment people engage in, or even the food people choose to eat from restaurant menus. In sum, signification is the basis for reproducing the sociocultural product Giddens calls forms of institutions.

Giddens (1979) suggests that one way to comprehend the signification of institutions was by studying their *ideologies* that ST defined as sets of symbols and/or modes of discourse. Giddens argues that ideologies, which reproduced institutions, are only one piece of the overall social structure of society. Giddens (1979) states that analyzing ideologies "is to examine how structures of significations are mobilised to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups" (p. 188). Giddens argues that agents were selfish and ideologically motivated to protect interests in institutions within

their social structures. Agents act out their intentions based on their cultural values or beliefs. By applying the signification principle, scholars and practitioners can identify motivating cultural factors for how agents reproduce certain social structures. To put it another way Kramer (1997, 2013), and Kramer and Ikeda (1998) explain that in signification, what agent/institution “A” says to or about agent/institution “B” says something about “B”, but it also reveals something about the identity and perspective of “A” albeit often unintentionally. By examining the signification principle in ST, scholars and practitioners can ask questions about motives that reproduce social structures. For example, what cultural values made it possible for agents to reproduce the social structure of apartheid for so many years? Moreover, what cultural values made it possible for agents to reproduce the security wall that provides minimal or no security at all?

Domination

Giddens (1979, 1984) argues that agents dominate the discourse and/or actions of others using power in the form of *authorization* and *allocation*. For example, Theal (1897) described how the Dutch East India Trading Company was a powerful agent that had authorization to create a colony in South Africa. Upon arrival, the company allocated resources to company members to start settling Cape Town. In the case of the U.S. Mexico Border, President James Polk both authorized the U.S. military to invade Mexico and allocated many resources to the cause. This domination led to the U.S. Mexico War and the annexation of Mexican lands as far south as the Rio Grande River, which makes up the modern border (Burton, 2000; Hamnett, 1999; Hernandez, 2010).

Legitimation

The final part of institutions is how they engage in legitimization. Giddens (1979, 1984) explains that agents and institutions use normative means such as enacting laws to protect their interests. ST assumes that agents should be accountable by giving reasons for how they legitimize their actions. Agents should accept responsibility for the consequences of how they legitimize actions, although in reality agents obviously do not always accept responsibilities. In particular, one normative means institutions and agents use is geopolitics to demarcate where their space begins and ends, whether they are protecting property or some other interest. To Giddens, the physical environment of a social encounter is as significant as the message shared or other parts of the encounter. Generally, scholars have not discussed connections between geography and communication despite evidence of a strong link between the two fields. Geopolitics is a strong means of legitimization that communication scholars could analyze in future projects.

ST Research Questions

While previous organizational and corporate communication research is helpful in understanding the axioms of ST, my research may offer new insights on how the theory functions to explain communication in other contexts. Giddens (1984) outlines several potential research areas with ST. My dissertation presents two areas that are the most useful for answering important questions about the communication functions of walls and their surrounding structures. First, unintended consequences from actions within social structures are as important as what agents intended to happen. Therefore, I

can pose some of the following research questions: When building the wall, did some agents and institutions unintentionally communicate their true or perceived intentions about the wall's purpose? If so, how did other groups receive the true intentions affected by the wall-building project? What were some unexpected effects that occurred with the decision to build the wall? How did those effects alter the communication within the social structure? If the agents that built the wall had not done so, would another agent or institution build the wall anyway? Finally, were there only certain agents/institutions within the social structure that had the power, resources, and authority to build the wall?

The second ST premise on which to build future research about walls is to examine events as parts of a fluid social system rather than individual events randomly happening. Researchers can analyze what kind of rational or irrational patterns agents and institutions form. Even though one agent's intentions may seem insignificant, together with many agents and/or institutions, those actions reproduce the social structure. Similarly, within my own research on the communication functions of walls, I am looking for evidence that individual agent actions when connected with others do in fact create a coherent social structure. This idea prompted the next set of possible inquiries. What are the unique cases of wall building by different cultures and civilizations? Is there any connection between these cases? If so, what is the holistic message? What does it communicate about human identity?

Dimensional Accrual and Dissociation Theory

Kramer (1997) developed this theory nicknamed DAD, as a way to study intercultural communication. The major difference between DAD and ST is that Giddens tends to see everything from western, modern, or what Kramer calls a *perspectival* point of view. DAD theory suggests there other “structures of awareness” or cultural perspectives that have existed throughout human history that scholars need to consider (Kramer, 1992, p. XI). DAD theory tries to encompass these structures of awareness rather than labeling them as outdated, unnecessary, superstitious, or non-sense. Kramer (1992, 1997, 2013) argues that if someone believes in a god, it is not the scholar’s job to destroy that belief but rather to understand how it influences values, expectations, motivations, and behavior. Kramer (1992) accept that scholars always have biases, but in order to do better research, scholars need to see the horizons of cultures that are different from our own. He further explains that this differentiation is not threatening.

The axiology of DAD comes from Gebser’s (1949/1985) *consciousness structures*, which are modes of awareness that encompass how humans think, see, communicate about, and otherwise identify ourselves. DAD also integrates ideas from Mumford’s (1934) critique of technology, and Kramer’s own ideas on the meaning of communication. DAD focuses on four consciousness structures identified as the magical, the mythical, the modern/perspectival, and the integral. Within each structure, communication displays values, behaviors, context, emotion, history, and motives that can help researchers identify and comprehend different worldviews (Kramer, 1997, 2013). Kramer (2013) argues that if there are “fundamentally different structures to

cultural reality, then there must be fundamentally different modes of communication” (p. 137). Kramer clarifies that many human behaviors do not make sense if we try to study them from only one viewpoint (in this culture we typically employ the modern perspectival view. For example, I cannot use statistical, empirical data to explain why the Tohono O’odam tribe is incredibly angry with the U.S. Government for building the wall across the borderlands (Hendricks, 2010; Morse, 2012; Schlyer, 2012; Weber, 2011). Statistical data can tell me how many tribal members might cross from one side of the border to the other, and perhaps some reasons why they travel. However, that data cannot explain or account for the deep emotional concern tribal members have by seeing Mother Earth stabbed by metal knives that will permanently upset the balance of the universe (Hendricks, 2010). There is context, emotion, history, beliefs, motives, values, and varying levels of knowledge surrounding these behaviors. Kramer (2013) concludes, “DAD offers a solid approach to understanding cultures and intercultural misunderstandings including competing efforts to re-socialize and enculturate the Other” (p. 137).

Gebser & Mumford Contributions to DAD

Gebser (1949/1985) illustrates that there are at least four periods throughout history where human consciousness structures altered substantially. Gebser labels these shifts *mutations*, identifying them as the archaic, the magical, the mental, and the integral. Gebser analyzes a large body of evidence found in all aspects of historic and current civilizations to demonstrate that consciousness shifts take place. Some of the evidence includes prehistoric cave paintings, pottery, idols made of wood and stone,

tapestries, literature, paintings, and modern scientific techniques. Gebser (1949/1985) found that as new mutations emerge, humanity gains additional perspectives, experiences, and knowledge, while at the same time retaining parts of previous structures. Regarding these mutations, Kramer and Mickunas (1992) explain:

To Gebser's own surprise, the phenomena suggested vast periodic transformations, mutations of awareness that restructure human modes of perceiving, conceiving, and interacting. Such mutations not only yield novel structures of awareness but also integrate and position other modes of awareness within the requirements of the currently predominant structure (whenever that may be). (p. XI)

In DAD theory, Kramer (2013) describes the accruing of consciousness structures as similar to building a skyscraper. The foundation of the skyscraper is necessary to build the additional floors, and without it, the building would fall. Likewise, Kramer (2013) argues that the magical and mythical consciousness structures were present in humans for thousands of years. They persist in some form as part of the foundation for the perspectival consciousness structure.

Gebser (1949/1985) concludes that humanity is facing a global crisis in the individualistic, selfish, mental culture that cannot sustain itself. Gebser suggests that the emergent integral structure is one possible solution to avert the crisis. As I noted in the ST section, systasis is an integral way of thinking and a method scholars employ to describe the interdependence between parts of a social structure and the whole (Gebser 1949/1985; Kramer, 1997; Murphy & Choi, 1992; Vitale 1992). For further evidence regarding mutations of consciousness structures, readers should refer to Gebser's seminal work on the topic, "The Ever Present Origin".

Like Gebser, Mumford (1934) describes several distinct periods of technological development that shaped humanity to what it is today. Mumford (1934) discusses the

influences of technology reaching back at least 10000 years. Mumford argues that humans *dissociate* or separate reason and emotion from technologies, decreasing the chances that we will actually stop long enough to question their ethical consequences. Although there could be some benefits to technology, there might be negative effects as well. Mumford (1934) explains that the introduction of Capitalism with “abstract symbols of wealth” (p. 23) during the *Paleotechnic* period caused a greater dissociation between people and technologies than ever before. Mumford (1934) stated:

Capitalism turned people from tangibles to intangibles: its symbol, as Sombart observes, is the account book: ‘its life-value lies in its profit and loss account’. The ‘economy of acquisition’, which had hitherto been practiced by rare and fabulous creatures like Midas and Croesus, became once more the everyday mode: it tended to replace the direct ‘economy of needs’ and to substitute money-values for life-values. (p. 23)

Mumford (1934) further clarified that Capitalism was an all-encompassing culture that preferred the use of technology to increase profits. Mumford (1934) declared, “The brute fact of the matter is that our civilization is now weighted in favor of the use of mechanical instruments because the opportunities for commercial production and for the exercise of power lie there” (p. 274). To ask powerful Capitalists in industry, government, or other trades to stop and reflect on the social consequences of their technologies would seem ridiculous to them since it would take up valuable time, businesses could lose profits, and progress would stop. Mumford (1934) concluded:

Because the process of social evaluation was largely absent among the people who developed the machine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the machine raced like an engine without a governor, tending to overheat its own bearings and lower its efficiency without any compensatory gain. (p. 282)

The lack of social guidance or control of technology during the Paleotechnic period was highly destructive. Mumford (1934) summarizes, “this second revolution multiplied,

vulgarized, and spread the methods and goods produced by the first [Eotechnic period]: above all, it was directed toward the quantification of life, and its success could be gauged only in terms of the multiplication table” (p. 151).

Mumford (1934) describes the most recent era or mutation as the *Neotechnic* period that we currently live in. According to Mumford, two facts define the Neotechnic era. First, scholars and scientists apply the scientific method across all aspects of life, not just the physical sciences or mathematics. Mumford (1934) explains, “the sense of order became more pervasive and fundamental” (p. 217). During this period, social scientists seek to explain and categorize most human behaviors. The second fact of the Neotechnic era is that all knowledge has to have a practical application or it is of no societal value. Mumford (1934) demonstrates, “It was Henry who in essentials invented the telegraph, not Morse; Faraday invented the dynamo, not Siemens; it was Oersted who invented the electric motor, not Jacobi; it was Clerk-Maxwell and Hertz who invented the radio telegraph, not Marconi” (p. 217-218). Mumford’s Paleotechnic and Neotechnic period are comparable to Gebser’s mental consciousness structure. In DAD theory, Kramer (1997) explains it as “the current world condition [that] is dominated by the value of becoming “modern,” “modernizing,” “westernizing,” “developing,” in a word perspectivism” (p. 96).

The Dimensions & Dissociation

When discussing the different dimensions and their accrual it is important to comprehend that change in and amongst dimensions, accrual, and dissociation is neither progression nor regression in the modern sense of trying to reach some final goal

(Kramer, 1997, 2013). Kramer (2013) argues that the purpose of DAD theory, “is rather an explanation for how and why things are as they are, and offers some guidelines for predicting outcomes given a set of known preconditions” (p. 133). In the perspectival world at times, there have been those who consider magic and/or the mythic cultures to be antiquated and choose to ignore their value systems, which Kramer argued might be dangerous. Kramer (2013) denounces such notions by concluding, “All that can be said is that some structures of awareness manifest more dimensions than others. History has shown that this is not necessarily “better or more “evolved, “mature”, “competent”, or even more “cognitively complex” (p. 133). In this section, first I discuss the characteristics of the magic, mythic and perspectival dimensions. Second, I discuss the dissociation and accrual process and its consequences in intercultural communication.

The Magic Dimension

There are three major characteristics of the magic dimension (also known as magic culture, magical worldview, magical structure, etc.) as articulated by Kramer (1997, 2013). First, identity does not yet exist in the magical dimension. The collective is most important, and everything in the cosmos is a spirit in balance with everything else. Second, magic cultures are highly idolic both in actions and in their incantations or other word rituals. Finally, the magic world is conservative and traditional. When change occurs to upset the harmonious balance, the magic world falls into chaos.

Kramer (2013) describes the magic dimension as, “spaceless and timeless one dimensional pre-perspectival magic worldview” (p. 143). According to Kramer (2013), the root for the word *magic* is to enable, meaning the magic world is the first attempt by

humans to exercise choice by separating themselves from the cosmos (this was the beginning of culture). Still, in the magic world, exercising free will and creating separation is very limited. Kramer (2013) expresses:

In the magic world, animism predominates. Emotional identification is extremely strong and shared. Collective identity prevails. An important aspect of the magic world is that there is total one-to one identity between all people and things, and therefore there is no identity as it is conceived by Moderns. For the Modern, identity requires difference. If all people are identical, then no individual has identity. My identity depends on you being different from me. But this is not identity in the magic sense. In the magic world, there is no identity because everything is interchangeable via sympathetic magic with no direction or fragmentation. (p. 151-152)

Since there is no individual identity in the magic world, and everything is alive, this means that the rivers, trees, animals, humans, and all else have a spirit and ought to be treated equally. In a magic worldview, it would be unimaginable to build a wall on sacred lands, as they are alive. The Tohono O’odam people have lived on both sides of the USMX border for generations. For more than 6000 years, the Sonora Desert has played an animistic role in their worship (Weber, 2011). In the 1990’s it was inconceivable to “traditional” O’odam members that the U.S. Government built the fence. Tribal elder Ofelia Rivas exclaimed, “It’s like a knife in our mother [earth]. These metal things are going to go in our mother and we can’t pull them out” (Hendricks, 2010, p. 119). Another example in the O’odam culture of how everything is alive and shares the same identity is the story of the saguaro fruit. Hendricks (2010) illustrated:

The O’odham consider the saguaro plant, with its bent-elbowed arms, to be human, magically transformed by “elder brother,” the god-like I’itoi, into a rooted plant. “A boy was fighting with his brother and I’itoi heard him and told him the O’odham don’t fight with their siblings,” López repeated the legend. “The boy wouldn’t stop. He ran toward I’itoi. And I’itoi made him into a cactus.” Another O’odham woman told Nabhan, the naturalist, that the stately

plants must be treated with reverence: “The saguaros, they are Indians too. You don’t ever throw anything at them. You don’t do anything. (p. 103)

Another example of this principle is the magic culture of the indigenous Altaians in Siberia. In the Altaian aquatic culture, the river, the forest, and the people share a spiritually identity (Wohl, 2011). The Altaians were greatly concerned with the Russian government’s plans to build a dam on the Katun River in the late 1980’s (Klubnikin, Annett, Cherkasova, Shishin, and Fotieva; 2000; Wohl, 2011). Building even one dam would dramatically upset the balance the Altaians had with the spirits. Klubnikin (2000) *et al.* and Wohl (2011) note that the project ultimately failed due to increased protests and unprecedented media coverage. What was most interesting in public hearings about building the dam was when the Altaians testified, they were not concerned with the health effects, or money. Wohl (2011) points out that their major concern was to protect the spiritual life relationship they have with the rivers.

Another characteristic of magic cultures is that they are highly idolic. For example, Kramer (1997) explains, “In the magic world, there is practically no dissociation or detachment of emotional commitment between what an expression means and its concrete presence. For instance, if I steal an idol, I have stolen a god” (p. xiii). Kramer (2013) illustrates that the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and the specific rituals performed are examples of an intense emotional commitment. Kramer (2013) explains:

Ka’bah is not a random structure, and the Black Stone embedded in its eastern corner is not a random meteorite, nor is the rock inside the structure upon which, it is said, Abraham stood with Ishmael on his shoulders....For Muslims, the Tawaf of the Ka’bah is ritual enactment that parallels the Tawaf that runs above the Jannat al Firdaws in the seventh heaven or paradise (often described as a blissful garden), which touches Allah’s throne, the Arsh. It marks the act of keeping harmony on earth as it is in heaven. (p. 145)

In another example, Kramer (1997) describes how Egyptian hieroglyphics were idolic. Kramer (1997) comments, “Images of animals were often either not completed on purpose, or presented in segments, for fear that otherwise they would literally jump off the surface and run away” (p. 69).

Kramer (2013) also argues that, “the magic worldview manifestly exhibits an idolic incantatory mode of communication that is identically univalent” (p. 145). In the example above, part of the ceremony for Muslims is to say a very specific prayer praising Allah that has an absolute and emotional meaning to them. Malinowski (1935/2002) shares extensive evidence that incantation has been an extremely important part of communication in magic cultures. While studying the people of the *Trobriand Islands*, Malinowski (1935/2002) argued, “the pragmatic relevance of words is greatest when these words are uttered actually within the situation to which they belong and uttered so that they achieve an immediate, practical effect....for it is in such situations that words acquire their meaning” (p. 52). The Trobriand youth are educated about rituals such as why the community burn gardens, because they have “fertilizing power of ashes” (Malinowski, 1935/2002, p. 51). Words mattered so youth learned exactly what to utter. If said incorrectly, the incantation would fail and the community would be in trouble. Consequently, the community used the narratives to maintain social cohesion in addition to using specific words from the narratives to produce magic.

An additional characteristic of the magic culture is that it is very conservative, harmonic (Kramer, 1997, 2013). Changes cause chaos in the magical structure. Gebser (1949/1985) uses the example of the Aztecs destruction to show the collision that happens between magic and perspectival cultures. Gebser argues that Cortez and the

Spanish Conquistadors did not win the war by using advanced technology. Rather, the Aztec empire lost because within their consciousness structure, they expected their magic to defeat the invaders. Kramer (1997) further describes, “the worst thing one people can do to another is forcibly deny their metaphysical assumptions, because then all orientation is lost (p. 64). Kramer (2013) describes how Cortez killed the royal family, and then committed the ultimate atrocity of killing Montezuma II, the emperor of Tenochtitlan and God of the Aztec people. With their God destroyed, the Aztec people fell into chaos allowing only a few hundred soldiers with minimal modern weaponry to conquer them.

To summarize, Kramer (1997, 2013) outlines a few major characteristics of magic cultures. First, identity does not yet exist in the magical dimension. The collective is most important, and everything in the cosmos is a spirit in balance with everything else. Second, magic cultures are highly idolic both in actions and in their incantations or other word rituals. Finally, the magic world is conservative and traditional. When change occurs to upset the harmonious balance, the magic world falls into chaos.

The Mythic Dimension

Three characteristics describe the mythic world (Gebser 1949/1985; Kavolis, 1992; Kramer, 1997, 2013; Kramer & Mickunas, 1992; Mickunas, 2008). First, Gebser (1949/1985) argues that the essential characteristic of the mythical world is awareness of the soul and time manifested in cyclical form. Next, Kramer (1997, 2013) argues that

the mythic world is one of ambivalence as manifested in polar relationships. Finally, mythic communication is symbolic (Kavolis, 1992; Kramer, 1997, 2013).

The essential characteristic of the mythical world is awareness of the soul and time. Regarding how time was manifested in mythic human, Kramer affirms, “[They are]....directly aware of various cycles that orient everything, creating cosmic and (its polar complement) particular sense. Cycles of birth and death, solar, stellar, and lunar cycles, the seasons, day and night, and so forth, dominate the mythic world” (p. 66). Furthermore, Gebser (1949/1985) notes that the acknowledgement of time keeping in cultures is evidence in a shift from the magic to the mythic consciousness. Gebser (1949/1985) contends:

Wherever we encounter seasonal rituals in the later periods of the magic structure, and particularly in astronomical deliberations and various forms of calendar, as for example among the Babylonians and later in Egyptian and Mexican civilization, we find anticipations of the mythic structure. Such forms of evidence indicate that the coming-to-awareness of nature has reached its conclusion, a process whereby the rhythm of nature with conspicuous auditory emphasis becomes, in a purely natural way, temporal. This is a decisive step taken by magic man out of his interlacing with nature. (p.61)

Kavolis (1992) and Mickunas (2008) clarify that mythic time differs from the magic time in that it does not have “eternal recurrence” (Kavolis, 1992, p. 165). Mickunas (2008) comments:

Eternal recurrence is a never ending sequence of repetitions no matter how vast or complex, whereas mythological cycling has a formation such that, on a circle, every event, as if it were moving to the future, meets its past, as well as any event, seeking its past, will circle to meet itself in the future that is already circling and catching up from the past. No historical time orientation and no repetition is yet available. (p. 13)

As the mythic person recognizes time, they also begin to find some sense of individuality. Kramer (2013) argues, “with the advent of mythical consciousness, a

nascent sense of space intensifies. The first inkling of ego –self begin to emerge ‘out’ from the ocean whole as individuation. The whole is left *behind*” (p. 153). Such a separation allows for some possibilities of individual agency. While not completely free to do as they choose, the mythic person is no longer bound to the collective as they are in the magic world.

The second characteristic of the mythic world is that it is full of ambivalence as illustrated through polarity of relationships. Kramer and Mickunas (1992) explain:

Polarity means the dynamic movement of one event, image, or feeling that provokes, attracts, and requires another event. The appearance of sky is also the appearance of its polar aspect, the earth; the appearance of love is likewise the appearance of hate, while the appearance of high, demands the polar presence of the low. One is never given without the other, and one may replace the other. (p. xix)

Kramer and Mickunas (1992) conclude that the Chinese tai chi with the polarities of yin and yang is a good example of the mythic mentality. Kavolis (1992) further describes the polarity of the mythic world as “mutually dependent, nonantagonistic polarities (which can be embodied as apparently contradictory qualities within particular entities)” (p. 164). The language choices of the mythic world provides further manifestations of ambivalence and the importance of polar relationships (Kramer, 1997). For example, Kramer (1997) demonstrates that mythic words maintain both parts of polar relationships as illustrated in the Latin word *Altus* that meant high and low; or *Sacer* that meant sacred and cursed.

The third defining characteristic of the mythic dimension is that communication is symbolic opening up the possibility of interpretation. Gebser (1949/1985) indicates that the etymology of the word *mythos* has two polar meanings that include to talk or have sound, and to be silent. Kramer (1997) states:

While myth is related to mouth, it combines the polar aspects of both speech and silence, emphasizing the necessity for interpretation of the ‘hidden’, or silent meanings. Hence, the importance of oracles, channelers, and interpreters (metacommunicators) even for the gods. Needs are expressed by such symbolic entities as Hermes and the Muses” (p. 67)

Furthermore, individuals in the mythic world now have the ability to choose some interpretations meaning that words start to take on literal and figurative meanings

Kramer (2013) describes:

The mythic world manifests a symbolic mode of communication that exhibits bivalent ambiguity between figural and literal meaning and a semi-linear proto-spatial narrative form. Magic incantation works as soon as it is uttered. The words, their intonation, and their sequence are not arbitrary, nor are they mere symbolic embellishments or representations, but rather they literally conjure the thing, and if the spell is broken the thing or event vanishes. (p. 152)

Kramer uses the example of a statue of God to clarify how interpretations start to be figural and literal. In the magic world, the statue of God is God but with mythic communication, the statue is a symbol of the God. This separation is a sign of dissociation from the magic to the mythic consciousness. In another example, Kramer (1997, 2013) demonstrates that in the magic world the cross of Christ is the actual wood that Romans used to crucify him and has magical power. In mythic symbolism, the cross is no longer the actual wood, but merely a symbol of Christ’s crucifixion. Yet, because there is still an emotional connection accrued from the magic world to the mythic, Kramer clarifies that if I step on the wood, it is not like stepping on a meaningless stick. The cross represents something very emotional, my relationship to Christ.

Another aspect of mythic communication is the way mythic people deliver the message. Because myth is related to mouth and sound, mythic communication is delivered orally through story telling often in the form of dancing, poetry, or other

musical means (Gebser, 1949/1985; Mickunas, 2008). Kavolis (1992) expresses that in the mutation from the magic to mythic, “The magic ritual, the incantation, becomes musical poetry as the crucial form of cultural expression” (p. 164). Kramer (2013) further clarifies:

The mythic world is a word built on sacred stories and extenuating commentaries that develop out of telling and retelling. Interpretation is a form of explanation of the text in the very telling of it. Mythic performance is yet very emotional, inspired And in this modality performance extends, enhances, embellishes; proto-explanation. (p. 154)

One possible consequence of dissociation into the mythic consciousness is that humans become detached from nature or an overall god or life force that connects everything. This detachment causes individualism allowing people to justify their selfish needs. Greek myths are full of humans who selfishly try to aggrandize themselves in some way and take advantage of the Gods, but receive punishment for their unwise ways. The story of Icarus demonstrates how egocentric humans use advanced technology such as flight. However, because Icarus flew too close to the sun, Apollo decided humans did not need to fly, melted his wings, and killed him. This story demonstrates ego-individualism (personal ambition and its dangers from the point of view of the mythic world) in the literal and figural use of technology and magic culture. Icarus and his father literally put feathers and wax on their arms to escape the Minotaur maze, and the hot sun melted their wings; but according to the myth, the symbolic magic of Apollo was the cause of their demise.

In summary, three characteristics describe the mythical dimension. First, the mythical world introduces an awareness of the soul and time manifested in cyclical form. Second, the mythic world is one of ambivalence as manifested in polar

relationships. Third, mythic communication is symbolic allowing for interpretation, and mythic communication is oratory typically in musical form or other modes of storytelling.

The Perspectival Dimension

Gebser (1949/1985) uses the term *mental structure* to describe the perspectival culture. He etymologically breaks down the term ‘mental’ to show how the Greek word *menis* (courage and wrath) has the same stem as *menos* (resolve, anger, courage, and power). In addition, the Latin word *mens* has an interrelationship with these concepts, but also means thinking, deliberation, mentality, and imagination. De-liberation stops free flowing association and emotion replacing it with logical necessity and the law such as the law of non-contradiction. Gebser (1949/1985) argues that the mental structure is the first time we see independent discourse and deliberation, which is “an unprecedented event, an event that fundamentally alters the world” (p. 75). He uses the example of Moses and the Nation of Israel worshipping a monotheistic God as a huge contrast from the magic and mythic consciousness structures where polytheism played a central role. Such solidification of perspective into tolerance, total exclusivity, individualism, and dissociation opened up the way for a fragmented society in a way that had never happened before. There is one truth. This is the historical origin of positivism. Kramer (1997, 2013) outlined two broad concepts that make up the three-dimensional, perspectival, or modern culture. First, all meaning is completely arbitrary; individual desire is paramount. Second, the modern world is concerned with progress, expansion, and fragmentation of space.

The first principle of the perspectival world is that all things are arbitrary and individual desire is the paramount goal. Kramer (2013) explains, “As the universe comes to be seen as random with no inherent purpose or meaning (sacred or otherwise), it becomes available for willful agency to construct what it wishes. Egocentric performance flourishes” (p. 159). The three-dimensional perspectival culture is a disruption of the mythic and magic perspectives (Kramer, 1997). In the magic culture, everything is one; in the mythic culture, there is harmony among polarities such as yin and yang or sky and earth. In perspectival culture, Kramer (2013) argues that dissociation influences everything. Modern communication becomes signalic meaning that, “binary computer language, with no emotional content proliferate[s]. Sentimentality is denigrated. Language becomes a tool for ulterior means. Communication itself is measured in terms of efficiency of goal-attainment” (Kramer, 2013, p. 162). Kramer (1997) posits that moderns try to remove emotion and motive from the communication we have with each other. During the Linguistic Turn, scholars such as Saussure and Levi-Strauss tried to make the study of language into a science where symbols, signals, or signs are completely arbitrary until communities assign meaning to them.

Kramer (2013) argues that dissociation allows the creation of nation-states who want to own geographical territory. Moreover, “property is privatized, words are strictly defined, laws are rigorously upheld, authorship is emphasized, religion fragments into sects of feuding theologies and continues to splinter until individuals have their own singularly ‘personal beliefs’ and so forth” (Kramer, 2013, p. 161). Dissociation widely affects other aspects of the modern culture. Individuals dissociate themselves from the

magic collective and/or the mythic ideology where the gods watched them from afar.

Kramer (1997) posits that in modernity, “magic correspondence and mythic complementarily no longer apply except as ‘superstition’ and ‘fantasy’” (p. 93).

Furthermore, Kramer (2013) notes that in the modern culture, to be emotional, religious, or spiritual is a waste of valuable time and is even perceived as “lacking cognitive complexity” (p. 143).

A problematic aspect of the arbitrary modern view is that because nothing has value, everything is replaceable (Kramer, 2013). This is vastly different from worshipping the sacred in mythic cultures or being at one with the universe so the idol is the god. For example, Kramer (2013) states:

The Modern also has trouble understanding why a "mere spot of land," which is *used for* the Jewish Temple Mount, which is *used for* worship, or the Muslim Dome of the Rock (the Al-Aqsa Mosque) in Jerusalem, evoke so much emotion. To the Modern, land and structures are arbitrary and contingent-negotiable and replaceable. One can always *move* if there is a dispute because space has no inherent meaning but is rather the dimension that enables movement... To the Jew and Muslim, however, nothing could be more wrong. This land is not arbitrary. It is sacred (eternal) and, as such, irreplaceable. To suggest it is negotiable, even in the pursuit of mortal/political peace, is blasphemy. This mere "piece of land" is worth defending to the death-worth raising one's children to defend to the death. After all what is mere mortality in the face of eternity? Such places constitute identity, magic, timeless being. (p. 149-150)

This example brings us to the second defining principle of the modern dimension, which is concerned with progress, expansion, and the fragmentation of space. Kramer (1997) states, “The modern world is obsessed with the method of fragmentation. According to modernism, the best way to solve problems is to first break them down into pieces (their “component parts” as if everything was made on an assembly line)” (p. 2).

Kramer (1997) further clarifies that the modern is obsessed with fragmenting all sorts of knowledge and events from creating disciplines in schools to trying to define sectarian conflict from other kinds of battles.

One of the most influential forms of fragmentation in perspectival culture is the introduction of the clock because it is precise and proportional (Kramer, 1997, 2013; Mumford, 1934). Kramer (1997) explains that, “Clockwork became the model for all subsequent machine development including the factory and the bureaucracy. A moral person became a person who was organized, prompt, and punctual “just like clockwork” (p. 105). Kramer (2013) also states, “the mechanical clock likewise dissociates time from the actual and variable length of light and dark that varies according to seasons. Virtual values displace actual entities. Identity is reduced to the sum of measures” (p. 161). Moreover, Kramer (1997) concludes that that the clock along with other machines that followed it express important values to the modern culture including the value of mindless automation, absolute control by surveillance, maintaining equilibrium in the status quo, and reductionism or ever-increasing fragmentation.

Kramer (1997, 2013) grants that not all of the modern culture display negative tendencies. Positive benefits from modern fragmentation include the ability to analyze which led to important evolutions of knowledge in areas such as physics and math. Modernity also allows discourse and debate to occur over political actions or philosophical questions. In modernity, we ask questions such as, what is human nature, or why should we employ ethics in a given situation? In magic and mythic cultures, there is no debate or analyzing why things happen because in those cultures everything happens not by reason, but by their nature. In modernity, everything begins to fragment.

For instance, what is moral may no longer be the same as what is legal. People who digress from the way things are in the collective end up dead for questioning tradition.

Despite some positive effects of progress in the perspectival world, it also can be *deficient*, especially in this globalizing world of hypertrophic or extreme individualism (Gebser, 1949/1985; Kramer, 2013). Kramer (2013) defines an *efficient* social system, culture, or form of life as one that can self-replicate and endure, while a deficient system cannot. For example, in the deficiency of the perspectival culture, we often see corporations that value gaining money and/or power at the cost of all things, including human lives. At this point, such a perspectival view is unsustainable or deficient. In 2014, General Motors (GM) proved this point in the fact that they did not want to recall cars to save lives based on their quantitative cost benefits to the corporation. In a globalized world, nations are finding increasingly devastating ways to manipulate the environment. Kramer (1997) posits that in the perspectival culture, “humans do not passively adapt to the environment but instead, they adapt the environment to their own interests, wants, and needs. Interests, wants, needs, and capacities constitute the very shape of the human world” (p. 50). This includes forcing subalterns to adapt, treating people as instruments of production. To summarize, there are two broadly outlined concepts that make up the three-dimensional, perspectival, or modern culture. First, all meaning is completely arbitrary and the individual is of paramount importance. Second, the modern world is concerned with progress, expansion, and fragmentation of space.

Dimensional Accrual

While some dissociation occurs during consciousness shifts, Kramer (1997, 2013) argues that humans *accrue* or accumulate culture and communication habits from each dimension rather than leaving one completely in the past and assimilating themselves into the current level of consciousness. Modern culture presumes magic and mythic consciousness structures. Throughout history, many leaders and civilizations have connected the perspectival with magic and mythic combinations to create a very potent force. For example, Ravenscroft (1973) relates the story of Hitler and the Spear of Destiny. Legend claimed this was the spear used by the Romans to pierce Christ in the side at his crucifixion. Hitler believed the Spear held magical power that would help the one holding it conquer the world. Immediately upon conquering Vienna, Hitler went to the Museum and when he held the spear, he looked as if he had a magical aura about him. Other witnesses later explained that Hitler claimed to have visions of his future success when he first held the Spear. Hitler is not unique in combining magic and mythic cultures with the perspectival. We find highly symbolic and idolic rituals and ceremonies throughout the modern world. Kramer (2013) illustrates:

We declare war. We pronounce couples husband and wife. We take oaths to protect the Constitution of the United States as we change our identities from foreign national to "naturalized" citizen, from civilian to soldier. We swear on the Bible to tell the truth. We christen children, ships, and space vehicles with ritual ceremony and "spirits" as a process of naming, and the name carries connotations transferred to the sense of the child and machine. Such utterances must be spoken aloud and publically for the magic binding force to work. (p.148)

Kramer (2013) posits one possible consequence of accrual is combining perspectival technology with strongly emotional magical or mythical beliefs. This combination leads to a high potential for volatile conflict. In the previously cited

example about Hitler, it is easy to see during his rise to power in the marches and rhetoric of the Third Reich, a violently persuasive movement combined magical and mythic beliefs with perspectival military technology to enforce that ideology. In 2014, many nation states and nongovernmental or what Andreas (2003) calls clandestine actors have the capacity and will to combine magic and mythical beliefs to enforce their will in the modern world. Some of these actors include terrorist groups (Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al-Shabab, Hezbollah, and others), transnational criminal groups, and other types of extremist groups. Consider the belief system of a terrorist, who combines a nuclear weapon with their magic beliefs. What would they be willing to do? This is not to say all cultures that have one set of beliefs or that have some combination between the magic, mythic, and perspectival will automatically be harmful, but in this globalized world, this is a very real possibility. However, if we could exist in an efficient or *integral* social system where we would treat all dimensions as if they exist on the same plane, the result could be mutually beneficial to everyone. The integral area of DAD theory is the part that needs more work and many more examples to see if it could actually function, as opposed to just being a good idea. Within my research on walls, I plan to strengthen this section of the theory.

Applied DAD Theory

As early as 1992, Kramer started elaborating on Gebser principles that communication scholars could apply to study messages. Kramer (1997, 2013) does not initially conceptualize DAD as a communication theory, but in later development illustrates the intricate relationship between communication and culture. This

dissertation is further evidence that DAD theory is effective in explaining the communicative functions of walls.

The physical structures we build contain messages, whether they are intentional or not. The choices about what to build says more about the individuals, communities and nations who construct the project than those who look at it and/or utilize it. Sometimes the structures can be highly controversial, as in the case of the Enola Gay Bomber, which the United States built for war. Ikeda and Kramer (1998) describe that after the plane dropped the atomic bomb, the Enola Gay became a highly iconic and controversial artifact. Ikeda and Kramer (1998) apply DAD theory to illustrate the various magical, mythic, and perspectival interpretations of the bomber when the Smithsonian Institute in Washington D.C. displayed it to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the dropping of the bomb. By the time the controversy was finished, the museum had almost entirely changed the original plans for the exhibit. Ikeda and Kramer (1998) clarify how several dimensions were simultaneously present in the iconic artifact:

The Enola Gay[‘s].... material presence-at-hand, magically evinces its identity as the "actual" machine that dropped the first atomic bomb on people. Mythically, it symbolizes hot war, cold war, national pride, evil, and many other potential adumbrations. Perspectivally (in the modern sense) this weapons system demonstrated itself to be the most efficient machine of mass destruction yet used....It is at once an idol, a symbol, and a sign. (p. 50-51)

This was only the first impression of the messages a person might have received while considering the bomber. The plane itself, as well as the context and history surrounding it contain a great range of messages for all the parties involved in the controversial decision of whether to put it on public display. Using DAD, Ikeda, and Kramer (1998)

examine the messages one at a time to understand what the iconic artifact communicated for different people.

Zuckerman (2008) provides another example is particularly relevant to a discussion about the semiotic nature of walls. Through a Gebserian analysis that included aspects of DAD theory, Zuckerman attempts to explain the troubles in Northern Ireland from several viewpoints. He argues that scholars tend to divide the Irish along national or racial lines, which ignores the importance of religious and political differences. Gebser consciousness structures allow for the inclusion of religion and politics because Gebserian analysis is interested in more than a few demographic traits. Zuckerman (2008) insists that the conflicts in Northern Ireland are more than about religion. Zuckerman examines political murals on barrier walls that display faction symbols and diverse language used to express divergent identities and even neighborhood boundaries. Zuckerman (2008) states:

Idolic and mythic boundary markers have become a ubiquitous part of the Northern Irish landscape. To the outside observer, the most obvious boundary markers are the hundreds of murals found in Belfast. These murals appear through the sectarian areas and seem to increase in intensity at the boundary areas where the Catholic and Protestant neighborhood meet. Here the murals frequently take on their strongest tone. (p.95-96)

Zuckerman (2008) concludes that the painters and others who support the murals are very aware of messages they are trying to send to those who see and read them. The murals serve as idolic and mythic emotional boundaries that people do not cross lightly. They serve as a magical means to keep enemies out of the neighborhoods. Like in the case of the walls in Northern Ireland, I noted in the literature review that murals on the security fence across the USMX border contribute to the identity and communication of the people who created them.

DAD Research Questions

To gain greater knowledge of what walls mean as communication artifacts, I offer the following research question. What are the magic, mythic, and perspectival dimensions of walls and what does that communicate about them? With the open-ended nature of DAD theory, as I work to uncover horizons, I may find additional research questions during the analysis process.

Chapter Four: Methodology & Research Design

Methodology

Phenomenology

In order to understand why the research design of semiotic analysis is necessarily open ended, it is helpful to understand *phenomenology* that is the foundation for hermeneutics, semiotics, ST, and DAD. Spiegelberg (1971) defines phenomenology, “as the study of the general essence of consciousness and of its various structures” (p. 105). Husserl, (1910/2006) expresses that the individual consciousness comprises subjective physical and mental experience that they use to discern the world around them. One place to look for why we act a particular way or how we communicate is in the consciousness of the human mind. Husserl contends that individuals have knowledge, values, and motives we use to accomplish a particular action or intention. These actions result in receiving new experiences that we add to our knowledge base, then form new intentions, and act again (Spiegelberg, 1971). Husserl's examination of intentions, also referred to as studying the human *transcendental consciousness* is akin

to communication scholars studying various aspects of the entire communication process. In DAD theory, Kramer (1997, 2013) clarifies that communication is a necessary co-evolutionary process for humans to exist. Kramer (2013) uses the term “pan-evolution” as a way to describe this integral and important process (p. 129-130). This is where our intentions and thoughts come together in our minds and then we are somehow able to put together messages we share, and the mutual exchange of shared messages that creates the social and cultural structures in which we live.

Phenomenology is critical of empirical ways of thinking because complete objectivity is unobtainable, and unnecessary. Husserl (1910/2006) contends that because we engage in science with our biases, we cannot obtain absolute truth of a phenomenon; rather, we can only see it from our subjective perspective. Many intercultural communication behaviors are so subjective that it may not be helpful to use surveys and questionnaires. It is unlikely such tools can accurately tell a researcher why a community picks one sign to represent them over another, or what particular cultural behaviors mean to their people. Quantitative data is only interested in averages so it is almost entirely ineffective in trying to comprehend and explain cultural behaviors. When an outlier exists, quantitative researchers label it as irrational or pointless and exclude it from their explanation. Quantitative research cannot explain why certain cultures rely on magic such as incantations or a belief in a natural life spirit. Instead, it is essential that as a researcher, we obtain the perspective or experience of those people and communities for why they make their choices, as far as it is possible to do so. An understanding of phenomenology opens up a path for valuable semiotic and hermeneutic analysis.

The Hermeneutic Circle

Semiotics scholars explain that semiosis is both an internal and external process. Internally, the human brain is in a constant state of interpreting and assigning meaning to the barrage of signs we receive externally through communication channels (Noth, 1985/1990). In conversations, a sender has thoughts based on their experience and they communicate these thoughts as a message. We receive and interpret the message based on our own experience, then construct and send a new message as a reply. Through this semiosis exchange and by employing instinctive abilities, we build a sense of individual identity. German philosopher Hans Gadamer (2004/1975), an expert in hermeneutics, defines the field as the study of interpretation. Furthermore, Gadamer defines identity as *horizon*, which is the interpretation of lived experiences, or a context for our unique perspective on things. We use our horizon to identify who we are and see how we are different from others. In qualitative research, Foley (1997) and Schwand (2003) clarify that the hermeneutic circle is the process of a researcher gathering and reconciling the various horizons in the semiosis process to gain a more comprehensive understanding of an artifact under study.

According to Gadamer (1975/2004), I have pre-conceived notions about the text under study. As I step into the hermeneutic circle, I have my own prejudice viewpoint that I need to understand before I can begin gathering other perspectives with which I can compare. In this case, my hermeneutic horizon comes from several years of studying the theories, South African history and apartheid, and the USMX security fence (see Table 5 in the data collection section for a complete list of where I developed

my perspective). The circle is representative of the idea that interpretation is always happening because we all have prejudicial horizons. My dissertation proposes to add more horizons to the circle as well as use the semiotic method to reconcile the various perspectives and come up with conclusions about what I learned. There are many more meanings than I can gather in a dissertation, but the process is still a worthy endeavor to understand the communication functions of the artifacts.

American semiotician Charles Peirce and Gadamer (1975/2004) demonstrates how semiosis and hermeneutics function together. Peirce states that a painter shares thoughts by painting them on a canvas that through the semiosis process becomes a piece of communication (Noth, 1985/1990). People can try to view the painting from the artist's horizon but they cannot exactly comprehend it in the same way.

Alternatively, people may interpret the communication of the painting in another way based on their own lived experiences. Gadamer (2004/1975) stated, "...everyone who experiences a work of art incorporates this experiences wholly within himself: that is, into the totality of his self-understanding, within which it means something to him" (p. xxvii). In some cases, like the postmodern painter, an artist or observer may articulate that a painting has no meaning (although this position itself is placing meaning on something). They may insist that an observer take away whatever meaning suits them the best or the artist might not care at all what others think. Many artists would concede that art is a never-ending process of semiosis where interpretation takes place regarding their communicative act. We not only interpret art but we interpret and assign meaning to all our experiences.

The Semiotic Method

In the theory section when explaining the concept of signification, I explain Saussure's (1972/1983) argument in that language is the most important sign system and makes up all other sign systems that humans use to communicate. Saussure argues that humans think of pictures in their minds and combine them with sounds. The resulting noise that comes out of the human mouth is communication. Elsewhere in the dissertation I refer to this process as transcendental consciousness (Husserl term), or pan-evolution (Kramer DAD theory term). Although there are some shared definitions on signs, each individual has a unique perspective so humans can have an infinite number of perspectives on any subject. We demonstrate this by how differently we speak about, culturally shape, and perceive the meaning of space. Saussure (1972/1983) postulates three characteristics about language structures that became the foundation for the structural analysis methodology. First, linguistics systems are the most important empirical and practical system. Second, linguistics is the most advanced of all semiological sciences, and third, the study of linguistic structures offers a basis to study and comprehend other semiological and structural questions.

French semiotician Claude Levi-Strauss (1964/1975) advances Saussure's concepts far beyond just studying linguistic structure, to include creating the *Science of Myths*. Levi-Strauss and Saussure influenced other semiotician's including Barthes (1957/1987, 1964/1973) who also studied the Science of Myths, and American communication scholar Ed Hall who studied how space is culturally structured. The common thread between these scholars is that the systematic study of linguistics is a cornerstone for understanding, analyzing, and describing other systems of signs that

make up social and cultural structures. We think and perceive in words and develop everything else on that basis. Hall (1966) explains,

Man's very perception of the world...is programmed by the language he speaks, just as a computer is programmed. Like the computer, man's mind will register and structure external reality only in accordance with the program. Since two languages often program the same class of events quite differently, no belief or philosophical system should be considered apart from language. (p. 1-2)

Levi-Strauss (1958/1963, 1964/1969) developed a semiotic methodology to conduct a structural analysis of cultures called a *Science of Mythology*. Levi-Strauss postulates that humans operate from similar mental classification systems so regardless of how their myths develop and differ, scholars should be able to see some similarities in their mental structures. One such characteristic according to the Russian semiotician Roman Jakobson is how humans, starting as babies, categorize everything into binary opposites so we can comprehend the world around us (Noth, 1985/1990). Levi-Strauss following Jakobson's theories argued, "Language may appear as laying a kind of foundation for the more complex structures [and categories] which correspond to the different aspects of culture" (Levi-Strauss, 1958/1963, p. 69). In an extensive ethnography on the myths of the Bororo Indians in Central Brazil, Levi-Strauss (1964/1969) classified myths into empirical categories. Major concepts within categories have binary opposites. One central binary opposite in this study was the distinction between nature and culture. Food analogies such as "the raw and the cooked, the fresh and the decayed, the moistened and the burned" (Levi-Strauss, 1964/1969, p. 1) were all examples of what Levi-Strauss argued was the difference between nature and culture. Natural food was raw, fresh, and moistened but when people try to cook it, burn it, let it decay, or otherwise manipulate it, it is cultural. Before starting the

analysis, Levi-Strauss conceded that the study of myths was a new, broad field that scholars needed to apply to other structural or social systems.

Berger (2011), a communication scholar and semiotician offers a basic method for conducting an effective semiotic analysis of binary oppositions. Berger refers to binary opposition analysis as conducting a *paradigmatic* analysis of texts. First, a researcher should categorize a text into opposing pairs. Then the researcher should discuss denotative and connotative meanings associated with the oppositions in the artifacts. Berger (2011, p. 64-65) uses the poem "Humpty Dumpty" to illustrate how paradigmatic analysis works. The following oppositions are present in the poem:

On the wall	On the ground
Unsteadiness	Stability
Danger	Safety
Liquid in container (egg)	Solid object
Fragile	Hard to break, strong
Pieces	Wholeness
Can't be reconstructed	Reconstruction is possible

Table 4 - Humpty Dumpty Binary Opposition Terms

The primary opposition is “being on the wall” or “on the ground”. The rest of the oppositions are subsets of the first opposition. Berger (2011) claims that researchers could reveal social and cultural messages by discussing the denotative and connotative meanings associated with each term or phrase.

By definition, walls are a binary opposite that divide space creating opposing positions. Therefore, to analyze the communicative functions of walls, we should apply the paradigmatic, binary opposition analysis. Depending on which side of the wall you fall on, you are going to have dissimilar views about the way things are. In order to illustrate how paradigmatic analysis of walls will work, I use the example of a carrot patch and fence. An open carrot patch is unprotected from rodents who may eat the

crops, weeds that may creep into the garden, people who may step on the crops because they are unaware that the carrot patch is there, or other problems. Putting a fence around the carrot patch creates a binary opposition by dividing the space. Inside the fence, the carrot patch now has a certain level of protection and its own space to grow. It is also contained to some degree so it cannot escape or grow wild crops or weeds. Anything outside the fence is wild or unwanted that may include animals, people, weeds, and anything else deemed to be an unimportant element to the carrot patch. The fence also may denote owned space that requires defensive measures from potential dangers lurking outside. While this example is an over-simplification, it does provide an illustration of how the analysis will function as I discuss the more complex issues of apartheid and the USMX security fence with their cultural and social characteristics.

Research Design

The research design for this dissertation has five steps. First, I develop my hermeneutic foundation. Gadamer claimed (1975/2004) that the hermeneutic circle has no beginning or end; it is both the first and last step in the research process. Therefore, as a first step, I identified my own knowledge and background on the topic. Comprehending my own horizon (that is inherently prejudiced) provided me with some context to start with. Throughout the project, I collected other hermeneutic horizons to give a more complete context for apartheid and the USMX security fence. As I worked through the research process, my own horizon also began to change to give me a greater comprehension of all the issues surrounding these two wall artifacts. Gadamer

(1975/2004) constantly cautioned against trying to gather all perspectives in order to create some kind of “objective” result because it is impossible and unnecessary.

Data Collection

The second step is to find data to add to my hermeneutic horizon in order to try and better understand the artifact under study. Within the data collection there are contrasting viewpoints but all are helpful in creating the most comprehensive, holistic view of the artifact. The units of analysis are historical apartheid in South Africa, and the USMX border fence. I found semiotic data in verbal communication such as interviews, official comments and letters, movies, TV, and the news. I found more evidence with non-verbal data to include books, legal arguments, photos, art images, written news articles, and a variety of texts on the Internet. Personal experience and observations are critical to comprehension and analysis. Preliminary data collection started in the spring 2008 semester after my first dissertation committee meeting and continued through 2014 (see Table 5 for complete details).

Table 5 - Research & Hermeneutic Background

Time of Data Collection	Resource	Description
Spring 2008	Hermeneutic experience, observations, and notes	Planning meeting, topic discussion to begin shaping my horizon
Fall 2008- Fall 2009		Coursework and research in semiotics, hermeneutics, phenomenology
Spring 2010		OU Institutional Research Board (IRB) for Human Subjects Research Board
Spring 2010		Visited U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (USICE) office in Oklahoma City, and spoke with the Customs and

		Border Protection (CBP) Port Authority. Also sent email proposal asking for help from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Public Affairs office in Washington D.C.
Summer 2010-May 2012		Wrote dissertation proposal drafts, and had meetings with Dr. Kramer
2008-2014	JSTORE, EBSCO Host, Communication and Mass Media Complete, Communication Abstracts databases, and books	As noted in the literature review, a preliminary review in these areas indicates that they are where the majority of any literature about walls exists, or is relevant to physical characteristics of walls.
	Internet search engines and websites	In a basic search on walls, besides marketing of walls and wall related items, there are plenty of websites discussing specific walls as tour areas, historical artifacts, etc. They can be useful textual evidence in understand a specific wall myth
2012-2014	Books, journal articles, newspapers on South Africa & USMX border	Develop semiotic historic context and current descriptions of apartheid and the security fence, and examine/answer theoretically related research questions for both artifacts.
	Internet search engines, websites	
	Visit to El Paso, TX Border Fence	

A search in Dictionary.com maintains a compilation of sources with 22 meanings, synonyms, metaphors, or characteristics of the word “walls” (Ammer, 2002; Collins, 2008; Dictionary.com, 2008; Easton, 1897; Etymology, 2008; Heritage-Steadman, 2012; Kipfer & Chapman, 2007). Table 6 reveals the 22

characteristics that provide a basis for collection of data from 2008-2014. Both the USMX border fence and apartheid fit several of the 22 meanings throughout the data.

Table 6 – Definitions of meanings of "walls"

<u>NOUNS</u>	
1. Shelter	any of various permanent upright constructions having a length much greater than the thickness and presenting a continuous surface except where pierced by doors, windows, etc.: used for shelter, protection, or privacy, or to subdivide interior space, to support floors, roofs, or the like, to retain earth, to fence in an area, etc.
2. Physical defense	rampart raised for defensive purposes
3. Intangible idea	immaterial or intangible barrier - <i>wall of racism</i>
4. Enclosure, physical or mental	example wall of fire, wall of troops
5. Physical embankment	sea wall, levy
6. Historical object	Great Wall, Berlin Wall, etc.
7. Scientific (physics/biology)	Outermost structural layer or film protecting, surrounding, and defining physical limits of an object
8. Mining	side of a level or drift; overhanging side of a vein; hanging wall or footwall
<u>ADJECTIVES</u>	
9. pertaining to a wall	wall space
10. growing on a wall	wall plants, wall cress
11. situated, placed, installed	wall oven, wall safe
<u>VERB</u>	

12. Enclose, divide, protect	wall in the yard, someone is walled in on every side
13. to seal or fill a doorway	wall an unused entrance
14. seal or entomb	
<u>IDIOMS</u>	
15. climb the walls -	become intense or frantic
16. drive or push	force into a desperate situation - back against a wall
17. Over the wall	break out of prison, overcome some great obstacle
18. go to the wall	be defeated in competition; fail in business especially finance; to be put aside; take an extreme and determined position
19. hit the wall	physical strength depleted, willpower becomes the key to overcome an obstacle
20. off the wall	bizarre or crazy occurrence
21. up against the wall	firing squad, failure, tight position seems eminent
22. up the wall	drive up the wall - driving people nuts at the office

Sampling Rationale

Step three of the research design was to justify the choice of samples in the data collection. There are three reasons for my sampling choices. First, the “Security Fence” plays an important role in the Intelligence Community (IC), federal, state, and local law enforcement communities. Due to my employment, I have an obvious hermeneutic interest in the border fence as it functions as a message about national security across this nation and around the world. The subsequent research I conducted in the literature

review, and further discussions with the committee, and co-workers in the IC, the communicative functions of the security fence became even more intriguing.

The second rationale is my personal and academic interest in the study of communication in international and intercultural contexts. The dissertation committee made up of communication and anthropology scholars felt the USMX border is an important artifact for scholarly study and it is comparable to apartheid. Furthermore, scholars in multiple academic fields as highlighted in the literature review claim that wall barriers are a critical social and cultural issue that we should study. A number of events from 2008-2014 increased the debate about the USMX border security. There continues to be a significant interest and awareness of how border walls function on a global scale and my data samples reflect that interest.

The third rationale for picking two specific walls is that trying to study anything larger would explode the research burden for a dissertation project. For example, as my committee pointed out in my proposal defense in 2012, a study of how walls create sacred space covers centuries of material and concepts about space that philosophers have a difficulty explaining. It is unlikely in this small amount of time I can cover such large concepts. There are more security walls in the world than I can write about in one dissertation project. Further comparison and discussion of those walls should be included in future research projects.

Data Analysis

There are two parts to step four in analyzing the wall artifacts. First, I will use the collected data to describe the hermeneutic history and context on each artifact.

Second, I will employ the paradigmatic analysis technique by examining the literal binary opposition of each wall, and then reviewing the related denotative and connotative definitions and explanations. I expect that some analysis will be obvious and some of the analysis will reveal hidden information. Through the discussion of meanings, I expect the analysis to reveal information about the people who built the walls and what that communicates to them, as well as the messages it communicates to other people who deal with the walls.

Theoretical Inquires

In step five, I apply the theories to the analysis to answer some research questions. Ultimately, I want to find the communication functions of the walls because they are more than inanimate structures without meaning. Do walls only fall in the pre-existing 22 categories? Does that communicate enough about their social meaning? If it does not fall under the categories, what are the additional characteristics that ought to be included in the meaning? ST and DAD provide an important basis for discussing additional essential characteristics of walls.

Chapter Five: The Apartheid Wall

Apartheid in South Africa was a legal and racial wall born out of social, cultural, and linguistic values. It forcefully separated people destroying meaningful communication starting in 1652 when European White colonists arrived at the Cape. Similarly, the USMX Security Fence separates people and their ability to communicate about important issues on an international, national, and perhaps most importantly, at a

community level. Lentin (2010) suggests that General Jan Smuts first used the word apartheid in 1917. In the Afrikaans language, apartheid means ‘of separateness’ or ‘apartness’ (Lentin, 2010). Derrida (1983/1985) explains the connotative version:

APARTHEID: By itself the word occupies the terrain like a concentration camp. System of partition, barbed wire, crowds of mapped out solitudes....the word concentrates separation, raises it to another power and sets separation itself apart: ‘apartitionality’....there’s no racism without ait institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it outlines space in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates. (p. 292)

This chapter employs semiotic and hermeneutic analysis to outline the historic, communicative functions of the apartheid wall, and the way people responded to it. There was minimal opposition to the colonial message for almost three centuries. Common to this time-period, the imperial European powers had an ideology consisting of Caucasian, Christian, European superiority over all other races, religions, cultures, or nations. Under that ideology, they immediately began to deceive and later physically remove indigenous groups from their lands. First the Dutch, and then British imperialism propped up this elitist ideology for over three centuries. The legalized wall of apartheid defined the South African identity until the late 1990’s when it was finally abolished. The effects of apartheid are still rippling across South Africa today.

The Semiotics and Hermeneutics of Apartheid

My horizon developed by reviewing books and Internet websites related to South African history so I could comprehend what apartheid is before trying to compare it to a seemingly incomparable communication artifact in the USMX security fence. Gathering a historic perspective is so important, that three prominent authors discussed

it when they wrote about and participated in the *South Africa War* (a.k.a. Anglo-Boer War, The Great Boer War, 1899-1902). They noted that understanding the war was critical to having a perspective on where the South African identity would be later on. My research starts with the history of colonization, wars and social affairs with indigenous peoples, the development of the Boer or Afrikaan culture, the Boer wars, and the establishment and influences of apartheid on the country and future leaders like Nelson Mandela. I argue that the ideology of apartheid existed in communication and actions long before the official law came into existence in 1948.

While developing my hermeneutic horizon, I identify a number of important binary opposites stemming from apartheid listed in Table 7. I conduct a paradigmatic analysis using connotative and denotative historic examples to give context to the consequences of the apartheid binary opposition. Of note is the fact that some of the words in Table 7, or the ideologies they represent are not antiquated ideas, but we still see them in a post-apartheid South Africa struggle, and in the U.S. immigration and security fence debate.

Table 7 - Apartheid Binary Opposition Terms

Separate	Attached
Apart	Together
Burgher	Poor farmer, slave, local colonist
Christian	Heathen
Civilized	Tribal society (Uncivilized)
European concept of property rights, borders, and law	Tribal rights, customs, and understanding of borders
White (European Caucasian)	African, Indian, Chinese (any race other than White)
European Dutch	Afrikaan Boer
Afrikaan Boer	Uitlander and/or African

Colonial South Africa and the Dutch East India Company (1652-1785)

In 1652 the Calvinist Dutch, and in 1688, a small group of French Protestant refugees called the Huguenots and a mix of German religious refugees settled at Cape Town. They became a Dutch East Indies Company (DEIC) stop on the trading routes. Slavery was technically illegal in Dutch colonies, but entrepreneurs illegally found ways to import slaves from East Asia to help develop the Cape colonies. There were several indigenous communities already on the land including most prominently the herding people known as the *Khoi Khoi* (*Kohekohe* is the current morphological and syntax title of the Khoi Khoi language and people and will be the reference used hereafter). The colonists gave the Kohekohe the nickname of *Hottentots*, a derogatory reference about their language using many clicking sounds. There was also the *San Bushmen* whom colonists confused for Kohekohe. They were mountain dwellers with excellent hunting skills. The Bushmen had a reputation for being plunderers so colonists and indigenous groups all treated them as subhuman heathens (Hahn, 1881 & Theal, 1897). Important indigenous groups in the East included the Xhosa translated in Khoi as *angry men* in Khoi (Peires, 1982). The Xhosa rebelled against colonial rule on a regular basis. Nelson Mandela was a descendent from the Abathembu (Thembu) Royal Line, one of the main tribes in the Xhosa group (Xhosa Culture, 2013). In addition, the Zulu who had a vast population would prove to be a difficult force for a time against foreign imperial governments (Beck, 2000).

Colonists at Cape Town employed Kohekohe to work on their farms, and used slaves imported from India and the Far East (Jenkins, 2012 & Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), 2009). Variava (1989) explains that despite some

internal discord, white Burgher (Dutch name for Bourgeoisie) settlers wanted to distinguish and separate themselves most importantly from colored natives and foreigners, but also from poor white people in various classes. In order to communicate their superiority, they created the title of *Afrikan*, or *Afrikaner*, or *Trekboere (Boer)* (translated as Dutch farmer; nomadic; pastoral). They developed a local version of the Dutch language called Afrikaan and typically communicated only among themselves, deeming other races, cultures, and languages as subhuman. The Boer Afrikaner ideology of apartheid became essential to perpetuating the walls of persecution within the government and social arenas.

Table 8 - White Burger Binary Opposition

White Burgher	Poor farmer, indentured servant, slave (Chinese, Indian)
Afrikan Boer	
Free Burgher	
White (rich or poor irrelevant)	Kohekohe, Xhosa, San Bushmen
Civilized	Uncivilized
Kohekohe “civilized tribal society”	San Bushmen “heathen tribe”

George M. Theal, South African historian, had excellent access to many Cape Town government documents and other resources. Theal (1897) described the early history of the Cape Town Colony from the perspective of the Dutch East Indies Trading Company who ruled from 1652 to 1795. This is admittedly a biased written view from a person originally of European descent. Indigenous peoples more often kept their history through oral histories rather than written, so accessing their written work is more difficult. Under the apartheid ideology, most white missionaries and colonists saw all indigenous peoples as less than human, and likely used witchcraft that came from the devil. Theal indicated that the only reason for the Dutch to establish any presence at the

Cape was due to its geopolitical importance as a shipping lane between Europe and Asia. Many authors note the harsh conditions of the land including an intimidating climate, tough topography, the threat of attacks from indigenous peoples, smallpox (1713, 1755, & 1767), and the wilderness beyond the coastal areas. Despite these objections, the Boer and later, immigrants from the rest of Europe began to establish the region as formal colonies. The challenges faced in the colonization could be an in-depth discussion, the implications of which I could explore in future research.

The *Free Burghers* were originally indentured servants of the Company, but became part of the Boer culture upon release. In 1657, the Company took the first step towards legalizing apartheid, almost 300 years before the 1950's movement began. The Company released indentured servants into the indigenous South African populations with strict conditions including regulating what they could grow and sell, how much they could sell for, and many other regulations. In addition, the Company expected the former indentured servants on new settlements to provide them with food and provisions. The Herman and Stephens groups formed to take the risk of leaving the colony because they perceived it was better than remaining a slave. Many free burghers obtained their freedom and left South Africa, but the few that remained became part of the Afrikan culture (Theal, 1897).

Instead of trying to communicate by learning any indigenous language, the Dutch and later the British established the apartheid ideology by speaking the most advanced languages that they egotistically perceived as their own native tongue, Dutch or English. One example that reveals this feeling of superiority was how early settlers gave derogatory Dutch and English geopolitical nicknames to tribal chiefs and their

territories. Indigenous people did not have written records or maps like the colonists as they had a different cultural understanding of the land. So many settlers used the nicknames that they became part of the social and geopolitical culture of the territories. For example, one of the first Kohekohe chiefs who interacted regularly with the Dutch was Gogoso, who was nicknamed “Fat Captain” (Theal (1897).

Table 9 - European Values Binary Opposition

Christian	Heathen
European concept of property rights, law	Collective respect/share land resources
Nationalism and borders	Tribe/Clan, Family

Table 9 identifies values the Dutch and other European colonists brought into South Africa that would strengthen the apartheid ideology and its subsequent binary opposition, including religion and land rights concepts. Theal (1897) expressed that Christian baptism was more critical than who belonged to which race. The communication of Christian conversion was a religious wall that segregated members of civil society from the heathens. It is no coincidence that ‘being clean’ and ‘acceptable’ was synonymous with being Dutch or English, white. Furthermore, it was a Christian desire to live in a modern colony, not live like the heathens outside the fence. Conversely, being another race or having a different cultural/religious viewpoint was comparable to being unclean, unfit, and one was ultimately damned for it. In addition, they were unwelcome in the modern city, and white social or political life. Heathens and outcasts such as indigenous peoples and foreigners made up the vast majority of the population.

The DEIC introduced the concept of legal property ownership to indigenous peoples in South Africa. According to borderlands scholars (Asiwaju, 1993; Magoro,

1985), the modern concept of property ownership, and the subsequent creation of borders to privatize property caused unique and devastating consequences across the African continent for centuries. Asiwaju (1993) argued that as recently as the 1990's, African nations and local tribes were still dealing with the consequences of property contracts that were hundreds of years old. These contracts have continued to fuel conflicts between countries and ethnic groups competing for resources. In Gebserian terms, the DEIC and imperial European powers acted from a perspectival consciousness structure in declaring humans could have land as a possession. From a magical consciousness structure, the Kohekohe could not imagine "owning" the land because the land was a spirit and equal with the people. The different magical and mythical cultures structures of the indigenous people were incredibly complex. In a Dutch perspectival world of 1659, there was no place for magic. When the Kohekohe saw the colonists claiming and crowding the cattle ranges, rebellions broke out. The Dutch had powerful technology like better flintlock guns and modern war tactics that quickly put the indigenous people under submission. Indigenous people had to contend with many new kinds of foreign values and technologies that would severely destroy their way of life.

In 1672, the commissioner Van Overbeke communicated that deception in trade was a normal practice so tribal leaders should be deceptive. For example, Van Overbeke revised negotiations with Chief Mankagou, son of Goagosoa who the Dutch colonists knew as Schacher. A cursory review of the etymology for Schacher is a swindler, haggler, or person who wanders in the woods. As far as the Burghers and colonists were concerned, Mankagou could fit any of those categories and appeared to be shifty in his

trading and other deal making with white people. Despite Mankagou's negotiating skills, Van Overbeke deceptively stole lands and resources to gain a stronger position over the Kohekohe. The deal included eight parts such as forcing tribes to sell their cattle only to the Company, and expecting that the tribes not harm the Company, in turn for some protection against other tribes. Mankagou also made some money and support in return for these deals. He signed his mark on the contracts indicating with the help of an interpreter that he comprehended all the transactions of the deal. Van Overbeke never intended to follow through on Company commitments so in essence there was no deal (Theal, 1897). As quickly as a deal was made, a new commissioner would come to the Cape and re-arrange agreements. More often, new commissioners discarded the generous deals for ones that only benefited the Company and a few bourgeois Burghers who supported the Dutch government in Europe. Within 30 years, the original white colonists culturally fused with the Kohekohe and slaves to create a new Afrikan community largely led by the Boer.

Table 10 - Dutch Culture and Language Binary Opposition

European Dutch Culture	Afrikaans Boer Dutch
	Intercultural fusion between Boer, Africans, and foreigners
European Dutch Language	100's of indigenous languages and dialects
	Afrikaans
	Chinese
	Indian
	Other languages and dialects

Table 10 identifies the binary opposition set up in Cape Town by Commissioner Simon Van Der Stel in 1679. Van Der Stel strongly believed in the wall of discrimination by separating everything Dutch from everything else. Anything Dutch

was superior to anything else. Similar to how physical wall deters communication or collaboration, Van Der Stel's policies effectively restricted communication so African natives and foreigners could not gain social, political, economic or legal power. Van Der Stel held the core belief that anything not Dutch was not only worse, but completely unnecessary, including the entire culture and language of many indigenous tribes (Theal, 1897). During his reign from 1679-1691, Van Der Stel fought to restore the Dutch language and culture to the colony by importing white Dutch settlers who had been loyal to Holland. In addition, Van Der Stel built a courthouse and schools where the "legal" language of the people was Dutch. Only Dutch people could marry other Dutch people. There was not to be a continuing intercultural mixing of the races and/or religions between the settlers, the indigenous people, and others. By 1687, Van Der Stel gained so much influence over the Kohekohe that he chose the successor of the Goringhaiquas tribe. Finally, Van Der Stel was so influential that the colony named Simons Bay (currently Simonstown) after him. Using language to enforce segregation had a profound and lasting impact on South Africa.

One sure way to erase the culture of a people is by killing their means of communication through banning their language. One of the most effective ways to entrench linguistic ideology is by passing and enforcing laws that elevate the oppressor's language over others. In two more extreme situations, the new walls created by legal means had very real, very horrific consequences. First, the Nazi Holocaust led to the genocide of six million Jewish people. Prior to the death camps, the Nazi political party passed laws against Jews especially in Poland that physically segregated them into certain parts of the cities that became known as *Ghettos*. By 1941, there were over 1100

ghettos, with the largest ghetto in Warsaw housing over half a million Jewish people (Holocaust Museum, 2013).

The second example where the oppressor's language was an enforcement mechanism with horrific consequences was the Sudan genocide starting in 2003. The Sudan government and the Janjaweed killed over 400,000 people and displaced almost three million more. Nyombe (1997) illustrates how language and its relationship with the law created a political crisis in Sudan that resulted in South Sudan declaring independence in 2011, but tensions continue to flare in the region. Prior to the independence of South Sudan, the northern government used laws to enforce Arabic as the national language. Millions of Southern Sudanese speak native dialects, English, or other tongues. This is largely because during the colonial period the British at one point supported the South, and then turned their backs on them when the Khartoum government, who was Arabic, took power. Schools teach Arabic since it is the official language. This means that children are learning to speak the language of the new hegemony while their parents and other adults cannot participate in society. Destroying language effectively eliminates opposing ideologies and competing cultures. Throughout South African modern history, foreign leaders constantly employed destructive language policies to eliminate unique indigenous languages.

The apartheid wall employed by the DEIC devastated the culture, language, and livelihood of the Kohekohe people. Around 1724 the DEIC peaked with success and then declined in power until they disbanded in 1795. By the 1760's when Governor Tulbagh came to power, Theal (1897) argued that in the first 100 years of colonization in South Africa, the most racism and violence came from infighting between the

indigenous tribes. By this point, many indigenous people worked for Boer farmers or within the Company. The Kohekohe launched many uprisings from 1755-1775 that made the Burghers anxious that the Kohekohe were becoming too powerful. The indigenous tribal people had their own tactics and weapons that could increase problems for colonists.

When Governor Plettenberg became Company Commander in 1771, there were several local and global events taking place that would continue to lead the Company to its demise. Like the American colonies at war with the British, the Afrikan's felt more and more compelled to defend their own interests that were different and in opposition to the Dutch motherland. Although many were Dutch by descent, the Afrikaners had their own interests to protect, including the right to free enterprise. Even for loyalists, it would have been difficult to maintain constant, reliable, up to date communication with the motherland. Message traffic moved with ships that took weeks and months to get to and from South Africa to Netherlands. About this time, South Africa was becoming a larger trade hub and export center so free trade was becoming increasingly important. However, the DEIC tried to keep the success suppressed in order to keep itself in business. The Burghers still had some attachments to the Company and made up the South Africa militia, but they were scattered across 500 miles of territory. By 1781, the Afrikaans knew that Great Britain had declared war on the American colonies. Although the Company continued to rely on Burgher and local support, they ultimately failed. The French and the British fought to take control of the Cape and when the British prevailed, they eliminated the DEIC in 1795 (Theal, 1897).

Notwithstanding the extensive analysis that is helpful to understanding the history of South Africa, some of Theal's comments in 1897 reveal the superiority complex that White people still had after centuries of intermixing with other peoples. This is further connotative evidence of the vast binary opposition in place, which continued to separate and divide white people from all others throughout the country. Theal compared records from the 1600's to those recorded around 1790 to see whether education, gardening, and/or moral training had increased among the Bantu. The common conclusion was that tribal peoples made no progress in their gardening techniques to improve the quality of tobacco and maize. Records also suggested that if any member of the Xhosa culture used modern farming techniques, the Xhosa people would accuse them of witchcraft. Finally, records suggested that the Kohekohe were smarter and more respectful than the Bantu was. In both cases, Theal's comments reveal that throughout the colonization period, anyone who was not White was of lesser human status, and this was a prevailing attitude that would provide an early foundation for domination.

Cape Governor Janssens comments in 1803 are further evidence of the racial superiority complex in the Cape. In spite of the cultural fusion that spanned 150 years, Whites still identified themselves primarily by their race and religion and were much more likely to communicate with similar sociocultural groups. Race and class distinctions caused communication to be difficult between the various groups. Variava (1989) notes,

Significantly, the white community soon began to create powerful distinctions between themselves and the blacks. By conceiving of themselves as 'burghers', 'Christians' and inhabitants, the whites saw themselves as distinct from and superior to non-burghers, slaves, heathens and aliens. In 1803 Governor

Janssen's remarked of the Cape whites that 'they call themselves people and Christians, and the Kaffirs and Hottentots' heathens, and on the strength of this consider themselves entitled to anything. This overriding sense of cohesion and unity was centered on the notion of being white' and 'European'. (no p.)

Hermeneutic Horizons and the Political Significance of the Boer (1795-1902)

The Boer had an increasingly central role to play in the history of South Africa throughout the Nineteenth Century. Two prominent scholars involved in Boer life, culture, and the Boer Wars felt a strong need to communicate their perspectives as to the motives of the British and Boer peoples. Their opposing writings help illuminate why strong communication disparities existed, and how those disparities resulted in the apartheid wall later on. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (1900) wrote a defense of the British Empire in their actions and relationship for 100 years leading up to the Great Boer War (1899-1902). Dr. Willem Johannes Leyds (1906) was the State Attorney, Secretary of State, and Special Envoy to Europe for the South Africa Republic (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, ZAR) between 1884 and 1902. Even after his removal from South Africa, for many years Leyds supported the Boer cause in Europe (Shuttle, 2012). Both authors justified their hermeneutic analysis by reviewing many major chronological events in the history of South Africa. Their comments echo Gadamer's (2004/1975) argument that shared hermeneutics are important to help people understand their identities.

Doyle (1900) defended British actions in the Great Boer War (1899-1902). To help the reader properly appreciate the strength of the Boer, or their stubbornness, Doyle highlighted important Boer events leading up to 1899. Doyle was entrenched in the underlying British ideology that whites, and particularly the British, were the superior race even over other white groups like the Boer. As a field doctor in

Bloemfontein Sir Doyle received firsthand experience about what it was like to face Boer strength, cultural identity and self-determination. He also documented stories from numerous patients and informants. Doyle described the character the Afrikaans from 1652-1795,

Take a community of Dutchmen of the type of those who defended themselves for fifty years against all the power of Spain at a time when Spain was the greatest power in the world. Intermix with them a strain of those inflexible French Huguenots who gave up home and fortune and left their country for ever at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The product must obviously be one of the most rugged, virile, unconquerable races ever seen upon earth. Take this formidable people and train them for seven generations in constant warfare against savage men and ferocious beasts, in circumstances under which no weakling could survive....Then, finally....an ardent and consuming patriotism. Combine all these qualities and all these impulses in one individual, and you have the modern Boer.... (Ch. 1 ¶1)

Leyds (1906) disagreed with the bias of English scholars like Doyle for making apologies and trying to cover up the British imperial oppression. Leyds (1906) stated:

A result of the annexation of....[Transvaal] and the Orange Free State....the Boer people have become an intimate factor in the political life of Great Britain. In order to judge the probable effect of this influence....with the British Government, we must first familiarise ourselves with their past relations. For in spite of the endorsement of the "clean slate" theory by certain English politicians, that theory is worthless in the estimation of those who realise that history is embodied experience and that the future is the outcome of the past. It follows that the Earlier Annexation of the Transvaal, its consequences, and the manner and circumstances in which it was brought about, should be matters of the utmost significance and interest to all who are concerned in the future of South Africa. But, just as it is impossible to consider recent events intelligently without a knowledge of the past from which they sprang, so is it impossible to deal satisfactorily with the annexation of 1877 without first reviewing, however briefly, the preceding incidents of which that annexation may be considered the climax. (P. vii-viii)

Beck (2000) explained the British conquered Cape Town from the French in 1795 to stop French control of trade with India and East Asia, but had no interest in developing it at the time. They held it from 1795-1803, briefly gave back to the Dutch

and then permanently took over in 1806. Afrikan farmers continually revolted against British rule to protect the lands for which they had fought so hard. The Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment that introduced anti-slavery movements in Europe had an influence on the Dutch settlements even though they were half way around the world. The Boer ironically felt like the British were oppressing them when after abolition there were increases in labor shortages in 1808. Maho (2002) clarified that only the slave trade was abolished, not the owning of people as property. Full abolition did not occur under the law until 1833.

Beck (2000) discussed the missionary movement that received support from the British commercial classes. Although Christian missionaries were willing to visit and even mingle in some ways with African people, the ethnocentric message they taught served to build up the wall that divided rather than united the people. The missionaries elevated their religious and cultural values as superior to those inferior people they tried to convert. Any message to help Africans was at odds with Afrikaners' who used slaves for simple labor. Dr. John Philip (1819-1851), a missionary who had been influential in the Emancipation movement in England, wrote many arguments in favor of equal rights for the Khekohe from 1826-1833. Afrikaners' were angry when emancipation occurred because they felt that slave labor was their economic means of survival (Doyle, 1900). After the emancipation, the British government compensation only offered owners 1/3 of the local price per slave and in order to retrieve the funds, the owners had to go to London or send someone that was not worth the cost of the compensation (Beck, 2000; Doyle, 1900).

Beck (2000) and Maho (2002) demonstrated that British appointed governors reinforced a wall of separation in South Africa as early as 1809. The Earl of Caledon instituted the Hottentot Proclamation in 1809, or what local residences called the Caledon or Hattentot Code. The communication function of the codes was similar to the communication function of walls. Walls try to keep people and/or resources in while also dividing and excluding others. The proclamation required the Kohekohe to have a permanent address or mission statement from their white employer. In addition, the code required the Kohekohe to obtain moving passes from a magistrate if they traveled outside of their local district. Sir John Cradock who took power in 1811 enforced the Hattentot Code fiercely by sending Colonel John Graham's military in 1812 to remove over 20,000 off their tribal lands (Beck, 2000).

Although this was a step in the right direction for the Boer, they still perceived the British as too sympathetic to the indigenous people. Sir Cradock introduced circuit courts that lead to the 1815 Slagtersnek Rebellion. Beck (2000) stated,

“...Black employees, even slaves, could now testify in court against their masters. Kohekohe workers, aided by British missionaries, sued farmers for abusive treatment, even murder, and sometimes won.... The Slagtersnek Rebellion... [began in 1815]...when Kohekohe soldiers killed an Afrikaner farmer named Frederik Bezuidenhout who resisted arrest for mistreating a servant. Johannes Bezuidenhout, Frederik's brother, declared war on the colonial government, but local authorities quickly put down the rebellion, killing Johannes and hanging five ringleaders. Although the incident was relatively insignificant at the time, during the twentieth century Afrikaner Nationalists depicted the Slagtersnek rebels as early martyrs in the struggle against British cruelty and oppression”. (p. 46)

Just as Van Der Stel had used language barriers in 1679 to create walls of separation between cultural groups, Craddock utilized the same policy in 1812 to make English as the official language in Cape Town. Language barriers became a very effective means

of diminishing communication between the British, the Boer, and the native population. The Boer and the native people could not attend English language schools or obtain an English only government job. With reduced opportunities to gain economic or political power, the Boer saw Craddock's policies as grievances that would ultimately lead them to war.

Lord Charles Somerset took over in 1826 for Craddock. Somerset immediately pushed for greater "Anglicization" by creating a Supreme Court with English rule and replacing the Dutch Burgher Senate with an English Council of Advice (Beck, 2000). Somerset also created social public institutions including a library, a museum, the Commercial Exchange, and a hospital. In 1820 over 5,000 British colonists, mostly non-farmers arrived at the Cape and moved towards the east frontier with Somerset's blessing. This push into Boer lands further divided the British and Boer people. The British reinforced that they had a superior, civilized lifestyle that the Boer and indigenous groups could learn. Afrikaners felt that teaching native people British sociocultural ways was another intrusion because the Boer perceived the Africans as a labor source without human value (Beck, 2000).

The Great Trek & Continual Destruction of Indigenous Groups

By 1834, the Boer felt pushed to action because of the vast large and small cultural and political changes forced on them by British rule. 15,000 Boer *Voortrekkers* or pioneers caused a mass migration over 600 miles from the Eastern part of the Cape Colony (Port Elizabeth) to the north (Mosega south of modern Johannesburg) and further east (Port Natal, Durban) (Durban, 2008). The migration became an important

historic marker in Afrikaner cultural beliefs (Durban, 2008). Doyle (1900) explained that such a huge migration by the Boer was comparable only to the migration of the Mormon Pioneers². The Voortrekkers felt beleaguered to the point of removing themselves from the law and influence of the British Cape Town. SAHO (2013b) pointed out that although the pioneers perceived themselves on a religious quest, this period in South Africa was wrought with social upheaval, land grabs through violent means, and forced labor on the conquered Ndebele, Zulu, Xhosa, and other African groups. By the time the trek was over in the late 1840's, the Voortrekkers had established the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Natal also had Voortrekker roots from the Trek, but fell to the British at Durban in 1842 (Durban, 2008). In 1845, the British Governor informed the Boer that regardless of how they felt, the people were still under British rule (Leyds, 1906).

The British government sent Sir Harry Smith to the Cape in 1847 to quell further rebellions. Theal (1893) described that Smith was already a hero from previous battles he fought in South Africa and India. This made Smith the ideal military appointee to fix problems and enforce British rule in South Africa. Within weeks of arrival, Theal (1893) explained that Smith proclaimed that all the lands in the South African region were part of the English Sovereign. Thus, according to Smith, all previous arrangements made by the Boer, indigenous people or any other group, the English considered void. Theal (1893) further described that Smith's meetings with regional tribe chiefs revealed how strongly Smith intended to enforce British apartheid against any opposing forces.

² The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Newsroom (2014) explained that the Mormon Pioneer Trek from 1847-1869 was comprised of 30,000 plus members of the Mormon Church who walked or traveled by wagons and handcarts from western Illinois to the Salt Lake Valley (roughly 1200 miles).

Smith characterized himself as the great chief and representative of the Queen of England. Smith required that each chief to kiss his feet in order to demonstrate their complete submission. He also threatened that if they caused rebellion the British military would destroy them. Smith outlawed witchcraft and local customs such as cattle robbing. Furthermore, Smith required that the tribal people listen to Christian missionaries to destroy heathenism across South Africa. For their obedience, the indigenous people would receive a yearly feast from the Great Chief. Smith placed military garrisons in the region to reinforce his divisive, exclusive wall-like strategy.

Near the end of 1848, Smith went to the Orange State to put the affairs in order but entirely underestimated the Boer and their willingness to achieve independence (Doyle, 1908). The Boer people so anxious to fight that they were willing to join African natives to revolt. After considerable losses and constant infighting, the British determined it would be in their best interest to relieve themselves of the Transvaal and its problems. This led to the Sand River Convention in 1852 where Transvaal received their independence, and became the first South African Republic. Shortly thereafter in 1854 the Orange Free State also became independent (Theal, 1893). At no point during the 1852 convention or later were any indigenous people acknowledged as having any legitimate claim to any land from which they had been violently removed. Like the characteristics of walls that serve to partition off space, foreign invaders portioned off native Africans so they could not communicate or fight for their homeland. The British destroyed the independence of one indigenous group after another. From 1811-1819 the Xhosa were defeated (Meredith, 2007). The British went on to subjugate or kill members of the Sotho and Tswana during the same period (Beck, 2000). The Zulu

illustrated strong war-fighting capabilities when they won their first major skirmish, but were shortly thereafter defeated in 1879 due to greater British technology and much larger modern military forces. The British partitioned the Zulu into 13 smaller groups with one tribe even including a white tribal leader. The British judges ruled that most of the former Zulu land became Boer territory. Within 25 years of defeat, the Zulu received government reservations that consisted of 1/3 of the lands they lived on for generations. The British government opened the rest of the land for White settlement after the Boer Wars (Beck, 2000).

The Diamond Rush, Uitlanders, and Gandhi (1867-1899)

According to Giliomee and Mbenga (2007), native children playing in a river discovered shiny objects on the ground in 1867 near Griqualand West in the Orange Free State. The discovery of diamonds and the subsequent discovery of gold in the 1890's would permanently change the economic outlook of South Africa in the world. From 1867-1870, 10,000 prospectors flocked to the area. The Afrikaan name for 'foreigner' was *uitlander* or 'outlander'; by 1890, the uitlanders outnumbered the Boer by more than two to one. Despite having no legitimate claim, the British government used political corruption to obtain the land from the local *Griqua* (combination of Boer and Kohekohe languages and culture first heard around 1730). At the time, the Griqua were living in a territory just outside of the Transvaal borders. The Griqua revolted against the miners after the British annexed their lands, but were easily defeated. In an ironic twist, the Griqua went to work in the mines that had originally been their territory. Doyle (1900) argued that the British had not previously known about the value

of the land and diamonds. Leyds (1906) disputes this claim providing significant evidence that the British government not only was aware of the valuable land, but also made several deceptive plans to annex many areas. The Boer had little choice but to accept British rule again.

The 1877 Sand River Convention that re-annexed Transvaal back to the British incensed the Afrikan people so much that historians argue the convention was the prequel to the Great Boer Wars of 1899-1902. The Boer complained that the convention gave too much political power to the uitlanders. In 1881 at the Convention of Pretoria, Transvaal was again given back to the Boer a second time. The people elected Paul Kruger as President who remained in the role in Transvaal for 18 years. Under Kruger, apartheid was reintroduced and the Boer expanded their lands to create the Republic of Goshen and Stellaland (Leyds , 1906). Kruger's legal wall protected the Boer interest and disenfranchising uitlander voter rights. For example, the controversial Act of 1890 dictated that in order to vote, uitlanders' had to be a resident for 14 years, be a landowner, be 40 years old, and be a member of a Protestant church. Few people were able to fit in this group, and most could not speak Dutch well enough to participate in government affairs (Hammond, 1901). In 1877 and in 1881 at Pretoria, both the British and the Boer denied indigenous people any rights to their homelands, thus forcing the native Africans to accept minority white rule.

Gandhi (1929/1940) recounted how the government and people in South Africa discriminated specifically the uitlander Indian population. Gandhi described that Indians, most of which belonged to the working class had long been derogatorily nicknamed *coolies* or *samis*, which ironically translated from Tamil and Sanskrit as

master. Despite having received British legal credentials, when Gandhi arrived in Natal in 1893, the local law society tried to reject his right to practice the law there. Gandhi's comments highlight the extent to which Boer governments would go to protect White power over other races. Gandhi (1929/1940) expressed:

The Law Society now sprang a surprise on me by serving me with a notice opposing my application for admission.... the main objection was that, when the regulations regarding admission of advocates were made, the possibility of a coloured man applying could not have been contemplated. Natal owed its growth to European enterprise, and therefore it was necessary that the European element should predominate in the bar. If coloured people were admitted, they might gradually outnumber the Europeans, and the bulwark of their protection would break down. (p. 175)

Three examples demonstrate the extreme discriminatory laws specifically forced on the Asian races. They are further evidence of how the British and Boer peoples used the laws to consolidate power into the hands of the minority group of Whites over the vast majority of African and other races. These laws were walls that communicated uitlanders and natives had no rights in South Africa. First, the *Law 3 of 1885* passed in Transvaal by the Boer controlled government. The law disallowed native "Asian" races from becoming land owning Burghers, forced Indians to pay tolls on their movements and hold a permit for movement past curfew, and the government could assign housing for sanitary purposes. Gandhi noted that this law applied equally to various races but Arab looking people tended to be exempt from it (Gandhi, 1929/1940; SAHO, 2013a). Second, in 1888 Transvaal and Natal used the law to exile the Indian people from their homes. Third, from 1894-1896 a series of laws were introduced to disenfranchise Indians of voting and political rights (SAHO, 2013a). During these troubled times, Gandhi (1928/1968) described the animosity the Indians faced:

The Europeans throughout South Africa had been agitating against Indians on the ground of their ways of life.... [The Indians] were very dirty and close-fisted. They lived in the same place where they traded. Their houses were mere shanties. They would not spend money even on their own comforts. How could cleanly open-handed Europeans with their multifarious wants compete in trade with such parsimonious and dirty people? Lectures were therefore delivered, debates held, and suggestions made at Congress meetings on subjects such as domestic sanitation, personal hygiene, the necessity of having separate buildings for houses and shops and for well-to-do traders of living in a style befitting their position. (p. 49)

The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902)

After conquering tribal groups, the British turned on the Boer to put down their rebellious states against the crown. Wessels (2011) echoes the words of Doyle, Leyds, and other scholars explaining, “One cannot understand the history of twentieth century South Africa (including the country’s political developments) without a knowledge of, or insight into the traumatic history of the Anglo-Boer War and the consequences it had for[all races regardless of color] (p. 14). Wessels argued that the Anglo-Boer war affected all of South Africa despite the fact mostly Whites fought in it and they only represented a fraction of the population. This could more accurately be describe as the second war between the two nations as the British had already given them independence in 1881. Seeing the great value in diamonds, gold, and geopolitical position, the British were now determined to take back the lands. On October 12, 1899, the Boer declared war on Great Britain. The British and historians believed the war would be a short skirmish but the Boer turned out to be the most difficult enemy the British ever faced up to that point. Biggins (2013) breaks up the war into three major stages including the Boer Offensive, the British Response, and Guerilla Warfare. For eight months, the Boer Offensive caught several British positions off guard defeating some strategic military

territories. When Lord Richards and Kitchener arrived in 1900, they doomed the Boer to defeat as the British Imperial military began to outgun and out match dwindling Boer forces. Lord Roberts took over Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Transvaal in 1900 presuming the war was over. Stage three consisted of guerilla warfare where the Boer fought in small mobile units to try to regain some of their lost lands.

Meredith (2007) explained that in response to the guerilla tactics the rebels used, the British started employing a scorched earth policy burning over 30,000 farms. The British used over 3700 miles of wire fencing to enforce borders and stop rebels from gaining any advantage. At one point, in order to capture the leaders, the British spread 9000 troops across a 45-mile stretch, one soldier for every 12 yards, but these attempts ultimately failed. In addition to their own military of 250,000 troops, the British formed a coalition with thousands of Boer and African rural families to fight the rebels.

According to Beck (2000), when the British strategically moved to incite and arm the African people, the rebels realized that the war would end. The Boer understood that the African people had plenty of reason to fight with the British because the Boer had originally moved the African people off their homelands. The Africans received little compensation from the British government for their service and it did not help them in regaining their lost homelands. Besides arming the Africans, the Boer rebellion leaders also decided to end the conflict to stop their own people from more displacement. At the end of the conflict there were 105,000 Boer in concentration camps, and a diminished ability to wage war against the more power British forces. On May 31, 1902, the Boer gave up political control, and yielded to new British rule.

Sir Alfred Milner directed the negotiations; Milner was a racist, dedicated British imperialist who saw the British as superior to all other races. He had a great distrust for the Boer, and took no thought of any other race. The Boer commandos agreed to surrender independence in exchange for political autonomy, the ability to keep their language in government and education institutions, and massive economic assistance in the post war period. The question of language was still essential because whomever controlled communication could limit political participation from those who did not speak Dutch or Afrikaans, which essentially excluded the native African peoples, the Chinese, and the Indians. Milner left the question of what to do about the Africans up to the Boer (Beck, 2000). Gandhi (1928/1968, 1929/1940) and Beck (2000) argued that neither the Africans, nor the Indians, both of which helped the British win the war, received any help of any kind. Instead, the British became traitors when they left both groups in the hands of new Boer government rule.

Transition Years and the Union of South Africa (1902-1910)

After the Anglo-Boer War, the White minority government passed laws to oppress any race, ethnicity, or culture who threatened the power structure. From 1902-1910, over 20 major laws served as a wall in Transvaal, Natal, and the Orange Free State to further disenfranchise and subjugate the vast majority of Africans, and foreign immigrants (in addition to 69 previously passed laws since 1806). The wall of the law was an enduring communication artifact to Africans and uitlanders that they would not and could not obtain political power and/or social equality. The major generals of the Anglo-Boer War including Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, and Barry Hertzog, among others,

would help found the new union and set up the political momentum that led to the official 1948 Apartheid Movement.

Smuts had been associated with Cecil Rhodes until he realized Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlin wanted to crush Boer resistance to British Rule (Lentin, 2010). Lentin (2010) described Smuts rise to political power after he fought in the war against the British. In 1904, Botha, Koos de la Ray, and Smuts formed the *Vereeniging Het Volk* (Peoples Union). Smuts went to England in 1906 to gather support for the Union. The message was that the British government should be-friend the Boer because they did not want to have another Irish catastrophe on their hands in South Africa. Smuts ran on a platform of reconciliation between the Boer and the British in order to create a united South Africa with the White minority in political power. The Boer felt combining with the British after having suffered defeat was a betrayal of principle, but Smuts made a convincing enough argument that in 1907, British Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman returned self-government to the colonies. The British politicians also knew that having the economic power of South African diamonds was a positive benefit that they could only obtain with Boer cooperation and reconciliation.

Levy (1917) identified many times how Smuts used segregation propaganda against the Chinese miners and the Indians to win political victories. In 1906, Lord Milner imported 10,000 Chinese miners that outraged the Boer. Smuts staunchly criticized this policy both in private letters, and in public interviews, and made promises that the policy would be changed so White workers could obtain equal pay with foreign workers. Smuts also used this kind of propaganda to garner support for the union of the four states, and that his people should run the government in order to protect themselves

from foreign encroachment. In 1907, Smuts stated, “the introduction of the Chinese was a crime. We shall not rest until every Chinaman has left the shores of South Africa” (Levy, 1917, p. 93).

Smuts voiced similar disdain for the Indians, particularly when he had to deal with Gandhi’s peace movement. Gandhi (1928/1968) illustrated the binary opposition in Smuts ideology:

South Africa is a representative of Western civilization while India is the centre of Oriental culture. Thinkers of the present generation hold that these two civilizations cannot go together. If nations representing these rival cultures meet even in small groups, the result will only be an explosion....the Indian question cannot be resolved into one of trade jealousy or race hatred. The problem is simply one of preserving one's own civilization, that is of enjoying the supreme right of self-preservation and discharging the corresponding duty....The Indians are disliked in South Africa for their simplicity, patience, perseverance, frugality and otherworldliness. Westerners are enterprising, impatient, engrossed in multiplying their material wants and in satisfying them, fond of good cheer, anxious to save physical labor and prodigal in habits. They are therefore afraid that if thousands of Orientals settled in South Africa, the Westerners must go to the wall. Westerners in South Africa are not prepared to commit suicide and their leaders will not permit them to be reduced to such straits. (p. 89-90)

Given his background in the Anglo-Boer War, his hatred for the indigenous people, and foreigners of any other type, all of the political players knew of Smuts intentions when he called for a constitutional convention in 1908. In 1910, the Het Volk party, led by General Botha, took control of the new Union of South Africa government, with Botha becoming the Prime Minister, and Smuts becoming second in command (Lentin, 2010).

African National Congress (ANC)

The ANC was the primary means of communication to opposition of Boer policy almost from the inception of the new South Africa and especially from the 1950’s through the 1990’s when Nelson Mandela took over leadership of the

organization. According to SAHO (2013b), Pixley Ka Isaka Seme was the founder of the ANC. He was born in Natal, worked with white missionaries who helped him move to the U.S. to receive an American High School education. Seme later attended Columbia for his law degree and just before the 1910 Union was formed, he returned home to South Africa. In 1906 while still attending Columbia, Seme gave an important speech entitled, “The Regeneration of Africa”, which outlined Seme’s intentions regarding the future political life of the African people. After the Union formed, in order to combat the policies of the new Boer government, Seme called on all of the African people regardless of their race or ethnic differences to put them aside and fight for the cause of freedom. In 1912, Seme founded the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) that was the precursor to the ANC.

According to the ANC (2011), the Land Act of 1913 brought the people together like never before. The Land Act prevented Africans from buying, renting or using lands outside of their reservations. The ANC fought against laws like the Land Act, and other policies that forced them to live in rural areas and work for whites in mines, farms, or other occupations. Most African people were only able to return home once a year. The ANC was willing to work with other groups like the Communist Party that formed in 1921, in order to fight the minority white government in any way they could.

Political and Labor Discrimination (1910-1948)

When the Union Act of 1910 created the country of South Africa, 1,300,000 Whites became citizens while other races and ethnicities became aliens in their homeland. Among the disenfranchised peoples, there were about 4 million Africans,

500,000 foreigners of various races and ethnicities, and 150,000 Indians (Beck, 2000). Beck argued that race was the most important of all the new issues the Union had to deal with. The following example is indicative of racist government policy that could eventually apply to all aspects of a white led South Africa. Beck (2000) described how South Africa faced labor strikes and problems similar to other industrializing nations. In May 1913, White workers in the mining industry wanted to unionize and protect their jobs. In order to quell rebellion, the Boer requested British military help in Johannesburg. The new government promised to help the workers, but the Parliament voted against the workers in the same year. Strikes continued through 1914 when new South Africa Union troops came to protect government interests against a revolution. World War I temporarily caused labor issues to dissipate, but after 1918, they continued to plague the nation.

Between 1918 and 1922, African miners revolted against lower wages that were worse than what Whites received for doing the same job. In 1921, 20,000 Afrikaner miners started to strike against the corporate use of cheaper African labor due to a depression of gold prices in the post-World War economy (Beck, 2000; SAHO, 2013b). The Communist Party of South Africa were particularly interested in the outcome of the strikes, and moved to support White labor. On March 15, 1922, the *Rand Revolt* occurred in Johannesburg and had the feel of a revolution again. Lentin (2010) described that Prime Minister Smuts, determined to crush rebellion, declared martial law, and took personal command of the 7000 troops with air and artillery support to put down the workers.

Two years later in the 1924 election, former General Hertzog won the election over Smuts and began to consolidate and strengthen Afrikaner power. Hertzog supported modernizing farming with better loans for farmers. He also increased job opportunities for Whites only in manufacturing of steel and iron, the railroad, and the government. Hertzog helped pass the Mine and Works Amendment Act 1926 that gave White workers guaranteed skilled jobs. By 1934, Hertzog and Smuts put aside political differences to create the Purified Nationalist Party that protected and created new racist minority government policies (Beck, 2000). For example, SAHO (2013b) noted that in 1936 the Representation of Natives Act and the Development Trust Act (Land Act) both became law making it impossible for Africans to own land outright. They were required to deal with a bureaucracy of White committee members to dispute land claims and/or borrow land appointed to them by the minority government. Africans and Indians faced a number of additional policies with similar racist underpinnings. Daniel Francois Malan (D.F. Malan) worked under Smuts and Hertzog but felt they were becoming too moderate. SAHO (2013b) described that Malan formed the Purified National Party (NP) in 1938, garnered support and won the 1948 election 10 years later. The NP platform was to institutionalize apartheid policy, which Malan made happen shortly following the elections.

The Apartheid State and Nelson Mandela (1948-1994)

General Smuts first used the word ‘apartheid’ in 1917 (Lentin, 2010). In Afrikaans, apartheid means separateness or apartness. The connotative meaning was much broader and encompassed the culture of white supremacy to maintain control

throughout the country (Lentin, 2010). O'Malley (n.d.) listed over 160 laws enacted from 1948-1991 to firmly root the wall of apartheid over the majority of the population. In 1973, the word and act of apartheid was globally synonymous with racial discrimination in South Africa. The United Nations (U.N.) passed resolution 3166, *International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid* (ICSPCA) defining the act as a crime against humanity (ICSPCA, 1976). It is of interest to note that from 1973-2013 the following globally influential nations have neither signed nor ratified the convention due to various political misgivings: South Africa, the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Israel, the majority of European nations (with exception of Poland), Australia, Brazil, China, and Japan. Mexico ratified the treaty in 1980, but never signed it (ICSPCA, 2013).

Derrida (1983/1985) and 85 other internationally recognized artists in 1983 condemned the oppression of the white minority government in an U.N. hosted exhibition. Derrida's condemnation of the word communicates how much power it has both as a linguistic metaphor, and a literal means of controlling people by setting them apart one race from another. Derrida (1983/1985) stated:

Since [World War Two], no tongue has ever translated this name – as if all the languages of the world were defending themselves, shutting their mouths against a sinister incorporation of the thing by means of the word, as if all tongues were refusing to give an equivalent, refusing to let themselves be contaminated through the contagious hospitality of the word for word. Here, then, is an immediate response to the obsessiveness of this racism, to the compulsive terror which, above all, forbids contact. The white must not let itself be touched by black, be it even at the remove of language or symbol. Blacks do not have the right to touch the flag of the republic. In 1964, South Africa's Ministry of Public Works sought to assure the cleanliness of national emblems by means of a regulation stipulating that is forbidden for non-Europeans to handle them. (p. 292)

McClintock and Nixon (1984/1986) argued that Derrida was admirable in detesting minority white regime actions. However, in his critique, Derrida missed the chance to outline the context for how the word gained its linguistic power. McClintock and Nixon believe the word is a unique movement. Derrida's assertion that the word had universal meaning was incorrect. McClintock and Nixon (1984/1986) argued:

[Apartheid] has its own history, and that history is closely entwined with a developing ideology of race which has not only been created to deliberately rationalize and temper South Africa's image at home and abroad, but can also be seen to be intimately allied to different stages of the country's political and economic development. (p. 141).

As McClintock and Nixon suggest, in my semiotic analysis of apartheid I provide a large historical context in which to comprehend the nature and oppression of the word and its unique attributes. Similarly, when I discuss the USMX security fence, it will be necessary to recognize that it has many linguistic and historical contexts.

Any discussion of South Africa in the 20th must include the life of Nelson Mandela. Being a royal descendent of the Xhosa tribe, Mandela knew well the history of oppression the natives of South Africa faced (Xhosa Culture, 2013). Mandela experienced firsthand the realities of racial discrimination under the law. In 1942, Mandela found that the Communist Party that was less concerned about race than it was about important economic issues. However, the Communist Party had a White elite power structure so equality for Africans was not a priority. Mandela gravitated to the ANC but it was not radical enough so Mandela helped form the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) to push for stronger actions in equality (Meredith, 1997/2010; Mandela Center, 2013). As a young man, Mandela had seen racism in the mining industry and in educational institutions where he attended. In 1943, when bus fares went up from

racism, Mandela participated in his first protest with 20,000 workers who were feeling economically crushed. Through this and other early encounters with African and Indian friends, Mandela learned how to form more effective resistance movements. According to Meredith (1997/2010), Mandela followed the teachings of Gandhi who had been successful only a few years before.

In 1948, Malan's new government feared that the Communist Party was powerful enough to create an effective resistance (Meredith 1997/2010). The new government passed the Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950 (SC44) which declared, "The Communist Party of South Africa [is] an unlawful organization; to make provisions for declaring other organizations promoting communistic activities to be unlawful and prohibiting certain periodical or other publications; to prohibit certain communistic activities" (Union of South Africa, 1950, p.549). This open-ended law encompassed all public gatherings in any way that resembled communism, essentially destroying public opposition to new government rule. By 1960, the South Africa government disbanded the ANC. In 1952, Mandela and 17 others started a "Defiance Campaign" to overturn the Suppression of Communism Act as well as other forms of discrimination coming from Malan's new government. Mandela and the others were charged and convicted with violating SC44, but the judges postponed sentencing for at least two years (Mandela Center, 2013).

There were multiple other occasions where the wall of apartheid had consequences for Mandela, his colleagues, and millions of his fellow Africans. Mandela faced arrest, detention, or prison in 1956, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1982-1990 (Mandela Center, 2013). For Mandela and a dedicated group of followers, the walls of

the Pollsmoor prison were symbolic of the oppression of the apartheid wall. After the prison closed, government and private funding renovated it into a museum to teach the world about the atrocities of apartheid so other countries would not make the same mistakes. Unfortunately, the current environment of wall building is an indication that people have not yet learned those lessons.

Conclusion

The ideology and wall of apartheid was ingrained in the social, cultural, and linguistic structure of South Africa from 1652-1994. This section covered the history and social impact of race from 1652 to 1990. Some of the racial segregation policies of note included manually removing indigenous people from their native lands, enforcing language and cultural laws to exclude certain groups. Later, they used the law and violence to disenfranchise the majority of the population of South Africa that included millions of native Africans, Chinese, and Indians. This semiotic review of the history of South Africa provides some hermeneutic context for the wall of apartheid that had immense consequences. These experiences and history are comparable to the problems facing the USMX border. An examination of the apartheid wall communicates that wall building has significant cultural, social, and linguistic consequences for people living on both sides.

Theoretical Considerations

ST Research Questions

RQ 1: What are the intentional and unintended consequences from the wall of apartheid?

RQ 2: Were there many individual events and motives that combined to create a larger structural social system and if so, what are those consequences?

The purpose of ST is to answer why social structures reproduce themselves and what we can gain from understanding that reproduction. ST ambiguously offers scholars several approaches on how to find answers to what he perceives to be the fundamental question. RQ 1 and RQ 2 are two areas that can help me comprehend and explain the social reproduction of walls, and their consequences for communication research. I answer the questions using the outline of the ST framework with its basic concepts and definitions as described in the theory chapter.

Agents and Power

In order to answer the what, it is helpful to know who is communicating. Throughout the history of South Africa, there are five main agents: first, the DEIC with its commanders and governors until 1795; second, the British government along with its military chain of command and governors; third, the African native people; fourth, the Boer/Afrikan people; fifth, uitlanders and slaves. The history of apartheid began with European agents and then the Boer minority government. Both agents held tight control of communication to reproduce the message they wanted people to hear, which was that of white (European) superiority was worth protecting at all costs. It was not until the early 1990's that new agents began to change the social message, and they are still in the process of creating a new message for South Africa, over a decade after the country outlawed apartheid practices.

The next ST concept is power, meaning who uses rules and resources to create the intended and unintended consequences in social reproduction? First, the DEIC

maintained power with resources such as Company employees, the Burgher colonists, indentured servants, and military troops on loan from the Netherlands. As noted in the history, the DEIC enforced their wall of laws when necessary with military troops. The use of military troops to enforce the wall of discrimination illustrated there were terrible consequences when the African tribes did not obey their white rulers. Additional tacit resources that helped the Dutch maintain control included using Dutch language to create the rules, spreading Christianity, and requiring intense loyalty, money, food, and equipment from the Burgher upper class in return for protection against the Africans. Although it appears irrational currently, the Burghers perceived from their horizon that they were better than other humans were and acted accordingly to reinforce a position of power.

Second, the British government used their power and resources in similar ways as the DEIC during their reign from 1800-1910 when South Africa became independent. The British had the most powerful military in the world, which also consisted of the most powerful naval fleet during the time and the agent with the most diversity of resources. The brutality of the British was much greater than the DEIC in trying to establish a permanent residence in the country. However, like the Dutch, the British used language tactics to cut off or severely limit communication and social/political participation. The British military crushed any rebellion by the African tribes or the Boer to communicate their presence would be permanent. During the Anglo-Boer war at one point, the British military even maintained a physical wall of men and fencing 45 miles across at points to stop the Boer from obtaining any

advantages. The way the Dutch and British used their resources left a profound intended consequence leaving white minority government in power until the 1990's.

The Boer/Afrikan people were the third agent with resources who took over the government from the British in 1910. Several political players had resources that helped the Boer gain the political power they needed to eventually run the country and implement apartheid, such as President Kruger who ran part of South Africa for almost two decades. Others included General Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, Barry Hertzog, Prime Minister Malan, and many others. They used political, social, and physical resources such as the law, diamond mines and other means to reproduce their message. They planned to keep the law permanently, despite perceived discrimination it permanently. This is evident when they incarcerated Nelson Mandela and other leaders as late as 1980.

The last set of agents is the huge number Africans, Indians, and Chinese that did not have power. Some of the better-known agents like Gandhi and Nelson Mandela tried to use the resources that were readily available. Regardless, the Africans, Chinese, and Indians faced the wall of discrimination for generations. According to the concept of power in ST, this group of agents had little or none. Their message of opposition to white power was not heard until the 1990's when the ANC finally won their first election. Nelson Mandela led the people into a new age for South Africa that is still in the early development stage in the post-apartheid culture.

Duality of Structure

The answer to RQ 2 is that when an individual acts, it not only affects them, but also has systemic repercussions. Individuals within the system of South Africa apartheid made individual and small group decisions that did affect the outcome of the country. Apartheid was more than just a word in a language. It was an individual and systemic hermeneutic horizon; the wall of discrimination was a culture. White people in the social structure perpetuated the wall of discrimination due to their belief that they were superior to other humans. Their perspectival consciousness structure allowed them to devalue some humans and make themselves feel better than others.

The social structure of white oppression used language barriers to maintain their power within a small group. The group partitioned themselves away from other social structures to avoid communicating with them for fear that integration might infect them like a disease. Within this social structure, there was no room to communicate the cultural values of the Kohekohe, the Zulu, the Griqua, or any other African indigenous group. Nor was there room to communicate the cultural values of the Chinese who provided a vast amount of labor in that country. There was not room for the Indians to communicate their cultural values in the white social structure either. General Smut's comments regarding the differences between Indian and European culture are strong evidence revealing that people in the Western world had no interest in learning about or integrating with each other. Anthropology studies or documentation of the native African cultures, or any foreign culture was limited largely due to the ethnocentric thought that these cultures were barbarian, sub human devil worshippers who practiced witchcraft or other evil magic. Maho's (2002) list of over 200 laws prior to apartheid

coming into law in 1948 illustrate that a message can be reproduced and entrenched so much within the minds of people in a particular social structure, that the ideology behind the message starts to be ignored.

DAD Research Questions

RQ 1: What are the magic, mythic, and perspectival dimensions of the wall of apartheid and what does that communicate about the wall of apartheid?

The research question related to DAD theory is open-ended because there are many horizons that might interpret and answer this question differently. There are dimensional manifestations of communication from each group. Great conflicts arose when one group communicated from a magic perspective while another group communicated from a modern perspective. The wall of apartheid is a deficient form of perspectival communication that led to violence and separation for two centuries due to its significant clashing with mythic and magic dimensions. Kramer (1997, 2013) explains that perspectival thinking is arbitrary, careless, spatial, and fragmentary. The apartheid wall was an ideology, a dominant social structure that eventually allowed the creation of arbitrary laws. These laws and the social structure communicated that some humans had less value than others did. Ethnocentric white colonists were in power to determine what value other humans had. The colonists, DEIC, and British used technologies like more powerful rifles and cannons to enforce the values of apartheid. Even after wall of discrimination came down in the 1990's, many critics would argue that this deficiency continues to exhibit itself in the political and social life of the people of South Africa.

The modern consciousness structure drove the white European horizon but also at times revealed magical and/or mythical ideas. For example, in modern thought we make progress to meet an end goal (Kramer, 2013). In the mind of a Dutch Calvinism colonist, a good Christian tried to live a virtuous life by following the teachings of the Bible, and hoping that enough work and grace in this life would help them obtain paradise after death. Not only should the colonists strive to save themselves, but they also felt it was their divine, magical mission to convert the barbarian tribal people to the religion or they were spiritually lost. Another goal was to make a life and fortune through colonization. End goals included becoming rich by owning land, or become politically powerful and returning to the motherlands in glory. Captains and governors often revealed their hypertrophic individualism that is absolute selfishness with their personal obsessions to gain political and social power. If colonists or natives could not benefit them in some way then the leaders disregarded those people. Diamonds were more important than people were so the British removed the natives by force of violence or death. The DEIC and the British later on could make and break deals to benefit themselves. The colonial powers introduced modern government, western law, education, and domestic farming all as means of progress to a greater goal. Theal (1897) used progress as a measurement in agriculture to gage whether the indigenous people were becoming more modern and cultured because they used industrialized farming techniques. The heathens were those tribes who had chosen not to, or had not learned the techniques to take advantage of progress. The DEIC, the Boer, and the British used new war technologies to colonize, create borders, and industrialize South Africa, all characteristics of a modern perspective.

Even with a modern perspective in mind, the European Whites sometimes communicated in a magical or mythic way. Specifically, the Boer history indicates the people received a divine mission to colonize the Cape, the highlands, and the vast plains across the country. The Great Trek was an example of the belief of such a magical calling. The tradition of hard work and pioneer spirit became mythic for the Boer and a reason to fight against the British in the Boer Wars. Their myth of strength and determination was so powerful that both Doyle (1900) and Leyds (1906) highlighted it as a determining factor that almost crippled the British in the first stage of the war. Another telling example is the actions of Sir Harry when dealing with the tribe leaders when he arrived in 1847. Sir Harry portrayed himself as a magical God messenger for the Queen of England and required tribal leaders to give submission to his eminence. Furthermore, he exclaimed to both Africans and Boer rebels that an act against the Crown of England was an act against God.

Chapter Six: U.S. Mexico Border

This chapter uses the hermeneutic circle and semiotics to identify the communicative functions of the USMX security border fence and responses to it. Long before anyone constructed a single piece of fence, numerous significant social factors helped make the security fence a reality. I found important communicative functions about the border in sociocultural, political, business, environmental, and legal controversies surrounding it. The discourse and assumptions of the earliest immigration laws communicated that foreign strangers from some parts of the world were not permanently welcome in the states. These strangers were only welcomed when they

could help grow the American economy. When American citizens and the U.S. government perceived immigrant workers as a burden, the government asked them or forced them to leave U.S. borders. Immigration laws within the last 100 years increased confusion and conflicting messages about the meaning of borders and the legal treatment of immigrants. Reforms to “secure” the border throughout the 1990’s, and especially after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 only made matters worse. The communication functions of the USMX Security Fence and immigration laws are comparable to apartheid (Nevins, 2002; 2006, 2012; Spencer, 2009). For example, apartheid separated people using laws to discriminate one group from another. Likewise, U.S. immigration laws categorize and oppress some ethnic groups more than others (Romero, 2013). Moreover, the ideological underpinnings that made apartheid possible were the same kinds of ideologies that made legal discrimination possible with American immigration laws.

The research throughout this chapter illustrates the development of my hermeneutic perspective about the USMX border fence over a six-year period. The research includes the 2008 committee planning meeting, coursework from 2008-2010, the 2010 and 2012 proposal meetings, several meetings with the University of Oklahoma Institutional Research Board (IRB) in 2010, a visit to El Paso, Texas in 2013, and employment with the FBI from 2010-2014. It also includes reading books, news articles, and scholarly journals in many social science fields. I researched websites, blogs, listened to audio interviews, watched online videos and other media sources, and listened to lectures from professional sources.

This chapter discusses communicative functions of the USMX Security Fence in three sections. First, I analyze linguistic oppositions and key historic events that created the border and successive development. Second, following the semiotics tradition, I examine the history of immigration law as a set of essential characteristics that make the security wall possible. When necessary, I present relevant binary oppositions with communicative implications. Finally, I apply ST and DAD to my research to answer some questions about the fence.

USMX Border Linguistic Oppositions

The USMX Security Fence is an example of a binary opposition in need of paradigmatic analysis for two reasons. First, the physical structure literally creates a separation with two sides that are often in opposition to one another. Second, the fence is full of social, cultural, and political denotative and connotative meanings that have opposites. The binary oppositions are entrenched in prejudiced ideological language resulting in discrimination on both sides of the border. Table 11 provides a list of binary opposites using language that is at the center of the national controversies regarding the fence and immigration.

Table 11 - Binary Opposition Terms about the Security Fence

Illegal	Legal
Alien	Naturalized or citizen
Undocumented	Naturalized
Refugee	Citizen
physical or mental illness	healthy
Idiot/Insane person	Regular person, not insane
Discourse of the other, alienation	Being a part of us
Foreign	Domestic
Laws	Lawlessness
Unnatural	Natural

Strange	Normal
Fence, wall, barrier	open
Separate	Connected
Natural Barrier	Human made barrier

The term *illegal alien* is a powerful semiotic sign and binary opposite in the discourse of U.S. immigration. Like any other semiotic sign, the term has a rich historic context. Semiotics and communication scholars indicate that to understand how semiotic signs are currently used, we must first review their historical representation (Berger, 2011; Flores, 2003; Levi-Strauss, 1958/1963). The U.S. government definition of alien has remained quite similar for more than a century. For example, the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 stated an alien is, “any person not a native –born or naturalized citizen of the United States” (p. 5). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 defined an alien as, “any person not a citizen or national of the United States” (p. 166). In 2014, U.S. government agencies who deal with immigration issues still use this definition. When the colonies became a nation after the Revolutionary War, early laws quickly clarified that the American Indians and people of the island territories were neither considered native to nor citizens of the United States. Although they had been in the new world for thousands of years, the U.S. government dismissed indigenous populations as primitive barbarians not fit for “civilized” society. Moua, Guerra, Moore, and Valdiserri (2002) pose a critical question: “Does the term immigrant refer to someone who arrived here legally to study, to work, or to join family members, [to become a] refugee seeking asylum....Or, is an immigrant one of....420,000 people a year who come to America undocumented?” (p. 189). The complicated answer to the question is ‘yes’, but with a myriad of legal and bureaucratic conditions. According to

Guerette (2007), scholars, the media, and government officials use several terms in immigration policies to describe aliens including: “undocumented aliens”, undocumented immigrants/migrants’, ‘unauthorized aliens’, ‘unauthorized immigrants/migrants’, ‘illegal aliens’, and ‘illegal immigrants/migrants” (p. 5). The discourse of immigration is a significant part of the American identity. It is vital to examine the semiotics signs of immigration to more clearly comprehend the nature of the wall building on the border.

The etymology comes from the Latin words *alienus* or *alius* which means ‘belonging to another’. In the Middle Ages the earliest versions of the current word have similar connotations including ‘different’, ‘foreign’, ‘stranger’, ‘non-resident’, ‘non-citizen’, and ‘unnatural’ (Harper, 2013). The concept of aliens crossing territories is as old as Old Testament stories of the Bible where sovereign territories and borders existed. For example, in ancient Israel, strangers were men of non-Israelite birth who lived in the Promised Land. Hoffmeier (2011) explains that Israeli law provided them with some fair treatment as outsiders. Throughout history, nations and cultures had similar terms or phrases for immigrants. The leaders of America were aliens themselves long before the American Revolution and the birth of the U.S. Republic.

Notwithstanding this heritage, the culture of anti-immigration started with the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 that allowed the government to deport foreign spies or others under the cover of national security. The government repealed the act in 1800, but the alien label has remained a staple of American immigration laws for the last 200 years.

In the late 1890’s through the 1920’s the Southwest U.S. economy needed a greater labor force, especially due to increasing restrictions on immigrants from China

and Japan (Sanchez, 1993). Mexico became a primary source of new labor even in the face of new laws in 1917, 1921, and 1924 to limit immigration. Sanchez (1993) notes, “Not surprisingly, immigration restrictions directed against Mexicans were at first consistently deferred under pressure by southwestern employers and then, when finally enacted, were mostly ignored by officials at the border” (p.19). During this period, Sanchez (1993) describes that immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents played a central role in connotatively defining the term ‘alien’ in a racist way. For example, in El Paso, Texas, it was common knowledge that members of the Klu Klux Klan were also immigration inspectors. Sanchez (1993) describes:

Officials would consistently denigrate those who crossed at the bridge, even if their papers were perfectly legal. Eventually crossing the border became a painful and abrupt event permeated by an atmosphere of racism and control—an event that clearly demarcated one society from another. An unintended result of the new immigration laws and the tensions they produced was to make temporary immigrants already living in the United States think twice about returning to Mexico. (p. 59)

In addition to the overt racism found at border inspections, Gomez (2003) explains that because Mexicans did not assimilate into American culture by denouncing their cultural heritage, so Anglo-American citizens labeled them as different or alien. Gomez (2003) clarifies that Mexican Americans actually fused their lives in a bi-national, bi-cultural way. This is evident in the fact that the predominant language in the Southwest was Spanish from 1848 through at least the 1920’s, and locals still celebrated cultural practices and Mexican holidays.

Some scholars criticize various synonymous as being inaccurate and demeaning (“undocumented aliens”, undocumented immigrants/migrants’, ‘unauthorized aliens’, ‘unauthorized immigrants/migrants’, ‘illegal aliens’, and ‘illegal immigrants/migrants’)

(DeGenova, 2002, 2004; Dunn, 2009; Guerette, 2007, p. 5; Romero 2013; Nevins, 2002; Sanchez, 2011; Spencer, 2009). De Genova (2002) argues that immigration scholarship focuses so much on giving answers to policy makers that scholars tend to miss most important data. De Genova (2002) clarifies, “Remarkably, little of this vast scholarship deploys ethnographic methods or other qualitative research techniques to elicit the perspectives and experiences of undocumented migrants themselves, or to evoke the kinds of densely descriptive and textured interpretative representations of every life” (p. 421). De Genova (2002, 2004) concludes that scholars should stop studying the “illegality” of immigrants and rather focus on collecting experiences from undocumented peoples so policy makers and other actors could truly hear their voices.

In 2010, the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) began an education campaign arguing that the words “illegal alien” and “illegal immigrant” have derogatory connotations in journalism writing. The SPJ and the National Association of Hispanic Journalists (NAHJ) demand that derogatory terms be replaced by *undocumented worker* or *undocumented immigrant*. The NAHJ criticized the Associated Press because prior to 2011, the AP stylebook required that the former language was preferable to the new description (Lawrence, 2010). Lawrence (2010) argues that the implication of being an illegal alien is against the principles in the U.S. Constitution that imply everyone is innocent until proven guilty. Aguilar (2011) shares a critical narrative in the language debate at the SPJ convention, noting, “I’m the daughter of undocumented workers. Every time you use the phrase ‘illegal alien’, my mother – now a proud American citizen – you insult her....Every time you use those words....you insult all other Latinos” (p. 13). After much debate, the Associated Press

altered the stylebook to reflect the views of SPJ and NAHJ. The current stylebook suggests that the terms ‘alien’ and ‘illegal immigrant’ are derogatory so journalists should avoid using the terms where they can use alternative language (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011). The Diversity committee of the SPJ also “encourag[ed] editors and news managers to sit down with their staffs and have a healthy discussion over avoiding the “I-word”” (Aguilar, 2011, p. 13).

Despite the calls from journalists and scholars for linguistic change, they have made little progress. In the U.S. legal system, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) explains that, “[Immigrants] are aliens.... [and] ‘Alien’ is the most dominant metaphor in all of immigration law. In fact, lawyers and judges refer to aliens so frequently that few would identify the word as a metaphor” (p. 1568-69). Flores (2003) found that as early as the 1930’s, the law rhetorically constructed Mexicans as ‘alien’, ‘other’, criminals illegally residing in the states. Politicians, federal agencies, media, and social groups, use the terms ‘illegal alien’, and ‘illegal immigrant’ as powerful rhetoric to depersonalize and portray immigrants as a security threat (Aguilar, 2011; BAC, 2012; Coleman, 2009; Dechaine, 2009; Durazo, 2013; Flores, 2003; Hernandez, 2010; Laurence, 2010; Nevins, 2002, 2006; Rivera-Batiz, 2000; Spencer, 2009). Using the ‘illegal alien’ language to criminalize immigrants is such a powerful rhetorical force that it allows the government to construct security walls (Ackleson, 2005; Coleman, 2008; DeChaine, 2009; Dunn, 2009; Jones 2012; Secure Fence Act, 2006). The government passed the Security Fence Act in 2006 under the pretense of stopping the “alien invasion” as America was supposedly “under siege” by illegal aliens, terrorists, and drug dealers. The federal government gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) unlimited

authority to build walls that theoretically would stop the “rising tide” and “flood” of illegal immigration (Rivera-Batiz, 2000). The Customs and Border Protection (CBP), The Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) and state law enforcement partners use the list of words interchangeably regard for perceived linguistic consequences (Hernandez, 2010; Maril, 1986, 2004) (the list includes “undocumented aliens”, undocumented immigrants/migrants’, ‘unauthorized aliens’, ‘unauthorized immigrants/migrants’, ‘illegal aliens’, and ‘illegal immigrants/migrants”, Guerette, 2007). The alien label is only the beginning of words used to help shape the powerful communication functions of the USMX security wall. There are many linguistic binary opposites in need of semiotic analysis in order to grasp the meaning of the security fence.

History of American Immigration Law

The communication functions and hermeneutic interpretations of the USMX security fence come from a rich historical context. Sheridan (2009) states, “To understand the history of physical barriers and the heightening of physical and psychological risk at the border, we need to examine U.S. migration laws, policy, and practice” (p. 16). De Genova (2002, 2004) argues that too often scholars presume the law is correct rather than analyzing its historical and social construction to identify how the immigrant came to be automatically illegal. This dissertation acknowledges how people use laws to create the sociocultural meanings of the security fence that we know today. Table 12 identifies various words or labels that constitute binary oppositions in U.S. immigration laws dating back to the beginning of the country.

Table 12 - Binary Opposition Terms in Federal Immigration Law

Illegal	Legal
Undocumented	Naturalized
Refugee	Citizen
physical or mental illness	Healthy
Idiot/Insane person	Regular person, not insane
Discourse of the other	Being a part of us
Foreign	Domestic
Law and order	Lawless ungoverned space
Unnatural	Natural

Chinese Immigration

Chinese immigrant *coolies* (interchangeable with alien especially in the 1800's) came to the U.S. working for low wages on labor-intensive projects like the railroads. Chinese immigrants also entered illegally through the smuggling and slavery *coolie trade*, similar to the coolie trade in South Africa (Gandhi, 1929/1940; Flores, 2003; Harper, 2013). The coolie trade was well established by the time Congress passed the Anti-Coolie Act (1862) trying to slow the tide of Chinese migration. On the surface, the law appeared to be humane by stopping Americans from participating in a slave trade, but the underlying motive was an ideology of anti-Chinese immigration. The regulations against the Chinese throughout the late 1800's reify the legal wall of discrimination they faced in America. Some of the following examples illustrate the bigotry against the Chinese, and demonstrate the contradictions and inconsistencies that were prevalent in American immigration laws.

First, inspectors loosely applied the 1885 Contract Labor Act standards in the Eastern U.S., whereas in the Southwest, the standards were strict especially for Chinese workers. The law "prohibit[ed] the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories, and the

District of Columbia” (Contract Labor Law, 1885). Congress designed the 1892 Chinese immigration Act to deport all Chinese immigrants, but when there was a greater demand for labor, this Act was appealed (CBP, 2013a; Starkweather, 2007). The unintended consequences of these laws were that they actually increased the number of people crossing the border illegally creating a greater need for a border patrol to enforce the laws already on the books.

The Immigration Act of 1891 amended the 1885 Contract Labor Act to expand the definition of Chinese workers being aliens (Ettinger, 2009). The Immigration Act (1891) also excluded:

All idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious diseases, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, polygamists, and also any person whose ticket or passage is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted by others to come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on special inquiry that such person does not belong to one of the foregoing excluded classes. (p. 1084)

Ettinger (2009) highlights that during this period, European and Asian immigrants were three times as likely to enter the U.S. illegally as their Mexican counterparts were. With an expanding and relatively vague definition, the 1891 Act ultimately failed to curtail any illegal immigration. In politics, the law created the 1891 Federal Immigration Service but did not provide enough resources such as money, human power, or other necessities to establish an effective law enforcement presence at either the Canadian or the Mexican borders. The social impact of the 1891 law meant that thousands of medically unfit people had to find other means of entry that increased likelihood they would be smuggled into the country illegally. Two hundred years of people flowing into the U.S. is strong evidence that no matter what kinds of barriers the government tries to

construct, they cannot stop people from trying to cross U.S. borders. People are willing to risk their lives and the lives of others to come into the country (Panunzio, 1927). By 1907, the Chinese, Italians, Greeks, Lebanese, and Japanese were all illegally coming across the Southwest borders. Border towns were creating economic growth with illegal activities. The patchwork of immigration laws even at this early point was entirely ineffective.

Mexican Immigration

The American government drew the USMX borderline in 1848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and 1853 with the Gadsden Purchase. Hamnett (1999) explained that Mexico did not feel the full shift of political power and colonial expansion of the U.S. until the 1830's even though it was evident as early as 1803 with the Louisiana Purchase, and 1819 when New Spain ceded Florida to the states. President James Polk wanted greater land expansion in the West. In 1845, the U.S. government and American settlers began occupying Mexican territories in Texas. Shortly thereafter, President Polk sent U.S. troops to occupy the Rio Grande River to illustrate his willingness to go to war for land expansion. The U.S. Mexico War lasted from 1846 to 1848, and ended at the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that seized Texas, New Mexico, and California (Burton, 2000; Hamnett, 1999; Hernandez, 2010).

Romero (2013) explained that the Treaty on paper protected Mexicans land rights, but in practice, the Mexican people lost almost everything. The American Supreme Court rulings favored American federal cases, regardless of proof from the Mexican people that they owned certain lands. The Gonzalez case in 1995 illustrated

some of the problems (Lopez, 1997). The Gonzalez case in Santé Fe, New Mexico used the 1848 Treaty as a premise of their argument to obtain their lands. Despite documented genealogical and other evidence, the U.S. federal courts still ruled against Gonzalez. Although Mexicans lost half of their country in 1848, the Mexican people freely roamed across the border into the 1890's. Marentes and Marentes (1999) lament that the 1891 Immigration Act (designed to control the Chinese immigrants) actually has worse consequences for the Mexican people. With the introduction of a federal law enforcement agency and a broader definition of alien, the government fundamentally shifted how they perceived Mexicans moving forward. Almost overnight, the entire Hispanic population suddenly became aliens in the native lands they resided on for centuries. Cameron (1998) concludes that by 1930, the Hidalgo Treaty and supplemental immigration regulations created a new lower class. Cameron (1998) explains, "Mexican-Americans, through legal defeat, fraud, or financial exhaustion, had been all but wiped out as a landholding class....Their transformation from masters into servants had been completed, and set the stage for....the exploitation of low-wage, migratory Mexican and Mexican-American labor" (p. 8). A strong example of such discrimination came in the form of a 1930 Alien Labor Act passed by the California State Legislature that made it illegal for the government to hire illegal aliens to do public works jobs. This immediately caused over 900 Mexican workers to lose their jobs, and during the Great Depression forced Mexican families into poverty (Sanchez, 1993).

American Immigration Legal Framework

The core components of federal immigration policy from 1917-2000 are ingrained in the same anti-immigration sentiments that tried but failed to stop the Mexican and Chinese throughout the 1800's. The laws are loaded with binary language such as the continued use of the term alien that separates people to create an "us/them" or "the other" dichotomy. The laws communicate a multifaceted message to many audiences who are part of the immigration issue. The ideology motivating these laws set the precedent to begin building fences, blockades, or other human barriers. Graham (1991) identifies some influential immigration laws that guide the historical discussion. These include the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 (Emergency Quota Act, 1921), the Immigration Act of 1924 (Immigration Act, 1924), the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA, 1952), the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA, 1965), the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, 1986), and Immigration Act of 1990 (Immigration Act, 1990). In addition, there are supplemental regulations and programs that are a part of the fence discussion including major organizational changes in government agencies, especially after the 9/11 attacks, the Bracero program, and the 1980's and 1990's border militarization strategies.

Two issues have plagued immigration law over the last 100 years. First, the government does not identify goals to measure the effectiveness of the policies. Second, legal jargon is either so complex or purposefully vague that even politicians, federal, state, and local Law Enforcement Officers (LEO), and personnel cannot interpret what the policies are. On the first point, a body of scholarship indicated that there is no way to account for people who illegally cross the border successfully and then disappear.

Moreover, criminals who conduct smuggling and drug operations are not lining up to share their information about the best tradecraft they use to overcome fencing or other obstacles. On the second problem, if leaders, judges, and lawyers cannot comprehend nor apply the law, then why would an ordinary citizen or an immigrant speaking a second language be able to comprehend how it applies to them? With the myriad of interpretations from so many perspectives, it is almost impossible to narrow down what any particular statute may mean or how it applies to particular cases (Coleman, 2008; Coplan, 2010; Ettinger, 2009; Graham, 1991; Legomsky, 1997; Martinez, 1989; Maril, 2011; Massey, 1981; North, 1987; Rivera-Batiz, 2000; USMX IRB, 2010).

Quota Discrimination (1917-1952)

The 1917 Immigration Act added over three pages of newly prohibited aliens to an already long list from earlier laws. Specific categories included Asians from island nations, the medically ill and insane, and criminals, especially if they were associated with socialists or anarchists. Physical examinations became stricter, newcomers paid more taxes, and literacy tests became part of the process. From 1917 to 1922, immigration was so widely debated that Dr. Scroggs, an education and public policy advocate, dedicated an entire issue of the University of Oklahoma Bulletin to the discussion. Scroggs (1922) stated, “Employers generally oppose restriction to immigration, while labor leaders generally favor it....Immigration is a great, a complicated and intricate question, and one which is very vital to our American life and to the present and future of our country” (p. 2).

The Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 also known as the Emergency Quota Act (1921) revised and tightened restrictions on admissions from the 1917 law. The quota system limited the number of entries to 3% per nationality in any given fiscal year, and based the number of foreigners already in the U.S. on the 1910 census. Martin (1993) described that the numeric quota system was the first attempt to make the immigration flow efficient or controlled. Between 1910 and 1920 the overall population of the U.S. increased by 15%. Six million people were newcomers, and in three of those years, the U.S. admitted more than one million foreigners. The INS statistics only accounted for legal migrants. Given the number of illegal entries at the same time, the INS statistics became unreliable (Martin, 1993). Other historical data suggested that when the government imposed the law, workers received triple pay and union membership increased (Briggs, 2001, 2007). The quota system was a wall with important communication consequences. The message of the quota policy wall was that America was no longer the melting pot or a land of opportunity. Instead, immigrants faced eugenics-based policies where the government actively discriminated against ethnic groups they perceived as inferior or undesirable. The government only permitted those immigrants with the most superior cultural traits to be a part of America (Briggs, 2001, 2007; Chacon & Davis, 2006; McGowan, 2008; Ordovery, 2003; Panunzio, 1927).

In ethnographic work, interviews, and observations, Paradise (1922) demonstrated how the quota system mirrored a wall in several ways. First, it was a legal wall forcing officers to separate people on paper. The story about a man from Liberia demonstrated this problem. The boat he arrived on was late to Ellis Island so Liberia's quota was full, except for half of a person. The options were limited to cutting the man

in half, sending him back home, or splitting the difference into two fiscal years. After the officers discussed options, they determined the man could remain in the country. Not only did the government separate people in ledgers, but the government had several other ways to partition people as well. Even with a valid visa, newcomers had several barriers to overcome, such as rigorous physical examinations prior to receiving permission to enter the country (Panunzio, 1927; Paradise, 1922). Anyone with physical or mental disease faced quarantine and immediate deportation. This resulted in two consequences; first, families had to separate; second, the separation was a form of gender discrimination. Typically, mothers took care of children so if the child faced deportation, the mother would also accept it to take care of the child. Deportation was permanent, so the policy literally ripped families apart for life (Paradise, 1922). Beyond these problems, officers had great flexibility to accept or deny entry based on many other subjective categories (Panunzio, 1927; Paradise, 1922). Finally, the law indicated that those who came to the U.S. first would have the first chance to enter the country. When those numbers maxed out, inspectors would reject all others. Paradise (1922) contended that this was an impractical, illogical rule. Paradise posited, what would that mean if one boat came to the port quicker than another boat? People due to no fault of their own would have to turn back to their country of origin since they picked the wrong boat or had bad weather and the list could go on. Despite the problems of the quota system, it became a permanent condition.

The Immigration Act of 1924 (Immigration Act, 1924) expanded the 1921 quota system by limiting the number of new people to 2% of the nationality already in the U.S. based it on the 1890 Census. The new statistics for the quota included citizens

many of whom had descendants from Great Britain and Western Europe, which increased the percentage of visas available to those people. Immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe suddenly had a severe drop in admission numbers. The act also reinforced antiquated regulations from 1790 and 1870 that eliminated people of Asian descent from entry. The U.S. reneged on a treaty deal from 1894 that appeared to give the Japanese the right to immigrate and receive the same rights as American citizens. The 1924 provision tried to revive and preserve American homogeneity through assimilation (Chin, 1995-1996; Panunzio, 1927).

There were several exceptions and contradictions in the 1924 policy that still remain in immigration law today. First, the policies and rhetoric of assimilation are racist and sexist. Panunzio (1927) pointed out that the author of the legislation, also Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration, Representative Albert Johnson, was explicit in his motivations to protect the American race, and was looking for “the best material for citizenship” (p. 149). Johnson was a well-known anti-Semitic racist who strongly believed that eugenics was the new science to cleanse the flow of undesirable immigrants (Chacon & Davis, 2006; Ordovery, 2003). Ordovery (2003) explained that Johnson was a member of the Eugenics Record Association and the Eugenics Committee of the United States, both of which helped him obtain his powerful congressional position. From 1924 to 1936, Johnson and a group of prominent leaders wrote anti-immigration literature that promoted eugenics policies. Weil (2000-2001) asserted that the 1924 law was racist due to the “races and peoples” list that politicians had started compiling in 1898 and then used to implement the “national origin” requirement into the new law. The fact that entire populations of Asian countries were

also excluded speaks volumes in how racist the regulation was, even more so than in 1921 (Chin, 1995-1996; Panunzio, 1927).

Silber (1996-1997) described how the 1924 law was also a sexist barrier that divided families, in some cases for life. Silber asserted that in addition to limiting genetic characteristics of workers, congressional eugenics advocates also limited the gender of newcomers as much as possible. First, non-American wives of citizen husbands had to petition for non-quota status, and the husband being a citizen was more important than whether or not the couple was married. Second, even if a non-American wife were to obtain the non-quota distinction and receive the proper visa paperwork they still had other hurdles to overcome. When they arrived for physical and mental examinations at the ports of entry, if the wife failed the rigorous physical, mental, and literacy tests, or had tuberculosis, or the inspectors considered them immoral, they were automatically ineligible to stay in the U.S. (Paradise, 1922; Silber 1996-1997). Third, Silber illustrated that after passing through all previous requirements, the couple had to prove they were married with civil documentation that might be difficult and expensive to obtain. The process from beginning to end put many women on a waiting list a minimum of thirteen years long before they could join their families. Fourth, American citizen women who married non-resident men lost their citizenship leading to an infinite number of problems to get back into America legally.

Beyond the explicit racial and sexual discrimination, the 1924 law had further problems as well. There were calls to build an eight-foot high wall with grid fencing at the top, across the California border to stop narcotics and liquor trafficking, but construction never happened (New York Times, 1924). In addition, many countries in

the Western Hemisphere were exempt from the quota laws such as Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, and several “independent” countries in South America. Panunzio (1927) pointed out that the immigration work force from China and Mexico was at least as big as the new quota population from European immigrants. Many exempted immigrants crossing from China and Mexico did not return to their homeland. The law favored economic development so people who worked in international and domestic trade received a higher priority for entry. This meant that families, ministers, teachers, and potential college students faced much greater barriers for admission than they otherwise would have. Panunzio (1927) found that in 1924 and 1925 that an alien wanting to bring their family into the country already had to be a citizen in order for the family to receive non-quota admissions. Upon applying to become a citizen, courts stated that the alien could not become a citizen without having his or her family already in the country. This paradox gained so much attention that President Coolidge finally asked immigration officers to be more lenient on letting families remain together for humane purposes.

A final problem with the 1924 law and many subsequent immigration laws is the bureaucratic backlog. Panunzio (1927) described that if an immigrant had the money, they could look forward to the following experience: “there is no escape from an endless chain of applications and reapplications, correspondence and painful waiting, delays and counter delays and unending anxieties” (p. 141). In 2005, Jernegan, Meissner, Grieco, & Coffey (2005) reveal similar problems with the federal agencies, with no indication of progress:

Over the last fifteen years, the number of pending applications for immigration benefits has swollen by over 1,000 percent, growing from 540,688 in 1990 to a high of 6.08 million in 2003. The body of [six million] applications [in 2003] caught in....the backlog....has been a chronic problem....with implications for

immigrants, their families, employers who sponsor them, and policymakers.The backlog problem has acquired new importance in recent years.... tied to the substantially heightened, resource-intensive, and time-consuming security precautions initiated.... [after 9/11]. These measures have increased delays and hampered backlog-reduction efforts. (p. 1)

The Department of State (DOS) reports that as of November 2012, there are over four million people worldwide on a waiting list to enter the U.S. More than 1.3 million are the people of Mexico, many of which fall into one of four family preferential categories with legal resident families already across the border. There are no signs of decreasing the backlog as America continues to be one of the most preferred immigration locations throughout the world.

The Bracero Program (1942-1964)

World War II brought a huge labor shortage to the American economy especially in the agriculture section. Despite numerous attempts to control and limit access, the U.S. government was generous with border laws in order to fill the labor shortage. Astor (2009) explained that one practice was allowing farmers to hire illegal immigrants already in the U.S. rather than having to recruit them from Mexico. The INS could not legalize the workers since it was contrary to their main mission. However, Astor (2009) described:

To maintain the appearance of upholding the law, the INS would “deport” undocumented immigrants by taking them to the border. However, upon reaching the border, INS agents would give them identification slips that enabled them to return and be legally contracted as soon as they stepped across the border. Moreover, the only way for many to obtain the slip of paper that enabled them to be legally contracted was to be caught working illegally in the United States and “deported”. (p. 13)

In 1943, Public Law 45 - Farm Labor Appropriations created and funded the Bracero program to further increase migrant labor (Starkweather, 2007). From 1942-1964, it allowed over 2 million *men* to enter the states legally to work on farms. The law required that employers provide transportation, basic health service, and a fair wage. In theory, the program was positive but in practice, it had multiple problems. First, the way the government processed men through the Bracero program actually resembled a wall even though men could come to work in the states. Second, Texas was not part of the agreement causing unintended rises in illegal labor, discrimination, and corruption. Third, the program created a two-tiered subsystem that increased discrimination and the physical danger of women and children.

First, Marentes and Marentes (1999) provided some worker context from Jesus Campoya Calderon, one of the first Braceros to start the program. Calderon's descriptions of what happened at the border illustrated the fences were already in position long before barricades were called for in the 1990's. In order to participate in the program, Calderon, as all Braceros, went to three windows: first for a work interview; second for more extensive interviews, including the humiliation of body and hands checks to make sure they were "clean" and "hard-working"; and third, to receive a working contract and have a photo taken for their immigration card. After passing the interviews and receiving the contract, later in the week on their way to the farms, inspectors sprayed all Braceros with white powder in order to rid them of "Mexican Fleas".

The Smithsonian National Museum of American History (2013) has an online exhibition with photos that illustrate well the "bittersweet" nature of participating in the

Bracero program. Regarding the border, the Smithsonian exhibition (2013) notes, “Braceros were often subjected to humiliating exams and bureaucratic procedures. They were told to strip and were sprayed with the pesticide DDT. If they did not pass the medical exams, they were sent back to Mexico.” The website goes on to describe how participants felt like livestock when inspectors examined them, and like vermin when inspectors sprayed them down. Furthermore, the interview process was intimidating. The interview process was intimidating. Even with setbacks, over 350,000 Mexican men made the trek for 20 consecutive seasons.

The second major drawback to the Bracero program was that it excluded Texas, increasing illegal immigration in that state. According to the Koestler (2013), Mexico excluded Texas from the agreement due to lack of civil rights protections, broken contracts, and intense discrimination prior to 1942. Notwithstanding these problems, Texas farmers and ranchers continued to hire immigrants crossing the border illegally to find work. In addition, the U.S. immigration agencies arrested thousands of aliens coming into Texas. However, for humanitarian reasons the agencies released the immigrants and helped transport them around Texas where they could find jobs. Bracero participants in other states felt their wages were too low so they abandoned the program in favor of working illegally in Texas. In 1951 due to complaints and corruption on both sides of the border, the Mexican government rescinded the original Bracero agreement for all U.S. states.

In retaliation for Mexico’s actions, in 1953 the INS, Border Patrol, the U.S. military, state, and local authorities began “Operation Wetback” to repatriate the majority of the illegal immigrants back to Mexico, or wherever else they came from

(Hernandez, 2010; Koestler, 2013). Astor (2009) argued that this operation was also an attempt to turn illegal immigration into a national security issue. Similar to the fears after September 2001 that terrorists could cross the border illegally, in the 1950's Senator McCarthy, Senator McCarran, Senator Walter, and many others felt that Communist conspirators could get into the country too easily the same way. It was no surprise that "Operation Wetback" took place shortly after Congress in a bipartisan vote passed the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, despite President Truman's attempt to veto the bill. By 1955 when funding ran out for the "Operation Wetback", law enforcement and military forces of the U.S. government repatriated over one million people (Hernandez, 2010). The INS claimed that in some places such as El Paso and San Antonio, the government apprehended upwards of 80,000 aliens. However, due to the fear of arrest, more than 500,000 people migrated back to their home countries prior to the beginning of the operation. Supporters of the operation claimed that removing illegal workers benefited the health and economy of the U.S., and it was in the national security interest to protect the border. Those that opposed the operation felt there was too much xenophobia, and the operation was inhumane.

The third problem with the Bracero program was that it created a two-tiered, class and gender discrimination system (Hernandez, 2007, 2010). Women who wanted to join husbands and/or families had to try to cross illegally. The traditionally accepted method of stopping migration was to beat up men, who generally gave up or tried to find other ways to get over the border. Hernandez (2007) described a different experience for women:

When unsanctioned female and family migration increased during the Bracero era, Border Patrol officers struggled to devise methods of migration control to

address the new gender dynamics of unsanctioned migration. Officers reported feelings of shame and discomfort when attempting to arrest women and children and border communities actively opposed the “spectacle” of publicly subjecting women and children to police violence. (p. 12)

In order to avoid too much attention, Hernandez (2010) described how the Border Patrol built “gendered” fences with the goal of forcing women to more remote and dangerous areas to try and cross, thus they would no longer be a political ‘spectacle’ for migration control. Anzaldúa (1987), Pettman (1996), and Spencer (2009) noted that gender violence was not unique to the Bracero program, but has continued as women find other ways to cross the border. Spencer (2009) clarified that the sexual harassment and violence of women is so extensive that women cannot travel alone with Coyotes (human smugglers). Some coyotes tried to be respectful by hiring women to protect the dignity of those traveling across the border. Anzaldúa (1987) concluded:

The Mexican woman is especially at risk. Often the *coyote* (smuggler) doesn’t feed her for days or let her go to the bathroom. Often he rapes her or sells her into prostitution. She cannot call on county or state health or economic resources because she doesn’t know English and she fears deportation. American employers are quick to take advantage of her helplessness. She can’t go home. She’s sold her house, her furniture, borrowed from friends in order to pay the coyote who charges her four or five thousand dollars to smuggle her to Chicago. She may work as a live-in maid for white, Chicano or Latino households for as little as \$15 a week. (p. 12)

Whether communicating about the consequences of the Bracero program, or the communication functions of the security fence, a useful semiotic analysis must recognize and create discourse about the historic and current gender oppression security walls embody.

Influence of Communism and Civil Rights (1949-1965)

Shortly after World War II, the two major geopolitical players, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. began a Cold War that would last until the late 1980's. The global political backdrop was the fight between the ideologies of Communism and Democracy. Countries around the world realigned their political systems between the competing geopolitical ideologies. As I noted in the South Africa chapter, the apartheid regime passed anti-Communist laws directly affecting Nelson Mandela and the political future of that country. In 1949, Mao Zedong was transforming China through the *Red Knowledge* he had gained from his Russian counterparts (Shih, 1972). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed on August 4, 1949 in response to future European aggression, the Soviet uprising, and the Korean War in 1950 (NATO, 2013). By 1961, the Berlin Wall divided a city, and symbolically divided the world for 30 years.

Immigration issues divided the Republican Congress and the Democrat President, Mr. Harry S. Truman. Democrats wanted to ban the 1921 quota system to gain support from international partners while the Republicans were concerned that Communism could spread its way into the states and threaten the American way of life (DOS Historians Office, 2013). In the 1950's, Senator McCarthy gave his famous speeches and accusations that there were many Communists in government positions. In this political culture, Republican Senator Pat McCarran's Senate Judiciary Subcommittee investigated the former President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the sitting President Truman to identify any ties to Communism. Democrat Congressman Francis Walter was the Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities. Senators

McCarran and Walter created the *Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952* (INA, 1952) that received bipartisan support despite a strongly endorsed veto by President Truman (Campi, 2004). The INA (1952) codified all previous immigration laws and made some significant new amendments. First, the INA lifted the ban on Asian immigrants. The second change increased the power of the government to deport individuals or entire communities if necessary to protect the country from the rise and spread of Communism. Astor (2009) explained that in 1953, “Operation Wetback” took place at least in part due to national security concerns about Communists possibly crossing the border illegally. The government in that operation repatriated over one million people. Although it was highly controversial, the INA (1952) became the new basis for immigration laws moving forward (Campi, 2004; Cox & Rodriguez, 2009; Herzog, 2011; INA, 1952; Truman, 1952).

President Truman’s veto letter to Congress underscored the essential arguments in opposition to the INA. Similar to the 1924 quota system, President Truman (1952) claimed, “the greatest vice....is that it discriminates deliberately and intentionally, against many peoples of the world” (§ 18). The INA (1952) was an institutional wall of racism and sexism (Chin 1995-1996; Panunzio, 1927; Weil 2000-2001; Silber, 1996-1997). As I have argued throughout this dissertation, walls come in many forms. Far too often, customs officers and physicians who had powerful authority created walls that made it difficult for immigrants to overcome. The officers had the sole discretion to deny entry to anyone based on factors such as mental or physical deformities or perceived immoral behaviors. President Truman (1952) reminded readers that the purpose of the 1924 law “was to cut down and virtually eliminate immigration to this

country from Southern and Eastern Europe....A theory [of assimilation] was invented to rationalize this object” (§ 18). Truman argued that the heart of the legislation went against the ideals of equality found in the Declaration of Independence and that it should not receive institutional support.

Beyond the most glaring trouble, President Truman (1952) identified several additional cracks in the INA (1952). Allowing Asians to enter the U.S. again did nothing to represent the serious problems many other races faced when trying to come to the country. Moreover, there were concerns that the law did not help thousands of refugees who were fleeing from Communism. Moreover, supporting the INA (1952) was a contradiction. President Truman explained that the U.S. could not support NATO while at the same time telling allies their citizens were not welcome in the states. Finally, President Truman (1952) argued that the INA (1952) was a Constitutional violation of the separation of powers because the bill gave Congress too many investigative powers over the Executive Branch and other government agencies. Senators McCarran and Walter argued that the investigative powers were necessary to fight Communist sympathizers (during the controversial cultural of McCarthyism across the country at the time) (Herzog, 2011).

Immigration & Nationality Act of 1965

President Lyndon B. Johnson (1966) introduced the new legislation standing in front of the Statue of Liberty. President Johnson (1966) stated, “This bill....is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives, or really add importantly to either our wealth or our power”

(p. 1037). This statement was a terrible misjudgment as noted by most academic and public policy literature dealing with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, 1965). Banning the national quota system was a monumental step in breaking down one of the walls to immigration. Beyond the quota ban, the law provided new desperately needed emergency visas for refugees and prioritized the visa process. The law had three goals. First, bring skilled laborers into the country, second, unite families, and third, provide non-emergency refugees an opportunity to come into the states (CIS, 1995; Fortney, 1970; Friedman, 1973; Kennedy, 1966; Ludden, 2006; Wolgin, 2011).

Kennedy (1966) described the development of the INA (1965). Within the Kennedy family, immigration reform was a strong issue going back to their grandfather John Francis Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald had supported a bill to accept refugees from the Great Boer War (1898-1901). President John F. Kennedy gained a strong sense of appreciation for immigration and pushed for equality under the law. In some ways, the law was a reflection to the world that the 1964 Civil Rights Act to ban discrimination was not only of domestic importance, but that the U.S. was making a shift in how they viewed citizens of the world in the new age of globalization (CIS, 1995; Kennedy, 1966; Wolgin, 2011). Kennedy (1966) argued that the momentum to eliminate the quota system started when Democrats failed to stop the INA (1952) from passing. Kennedy (1966) stated, “the stubborn forces of radicalism and reaction were not easily overcome....” (p. 138). It took the Truman Commission and the work of both political parties and sides of Congress and the President to push forward a movement for change. Kennedy (1966) further complains, “hearings in the house were delayed considerably because the subcommittee chairman evidences little public interest in immigration

reform, and , in any case, was opposed to the formula recommended by the President” (p. 141). Even in the face of many obstacles, the act became law on October 3, 1965 (Johnson, 1966). Kennedy (1966) concludes that those who supported the new legislation to eliminate racial discrimination for immigrants, “did so because they did not believe that individual character and capacity are functions of blood and ancestry....[and] they recognized the need to facilitate the reunion of families long separated by rigidities and strictures of the national-origins system” (p. 145). Kennedy and others were also encouraged about the prospects of bringing in new skilled labor, but those who opposed change were concerned there would be a huge influx of new immigrants, and for better or worse, they turned out to be correct.

When the U.S. government broke down the quota wall, it communicated an economic message to students and skilled workers that America was open for business. The impact of this message was immediately apparent, particularly in the hard sciences, engineering, medical and dental career fields (Fortney, 1970; Friedman, 1973). Fortney (1970) found that in two years, scientists emigrating from Taiwan went from 47 in 1965 to over 1300 in 1967. Likewise, there was a similar increase from India and the Philippines. Rates were about half that size across the countries of Africa, but still a significant increase after 1965. Fortney (1970) also found that the majority of students from developing countries who obtained degrees in engineering, the hard sciences, and in medicine tended to stay in the U.S. rather than return to their home country. In the case of Taiwan, Korea, India and Iran, the percentages were even higher. This was likely due to jobs not being available in students’ home countries. For example, Ph.D.’s in nuclear engineering had the highest chance of finding jobs in the West. Fortney also

found that the more education and training a person had, the more likely they were to stay here. Finally, Fortney (1970) noted that in 1966, one quarter of all students who studied medicine were immigrants from many areas of the world. This was a 40% increase from the previous year.

The INA (1965) provided some positive benefits, but it also had consequences for other countries. Friedman (1973) explained that with the new incentives to immigrate to America, the law created a brain drain on developing countries desperately in need of keeping the few skilled workers they had. Friedman revealed that the percentage of highly skilled, specialized professional workers correlated closely with the gross national product of a nation. In addition, Friedman explained that the medical brain drain was quite drastic. In many countries, there was a ratio of one doctor to 5000 patients, and that number continued to widen as more doctors immigrated to the US where the ratio is much lower, typically one doctor to 600 patients. Friedman (1973) concluded that many more foreign students were coming to the U.S., which was a benefit to the American economy, especially when they considered staying in the country permanently. The vast majority of immigrants that faced the change in policy felt it was a positive step to erase certain kinds of discrimination from U.S. laws. Removing the quota system was akin to removing a wall of racism that was a critical step for immigration reform.

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986

After 21 years, Congress and President Reagan decided to tackle the issue of immigration reform again. They faced similar challenges as previous leaders including

how to decrease the backlog, how to help illegal immigrants without providing blanket amnesty, how to help the American economy, and how to appease the American people. These problems led to the creation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, 1986), also known as the amnesty act. In the political language of 2014, the IRCA (1986) would be similar to the Dream Act with fewer partisan political challenges. The IRCA (1986) contained 88 pages of legislative jumble that attempted to make sense of a complicated and incoherent immigration system. The main intention of the IRCA (1986) was to combine enforcement mechanisms with legalization processes to move immigration forward in a major way. There were three controversial pieces to the new legislation. For the first time, the IRCA (1986) sanctioned employers for hiring illegal workers, and provided some worker protection, especially against discrimination practices. The idea of the law was to streamline the hiring process as a means to reduce the backlog of immigration applications in the system. The second portion of the law was a message from Congress that all people were welcome to be in the U.S. whether they came here legally or not. The law offered amnesty to those who could prove through various requirements that they had been continuous residences since 1982. The third portion of the IRCA (1986) was a monumental and unprecedented increase in border enforcement that I discuss in a later section (Cooper & O'Neil, 2005; Hagan & Baker, 1993; Hernandez, 2010; North, 2010).

The government advertised the employer sanction and enforcement sections as the most important part of the new law. The intent of the IRCA (1986) was to deter recent arrivals trying to find work. To the detriment of the law, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) only received 10% of the allocated budget to enforce the

sanctions. Other funding was supposed to come from fees produced through legalization applications. The INS was vastly unprepared to enforce the employer sanctions or deal with the huge influx of legalization applications that quickly filled up their offices (Cooper & Oneil, 2005; Hagan & Baker, 1993). This was not surprising as backlogs plagued the INS since its inception. A backlog with millions of new legalization applications only compounded the previous problem. While some politicians blamed the INS and Border Patrol for failing to enforce regulations, in actuality the entire government was to blame because none of the agencies involved, nor did Congress or President Reagan plan for the unintended consequences resulting from the IRCA (1986) (Cooper & Oneil, 2005; Hagan & Baker, 1993). Three examples below demonstrate the larger problems with the IRCA (1986).

First, the federal government assumed that local community organizations would act as the intermediary between the illegal population and INS officials with whom they were afraid to interact (Hagan and Baker, 1993). In participant observations and interviews with 79 participants that included federal officials, local religious and business leaders, and a Maya community, Hagan and Baker (1993) found that the majority of the population went straight to the INS. The perception was that the process was easy and the officials were relaxed about the regulations. When a few Maya men applied, everyone else wanted to wait and see what happened. When they saw how easy the process was, they communicated to their friends and word spread throughout the Maya social network quickly. The network included people talking at work, parents talking at kid's soccer practices, and between homes that were mostly apartment complex neighbors (Hagan & Baker, 1993). The word spread faster through the social

network than any formal advertising that the federal government was conducting at the national media level at the time (Cooper & O'Neil, 2005).

Second, scholars noted several reasons why INS officials were unsuccessful in acting on the new IRCA (1986) regulations. North (2010), who was himself a field officer in 1986, described that the majority of the frontline field officers had no immigration experience. Moreover, when field officers denied an application, regional offices in many cases still processed them anyway. In ethnographic research and interviews, Heyman (2000) found that federal law enforcement officials felt like their agencies wanted them to make impossible moral choices that had profound consequences for the people involved in the decision. Heyman described the intense struggle INS agents deal with every day when they make judgments on cases. For example, one interviewee was a second-generation Mexican American INS officer. The official stated that if he were in the same place as a hungry immigrant trying to cross the border, agents would have a difficult time catching him. Yet, this same officer continues to arrest immigrants in desperate situations. Another officer was fascinated with Mexican art and poetry all his life and took a job with INS to be near those things he enjoys, not necessarily to deal with the law enforcement implications of the job. In each case, Heyman (2000) discovered that officers felt conflicted about their responsibilities on the job.

The third unintended consequence of the IRCA (1986) was when many immigrants applied for legalization not because they wanted long term residency or citizenship but rather, they perceived legalization as an investment and means of survival (Rivera-Batiz, 2000). This continued to perpetuate the larger misconception

that all illegal immigrants want to stay in the states. Scholars have continued to prove that this idea is demonstrably false. Hagan and Baker (1993) explained that migration was not a new phenomenon in the Maya community, nor is it new to many migratory cultures.

Immigration Law in the 1990's

Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera (2013) indicated that more immigrants (legally or illegally) have come to the U.S. between 1990 and 2012 than any other period in American history. This increase happened with the IRCA (1986), and three new influential laws passed in the 1990's: The Immigration Act of 1990 (Immigration Act, 1990), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996. These policies continued to build on the IRCA (1986) by increasing economic cooperation and providing stronger enforcement mechanisms at the border to block illegal activities. I discuss the law enforcement mechanisms later in the dissertation.

The Immigration Act (1990) was the most comprehensive reform in 50 years with three main goals: First, family reunification; second, helping refugees; third, more employment visas especially for skilled workers (Bush, 1990; Graham, 1991; Rosenblum & Brick, 2011). The Immigration Act (1990) was similar to the IRCA (1986) since it removed similar barriers to immigrants. The communicative function of the Immigration Act (1990) was to tell highly skilled workers, students, and their families to come to the states. Employment visas for skilled workers increased from 56,000 to 140,000 per year, but that number included family members so there were

fewer actual workers than expected (Rebooting, 2011). The preferences included people with advanced degrees, exceptional abilities, skilled workers with bachelor's degrees, and investors. The Immigration Act (1990) made the U.S. more competitive by receiving more tax from skilled workers (Lawson & Grin, 1992; Rosenblum & Brick, 2011). The Immigration Act (1990) also removed political restrictions put in place by the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (Bush, 1990). Moreover, the Immigration Act (1990) provided new protections and preferential treatment for underrepresented immigrant populations. For example, the government reserved 1000 visas for displaced Tibetan refugees from India and Nepal due to increasing violations of human rights in those countries (Lawson & Grin, 1992).

President George H. Bush (1990) argued that the *temporary protected status* section of the law was unconstitutional. *Temporary status* referred to amnesty for refugees fleeing war torn or otherwise violent countries. Anti-immigration advocates argued that the law created a new category for temporary residences that would now have an excuse to overstay their visas (Graham, 1991). Pro-immigration advocates felt that this section of the Immigration Act (1990) did not do enough to protect people. Hassan (1992) explained that there were some important benefits to being a temporary status refugee. These immigrants had the right to work legally in the states. They could travel. Most importantly, they could obtain legal status if they could prove that deportation would endanger them by returning to their country of origin. The law benefited over half a million displaced refugees from El Salvador, and Honduras due to civil war, flooding, and two earthquakes (Rosenblum & Brick, 2011).

Regardless of the high level of success, Martin (1991-1992) demonstrated several structural problems with the temporary status refugees' clause. First, the provision offered protection on a limited basis meaning the government repatriated many refugees because the application process was not complete. Second, border officials with no judicial background or oversight made arbitrary decisions about who could be deported. Third, the provision defined a refugee very narrowly excluding the vast majority of undocumented immigrants. Even if immigrant refugees could make it to the states safely, they still faced impossible odds of achieving asylum status. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ, 2009), from 2005 to 2008 over 12,000 Mexican asylum cases were filed but fewer than 120 people, or 1% of the applicants won their cases. Since 2008, cases for Mexican *narco-refugees* (persons fleeing from the drug related violence in Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere) have increased even more (Kan, 2011). The refugee status procedure is demoralizing to applicants who have no other means of escaping the violence in their country of origin (Garcia, 2011; Kan, 2011). The border drug war has become so devastating that non-profit organizations such as the Annunciation House in El Paso started to petition for President Obama, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice to create a refugee status for people stuck in these conditions (Petition for Mexican Nationals, 2014). The U.S. government does not apply the refugee status equally, which makes the law even more difficult to comprehend. The Petition for Mexican Nationals (2014) described, "the United States received 5,879 asylum claims from Colombian nationals during this same time period [2006-2013] and granted political asylum to 2,351 individuals -

nearly 40% of all Colombian applicants” (§ 4). Several sections of the Immigration Act (1990) clearly have structural deficiencies that Congress and the President could fix.

Beyond the Immigration Act (1990), two other influential laws passed that did not help immigrants. These laws were the 1990’s were the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Act, 1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (Illegal Immigration Reform, 1996). Unlike prior laws that increased privileges, these laws targeted and removed benefits. The federal government for the first time also transferred more power to states to control various aspects of immigration policies. The Welfare Act (1996) created a distinct line between citizens, non-citizens, and *qualifying aliens*. Moua, et al. (2002) explained that qualifying aliens included lawful permanent residents, refugees with asylum status, and various other categories. The law did not account for the larger population of undocumented immigrants. Under the government definition of non-qualified persons, the law barred undocumented immigrants and others from receiving Medicaid or food stamps (Hagan, Rodriguez, Capps, & Kabiri, 2003). The fact that undocumented persons could not receive benefits is not new. Ruben Garcia is the Director of Annunciation House (A-House) in El Paso, TX, which is a nonprofit Catholic linked organization that has been supporting undocumented immigrants since 1978. The A-House (2013) website explained:

In the El Paso community [in 1978], there was an entire group of people who were unable to receive any of the social services that are ordinarily available to the poor. When referred to an agency, they would return to the house saying, They say they cannot help me because *no tengo papeles*, because I have no papers. There was no place where the undocumented could receive such basic services as food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention. In the El Paso community the undocumented were among the poorest and the most in need. (§ 6)

When Hagen, et al. (2003) interviewed more than 500 participants throughout Texas including many local leaders, they found that the “Welfare Act” was the newest form of bureaucratic wall that negated health care to the poorest families living in the borderlands. Moua, et al. (2000) concluded that not helping undocumented immigrants with their health problems increased the health risks for everyone regardless of their alien or citizenship status.

Shortly after the devastating effects of the Welfare Act hit, the much larger and harder hitting law came into effect known as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (Illegal Immigration Reform, 1996). The first section of the law added more personnel and resources to increase border enforcement. More importantly however, the law built back up the walls that Congress had removed in 1986 and 1990. Scholars agree that the most distressing part of the law was its impact on legal immigration (Immigration Policy Center, 2011; Fragomen, Jr., 1997; Garcia, 2011; Legomsky, 1997). Annunciation House Director, Ruben Garcia (2011) explained the crux of the 1996 law: If an immigrant stays 180 days “plus one” on their visa, they cannot reapply or return to the U.S. for three years. If an immigrant stays one day past the 365-day visa, the government delays their application for ten or more years. Finally, if an illegal immigrant is caught without documentation, is deported, returns to the U.S. and is caught a second time, they are permanently debarred from trying to legally come into the U.S. for life. Garcia (2011) stated that he had seen more than 10,000 people come into the U.S. since 1996 and not one of them was able to receive legal or other assistance to be compliant with the law. The Immigration Policy Center (2011) clarified that many people are already eligible to obtain residency but backlogs and waiting

periods make it extremely difficult to stay in the country without violating the law.

Moreover, there are waivers available in extreme cases for people who could potentially explain why they violated the law by overstaying their visas.

Time is the biggest challenge to the entire visa system. It can take an average of 15 months to receive a first hearing with a US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) official in an office like Ciudad Juarez (Garcia, 2011; Ruben Garcia, personal communication, November 9, 2013). Garcia (2011) explains that when USCIS denies the waivers and they often do for first time applicants, it can take up to two or more years to receive an appeals hearing. Backlogs and denials mean those families must be separated by the border fence potentially for years. More importantly, it means that many families must return to dangerous areas such as Ciudad Juarez where a drug and turf gang war continues to escalate. Stakeholders interested in helping undocumented immigrants conclude that the Illegal Immigration Reform Act (1996) formed a new structural punishment for immigrants seeking help (Garcia, 2011; Legomsky, 1997). This is particularly true for refugees seeking asylum. For many of them, not being granted asylum means they return to a situation of fear and a likelihood of torture and/or death. In order to break down the walls of immigration policy, the people it affects most must be stakeholders at the table.

The Post 9/11 Security Ideology & Immigration Laws

The 9/11 Commission (2004) described American culture prior to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. The American public was decidedly ignorant about world events since the perception was that the U.S. was

relatively isolated from the rest of the world since World War II. It was as if we had an imaginary wall protecting Americans from dangerous terrorist acts. Two political ideologies came to dominate world politics after World War II: Capitalism and Communism. After the Cold War ended in 1989, the U.S. government had an identity crisis. Congress made unprecedented cuts in defense funding that had not happened since the 1950's. In the 1990's, American politicians and people disregarded globalization, concerning themselves almost entirely with the domestic economy and the technology boom. World events mostly ignored by the U.S. included the Bosnian and Rwandan Genocides; the Black-Hawk incident in Somalia; the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya; and the terrorist attack in 2000 on the Destroyer, U.S.S. Cole, docked in Yemen. Domestically, there were two major terrorist attacks including the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995. These incidents did little to arouse concerns about any kind of terrorism (9/11 Commission, 2004).

On September 11, 2001, the death toll and physical damage to the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and the diverted American Airlines flight in Pennsylvania were considerable (9/11 Commission, 2004; Kean & Hamilton, 2014). The U.S. had not lost so many people since the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Although there had been some physical damage, people could rebuild. The most catastrophic damage came in shaking the core of the American psyche. For more than 13 years, U.S. culture and government have had an identity crisis of global proportions. The terrorists suddenly forced the U.S. military, law enforcement communities, and the American people to face and combat a new enemy. The 9/11 Commission in 2004 and in 2014 argue that the terrorists were so

creative that they knocked America off its feet. Scholars, the media, and some government entities recognize that a new security ideology or culture formed to help citizens feel more secure against another imminent terrorism attack (9/11 Commission, 2004; Ackleson, 2005; Adamson, 2006; Alvarez, 2012; Astor, 2009; Brown, 2010; Dunn, 2009; Gulasekaram, 2012; Hayden, 2013; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2002, 2006; Nguyen, 2006; Romero, 2008; Rosas, 2006b, 2007). Congress and President George W. Bush declared “War on Terror” by passing the Patriot Act and creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the third largest department created since World War Two (Andreas, 2003). DHS is comprised of 22 federal agencies whose primary mission is to protect the U.S. against terrorism and other many other threats. The INS and Border Patrol were reorganized into three new agencies in charge of immigration under the DHS which included Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) (9/11 Commission, 2004).

The most obvious sign of a new security culture was the deployment of the National Guard at airports with automatic machine guns and police dogs. In addition, the Transportation Security Administration hired thousands of federal Marshals including covert air Marshals to protect planes in the skies. They also hired thousands of new airport screening personnel required to be U.S. citizens. Nguyen (2006) describes the catastrophic effect new rules had on immigrants:

Out of twenty-eight thousand screeners nationwide, about ten thousand were immigrants....The following month, the government launched Operation Tarmac, a multiagency sweep of airports nationwide. The sweep resulted in the detention and deportation of more than one thousand undocumented airport workers— none of whom were ever shown to have links to terrorist-related activities. One of those caught up in Tarmac was Elvira Arrellano, who had

cleaned airplanes at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport for three years when federal agents raided her home in December 2002 and took her away in handcuffs. She now faced deportation and potential separation from her children, who are U.S. citizens. (p. XX)

Furthermore, Jones (2012), Maril (2011a, 2011b) and Nevins (2002, 2006, 2012) argue that the security culture may be seen and felt along the border and at ports as the government continues to hire thousands of additional agents to join the fence line. Brown (2010) described the physical environment in Washington D.C. in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks. For more than three years, "Jersey" barriers were deployed around the Capitol building, the White House, and many other federal government sites. Many of those barriers still exist in 2014, especially in front of the White House and other federal buildings. These barriers are a visual reminder of the fear of another attack and that America is still in a state of emergency. In the new security culture, the 9/11 Commission (2004) identifies the enemy:

Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world....which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe. The first enemy is weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering and will menace Americans and American interests long after Osama bin Laden and his cohorts are killed or captured. (p. 363).

The 9/11 Commission (2004) clarifies that the War on Terror was not against the religion of Islam, reminding everyone who lived in America to be respectful of all religions. However, the Commission plainly warns that the U.S. will not tolerate radical terrorism ideologies. The language the Commission used to justify war rhetoric throughout its report was another sign of the new security culture that would continue indefinitely. The 9/11 Commission (2004) rationalized, "calling this struggle a war accurately describes the use of American and allied armed forces to find and destroy

terrorist groups and their allies in the field....the language of war also evokes the mobilization for a national effort” (p. 363). These types of open-ended statements created the security culture that would be necessary for future government officials to continue justifying the need for the War on Terror.

Vigilante groups have been a popular part of the discussion on border militarization. DeChaine (2009), a communication scholar, analyzed the rhetoric of one vigilante group that gained a national following after the 2001 attacks. Private citizens formed the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) around 2005 because they felt the federal government was not doing enough to secure the borders. The MCDC website mission is, “To secure United States borders and coastal boundaries against unlawful and unauthorized entry of all individuals, contraband, and foreign military” (Minutemanhq.com, 2013). The website has a continuing tally of illegal aliens entering the nation as well as a large selection of discriminatory rhetoric for public consumption. DeChaine (2009) summarizes how the MCDC communicates their message in two major ways. First, they are hyper-vigilant in using the media in all forms as well as knocking on doors, lobbying congress, and visiting college campuses to increase recruits. Second, they spread their message by implying that every “good” ‘patriotic’ citizen should act to stop aliens from entering the country. This means helping build private fence lines and physically guarding the borders just as the federal government should be doing. DeChaine (2009) concludes, “[The MCDC] conception of the American citizen reveals a profoundly immoral discourse that excludes, racializes, and otherizes individuals and groups – a discourse all too readily conscripted for the cause of national unity in troubled times” (p. 61). Regrettably, many opinion polls still find

that the majority of Americans support some kind of action against illegal immigrants so the message of groups like the MCDC is still resonating in many corners of the country.

For some scholars, businesses, and communities, eight years after 9/11, it felt like the security culture had gone away. Adkins, Thornton, and Blake (2009) found that the private sector was vastly unprepared to deal with a terrorism crisis. Alternatively, there was strong evidence in scholarly and industrial literature that the federal government was continuing to prepare for new disasters or terrorism attacks. Perhaps in some ways, the security culture seems less visible or people just stopped caring about terrorism as an issue in their daily lives. The fact is that the security ideology or culture has not gone away at all. On September 17, 2014, President Obama informed Congress that the U.S. is still under a national emergency caused by terrorist acts that occurred in September 2001 (Message to Congress, 2014). Former Republican Senator Thomas Kean and former Democrat House member Lee Hamilton chaired the original 9/11 Commission in 2004. Kean and Hamilton (2014) exclaimed in the *Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary of the 9/11 Commission Report*, that, “the struggle against terrorism is far from over – rather has entered a new and dangerous phase” (p. 7). Kean and Hamilton pointed out two events in 2014 that illustrate the ongoing security culture and crisis in the states. These events included fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the continuing efforts of al Qaeda to try attacking the U.S. homeland. FBI Director Comey (2013) stated that terrorism threats remain a top priority especially in light of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings. Both the DHS and the FBI 2014

mission statements place border enforcement and the investigation of terrorists as primary goals (Core Missions, 2014; ‘What We Investigate, 2014).

After the Security Fence Act passed in 2006, more and newer border walls became one of the most visible symbols of the ongoing security culture in the U.S. One of the hotly contested issues in the 2013 immigration reform congressional debates was whether to expand border enforcement that originally came from the 2006 law. Congressional leader’s votes communicated very clearly to their constituents that maintaining their job was more important than listening to the people (Brown, 2010; Gulasekaram, 2012; Luke, 2013). In an examination of the votes for and against the 2006 Security Fence Act, Gulasekaram (2012) found that interior non-border states with low immigrant populations voted overwhelmingly in support of the wall. Politicians in non-border states were not accountable to constituents who did not live in the borderlands. Politicians in these states did not have to account for human rights abuses, social and cultural costs, or law enforcement problems that resulted from the fence building. In contrast, politicians had mixed votes in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. The majority of the Californian members in the House of Representatives voted against the Federal law in 2006. In the 2013 federal immigration debate, McLaughlin and Dinan (2013) found that 64 Senators have never visited the border, or refuse to discuss whether they have.

Beyond the politicians rhetoric, many scholars across the social science disciplines remain concerned about the persistent security culture that manifests itself across the nation (Alvarez, 2012; Brown, 2010; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Chavez 2012; Dunn, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2011a,

2011b; Nevins, 2012). Chavez (2012) argues that the stronger the link between undocumented immigrants and terrorism becomes, the more incentive politicians, the media, and the public have to support increasing border patrol technologies and other forms of protection. Luke (2013) concludes that regardless of how politicians or scholars label it, the security culture is still a major part of life in the U.S. for a number of reasons. Luke claims, for example, that the defensive wall barriers do not stop immigrants from crossing the border. Still, politicians claim the walls are the only way to stop invading enemies; therefore, the government should support further wall building and border enforcement.

The U.S. Mexico Security Fence

In the USMX chapter, I reviewed the language of immigration. Then I discussed the history of immigration laws that help create a semiotic context for comprehending the security fence. In this section, I examine four components that make up the security wall with their associated communication functions. The four components are language, law enforcement, militarization, and virtual or smart fences.

Since 1848, there has always been some form of fencing or walls across the USMX border. There was a great push in the 1990s to modernize border security by building larger fences and adding technology to make enforcement easier. The newest and most controversial wall came into existence with the passage of the Security Wall Act of 2006. Congress and President Bush made a huge geopolitical decision by signing the law that provided all the federal funding and support necessary for the DHS “to achieve and maintain control over international land and maritime borders of the United

States.... [preventing] all unlawful entries....by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband” (Security Fence Act, 2006, p. 2). The main purpose of the law was to build a wall to secure the 1951 miles of the Mexican border, but it included provisions for more officers and smart border provisions. Despite all the rhetoric from politicians, federal contractors, government agencies, and the American people who supported the fence, by 2010 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) using Boeing as the primary subcontractor, had only built 700 miles of the busiest and most dangerous parts of the border. The first component communication component of the wall is language associated with it.

The Language of the Fence

Previously in two sections I argue that language is central to understanding more complex communication structures, and language is arbitrary without context (Berger, 2011; Brown, 2010; Kramer, 1997; Levi-Strauss, 1958/1963; Noth, 1985/1990). The word *fence* is arbitrary but in the context of American immigration discourse, it becomes something entirely different, something worth fighting over. Table 13 reveals some of the binary opposition terms that cause conflict when communicating about the physical characteristics of the USMX border.

Table 13 - Binary Opposition Terms on Physical Fence Characteristics

Fence, wall, barrier	Open
Separate	Connected
Natural Barrier	Human made barrier

Kramer (1997) explains that “what Peter says about Paul tells me very much about Peter” (p. 185). In relation to the security fence, this means that how organizations or

individuals reference the fence communicates a great deal of information about that organization or individual. Two examples demonstrate how dissimilar the interpretations are. Ruben Garcia, Director of Annunciation House in El Paso, TX, supports Kramer's argument with his interpretation:

There is no question that the wall says something in and of itself. And it depends on which side of the issue you are on as to what you think it says....[The wall] is so connected to the poor – that wall is almost like a denial of the humanity of the poor. I am not even going to recognize that you are a human being. This wall says that. (In Jones, 2012, p. 5)

In stark contrast to Garcia's view, Maril (2011a) finds that the DHS arbitrarily refers to it as a fence. Maril (2011a) explains, "If DHS and CBP....call this construction a border fence, then that connotes to those who have not actually seen it a meaning and definition that is, for all practical purposes, totally deceptive" (p. 216). The Oxford Online Dictionary (2013) defines a fence as "a barrier, railing, or other upright structure, typically of wood or wire, enclosing an area of ground to mark a boundary, control access, or prevent escape" (p. 1). An Internet search of a typical fence reveals images of a wood fence you might build in the yard, or a chain link fence to keep children inside the schoolyard and off the street. Sometimes people imagine Robert Frost's version of neighbors and old stone fences. Jones (2012) argues that a fence, "sounds more temporary and permeable....[while the] wall, on the other hand, has the connotation of being much more permanent and solid with the strong sense that it blocks movement as well as vision" (p. 11). Maril (2011a) and Jones (2012) conclude that the language regarding the fence or wall or barrier has political and social consequences. Maril (2011a) claims, "These new sections of the border fence are not *fence* in any sense of the word as commonly understood or meant. Already before

completion, these constructions are nothing more or less than imposing and massive border walls” (p. 216).

Other scholars and media personnel provide many examples in their research and on the Internet of more accurate images of the DHS fence (Gulasekaram, 2012; Dunn, 2009; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011). Drehle (2008), for example, reveals that the DHS fence “is a hodgepodge of designs. The best--sections of tall, concrete-filled steel poles deeply rooted, closely spaced and solidly linked at the top—are bluntly functional. The worst--rusting, graffiti-covered, Vietnam-era surplus--are just skivvy walls of welded junk” (p. 29). The DHS language about the border fence has faced battles in cities and courts throughout the Southwest since the project began. In 2007, DHS wanted to build their version of a physical barrier at the University of Texas at Brownville and Texas Southmost College (UTB/TSC) that sits along the shores of the Rio Grande River. The wall barriers would carve up the campus in the name of national security. University President Dr. Juliet Garcia and the Board of Regents fought the DHS in court for over a year and finally agreed to build an alternative fence resembling something more traditional as opposed to the awkward and ugly DHS barriers (UTB/TSC, 2008; Maril, 2011).

Law Enforcement as a Communicative Function of the Wall

Law enforcement officials (LEO is the abbreviation used in the U.S. Intelligence Community) who work locally, statewide, and across the nation are as much a characteristic of the border wall as any other artifact associated with it. Indeed, LEO participated historically in a number of important roles that helped craft the border wall

into what it is today. As of 2014, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials who work along the border are a high profile communicative function of the fence line. Starting in 1849, a border commission built 52 tall obelisks to demarcate a physical borderline. Due to population growth and expansion, the commission built more obelisks that brought the total to 258 by 1894 (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; CPB, 2010b). The pictures below are *Monument One* on the right, the first of the obelisks, and in the picture on the left there are several smaller markers next to the Rio Grande River that are situated west of El Paso, TX.



The Treasury Department formed the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration in 1891, and then became the Bureau of Immigration in 1895. This office was responsible for all immigration activity across 8000 miles of the Canada and Mexico borders. In 1903, the duties of the Bureau of Immigration moved under the Department of Labor as immigration played a role in economic affairs more so than in tax and treasury concerns (CBP, 2013b). Southwest Texas Rangers such as Jeff Milton and others who lived around El Paso and other border areas became the first immigration officers throughout the 1880's (CBP, 2013a; Hernandez, 2010). The CBP website shows a photo of Milton

and other officers in 1887 with the photo belonging to the University of Oklahoma Library Archives (Archives of the Texas Rangers are available at the University of Oklahoma Libraries, Western History Collection, Noah H. Rose Collection).

In 1924, the Border Patrol became an official federal government agency in the Department of Labor. At the time there were 255 total employees including administrators and staff to support field agents. The government added 400 agents although there were debates over whether or not that would be enough to enforce the laws (Ettinger, 2009). In 1940, CBP (2013a) transferred from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice (DOJ). CBP remained in the DOJ until 2003 when they moved over to the newly created DHS. During World War II, the government added 800 agents and support staff to CBP. The officers acted in various roles including guarding aliens in detention camps, increasing border surveillance for Axis saboteurs, protecting diplomats, and significantly increasing aircraft surveillance use (CBP, 2013b).

Deterrence & Walls Ideology Failures

Long before the 1920's, immigration officers knew better than anyone that it was impossible to seal off the entire border. Maril (2011a) explains that *deterrence* became, "the fundamental rationalization for the work engaged in by all CBP agents patrolling the line" (p. 91). Deterrence became an ideological framework with which to view all immigration, drug, and terrorism related activities at the border (Dunn, 2009; Maril, 2011a; Nevins, 2002). There are three main ideas that explain deterrence theory. First, if criminals perceive a punishment is greater and will happen faster than the

benefit they receive, then they are less likely to commit the crime. Second, the speed of the punishment is more important than severity. Third, regardless of motive, the theory suggests that all potential illegal border crossers will think rationally about their decision. A rational person will decide not to make the trip (Maril, 2011). Deterrence theory has never proven to be a useful means of explaining criminal behavior. The theory tends to be overly simplistic by not accounting for huge diversity of motives for individuals and their willingness to obtain their goals. For example, Maril (2011a) argues that deterrence may keep some people away from crossing the border to get jobs. However, it is unlikely a wall deters a terrorist who is clearly committed to their cause to the point they kill and die for them. Deterrence policies lead to unintended consequences. I have noted elsewhere that deterrence led to border militarization. Deterrence strategies forced Coyotes (human smugglers) to increase prices and change their border crossing strategies (Sheridan, 2009; Spencer, 2009). Deterrence strategies forced immigrants to make much more dangerous trips over difficult geographic terrain usually with a lack of food, water, or shelter (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2004; Maril, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Sheridan, 2009; Spencer, 2009). Although deterrence fails, policy makers have used it for over 100 years as a justification for many border related issues. Panunzio (1921, 1926) commented:

In each successive annual report the Commissioner General of Immigration suggests the need of increased appropriations in order to strengthen the present cordon and build new lines of defense. There are others, however, who consider this not a true solution. They believe that it is not a matter of holding a Thermopylae pass against a small organized army, but rather the guarding of nine-thousand miles of border against individual particles of human dust blown toward America by the urge of life itself. The United States Secretary of Labor is reported to have said that "If we had the Army on the Canadian border and on the Mexican border, we couldn't stop them; if we had the Navy on the water-front, we couldn't stop them." In fact not even a Chinese wall, nine thousand

miles in length and built over rivers and deserts on mountains and along the seashores, would seem to promise a permanent solution. (p. 282)

Notwithstanding the obvious dangers and inhumanity in the deterrence policies, fences of many lengths, sizes, and materials still rise on the border (Compton, 1948; Martinez, 2008). In 1925, the government proposed two fences near El Paso, one that would be electrified and another that would be 18 feet high, 30 miles long, and cost \$33,000 to complete (\$437,000 in 2013). The communicative function of the barriers was to dissuade narcotic smugglers, rumrunners, and aliens from illegal entry. Observation towers came up in 1937 (Aguilar, 2010; LA Times, 1925; McGreal, 2011; Washington Post, 1925).

Rene Mascarenas Miranda was the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico in the 1950's when the towers were very visible and the barriers were a danger to people and an eyesore on his city. Martinez (1976) asked Miranda whether he had heard rumors in 1951 that El Paso planned to build more barriers, and did that bother him. Miranda's response not only communicated his personal feelings about the 1951 rumors, but in a broad way, his message communicates the perception millions of immigrants have about the USMX border wall. According to Martinez (1976), Miranda said:

“En El Paso 51.' ha hecho una proposition de que SI.' construya un cerco grande del otro lade para tratar de detener a esa gente, para que no cruce . Que Ud. de esc?” (p. 287).

English Translation: “I don't like the idea of fences. We don't live between East and West Germany. The Communist Wall that is there is a slap in the face to any nation that boasts of being democratic. We want greater fluidity and communication between us. We don't want barriers; we don't want barbed wire fences. We brag that we are two neighborly countries, two friendly nations, and that this is the longest border in the world where one does not see a single soldier, a single rifle, a single bayonet, or a single affronting or discriminatory sign”. (p. 269)

Miranda also expressed his dislike for the observation towers that were highly visible when he visited with U.S. Ambassador Hill in 1958 (See Martinez, 1976, p. 287-292 for complete Spanish language transcript). Both the ambassador and Mayor Miranda agreed that the towers and fence were an insult to Mexico, and shortly thereafter, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered that the towers be removed (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; Martinez, 1976, 2011).

The incident in El Paso did not stop construction or call for more fences and barriers. In 1955, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution for 696 miles of fencing to enforce the quarantine of animal and plant diseases (Chicago Daily Tribune, 1955). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) announced the same year that it would replace four miles in San Diego that would be 14 feet tall and cost over \$150,000 (\$1.2 million in 2013) (LA Times, 1955). Martinez (2008) laments that journalists did not keep records or follow up on the fence building, so it is hard to know whether the projects were finished and if they were, whether they worked for the purpose for which they were built. Amidst increasing concerns about illegal aliens in the late 1970's, the INS requested funding to build and repair major fence lines in El Paso, TX, and San Ysidro, CA. The holes in the old barriers were big enough for cars to drive through, and the INS wanted to force immigrants to cross the border outside of urban areas in order to increase detection. The new 12 mile project was labeled *The Tortilla Curtain* in the media due to exaggerated claims that spikes could cut off toes and fingers of anyone who tried to climb it (Karaim, 2008; Martinez, 2008). By 1980, because President Jimmy Carter cut back on the original proposal, the Tortilla Curtain failed. Section Chief Cameron of the CBP also noted that there was no funding for maintenance and

updating of the fence, and within the first 30 days of building, travelers illegally crossing the border already punched new holes through it (Lodi News Sentinel, 1980). Many borderlands scholars view the Tortilla Curtain as the catalyst for further funding and support from the federal government in the 1970's through the 2006 Security Fence Act (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; Chacon & Davis, 2006; Dunn, 2009; Karaim 2008; Martinez, 2008; Martinez & Hardwick, 2009).

Militarization of the Wall

Legally, according to the *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878 (PCA, 1878), the federal government may not use military intervention in domestic affairs, but the law has not deterred misinterpretations or abuse of the law (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Mason, 2013). Brinkerhoff (2002) claims that technically the law only applies to the Army and Air Force, although the Department of Defense has consistently held that the Navy and the Marine Corp should act in a similar manner. Brinkerhoff further clarifies that the law does not apply to the Coast Guard due to their being a civilian agency and a part of the Armed Forces. Nor does the law apply to the use of the National Guard, any state guards, the Military Police, or civilian employees of the government. Furthermore, the law does not exclude the President from quailing riots or civil disorder (Brinkerhoff, 2002).

The *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878 is important to this dissertation since it led the government to justify militarizing the border (Mason, 2013). Mason (2013) demonstrates that the government used this law to intervene in the drug war in the 1990s and after the 2001 terrorist attacks, President Bush and President Obama have

both used the law to enforce immigration laws at the border. Levario (2012) describes that in 1997 during a U.S. Marines anti-drug operation in Texas, the Marines killed an innocent, eighteen year old, Esequiel Hernandez Jr. who was mistaken for a drug smuggler. Mason (2013) states that from 2006 to 2008, President Bush sent 6000 National Guard troops to the southern border to help CBP with engineering, aviation help (unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), helicopters, surveillance planes etc.), entry I.D. teams, and other types of technical, logistical, and administrative support. Mason (2013) explains that in 2010, President Obama used a similar interpretation of the law to send National Guard troops to support law enforcement in securing the border. Mason (2013) also claims that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and CBP have made other requests where it was determined military force was necessary, such as in counterterrorism operations, drug war incidents, or stopping undocumented immigrants from crossing the border. Due to the way the government interprets the law, scholars across the discipline of Borderland Studies claim that militarization along the border was inevitable (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; Andreas, 2003; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; BAC, 2012; Coleman, 2007; Dunn, 2009; Durazo, 2013; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2002, 2006, 2012; Spencer, 2009).

The most important bill that communicates the U.S. government was serious about building security fences at the border was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1986), signed by President Reagan to fight the War on Drugs (CBP, 2011). The law primarily contributed funding for drug interdiction, but a side effect was an early attempt to militarize the border. The INS received 25 million dollars to build three command

centers that supported control, communication, and surveillance of the borders (Anti-Drug, 1986). In addition, several military units from the Coast Guard, Navy, and Air Force increased cooperation on drug interdiction campaigns. The Ant-Drug Act (1986) supplied the INS with eight Blackhawk helicopters to help monitor the drug flow. The combination of the Anti-Drug Act (1986) and the Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986) communicate a powerful message from the U.S. government: militarization of borders is a standard operating procedure (Ackleson, 2005; Anderson & Gerber, 2007; Andreas, 2003; BAC, 2012; Chavez, 2012; Coleman, 2007; Dunn, 2009; Durazo, 2013; Figueuroa, 2013; Hayden, 2013; Hondagneu-Sotelo, Guadinez, Lara, & Ortiz, 2004; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011; Nevins, 2002, 2006).

Dunn (2009) describes another huge step that increased border militarization. Dunn (2009) explained that in 1993, Chief of the El Paso Customs and Border Protection (CBP) sector, Silvestre Reyes, formed a new program called *Operation Blockade* or *Operation Hold the Line*. The goal of Operation Blockade was to deter illegal crossing in urban El Paso by building barriers across the middle of the city. According to Ackleson (2005), Dunn (2009), and Maril (2011a), Reyes placed 450 federal agents in highly visible locations such as on top of the levees and canals, as well as other banks on the Rio Grande River. The agents monitored the fence line 24 hours a day, seven days a week in lighted trucks and other forms to ensure their presence would be widely noticed. Beyond the wall of agents that blocked the border, Reyes received permission from the INS to build a fence west of the city including 14 miles of new fencing. The fence was steel mesh, 10 feet high, 1.3 miles long, and was thicker and larger than the original proposal. Dunn (2009) claims that the government constructed

the fence in a way that could make it easier to turn into a larger wall later on. The fencing included an extensive network of underground seismic and magnetic sensors that rarely were successful in tracking down criminals or immigrants crossing the border illegally (Maril, 2011).

One communicative function of the El Paso wall was that it created public discussion Dunn (2009) describes as unusual. Typically, the government does little consulting with local groups prior to building what they deem to be essential to border security. Dunn found in 1993 that some people in El Paso (businesses, churches, civic organizations, the city government, and other stakeholders) did not want a fence that they considered a Berlin Wall with their neighbors. The people who opposed the fence argued that it would send the wrong, contradictory message to Mexico, especially in light of the fact that Congress had just passed the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). Furthermore, people who opposed the wall argued that it illustrated a lack of compassion for human life, and instead of a wall, the CBP should open a new port of entry. Ironically, Vila (1999) notes that 90% of the population supported Operation Blockade, with almost 70% of that group having origins in Mexico within the last 20 years. Vila explains that Mexican American residents blame new undocumented immigrants for all of El Paso's problems.

In order to win the opposition, and increase those in favor of the operation, Chief Reyes and the CBP changed their rhetoric about the fence (Dunn, 2009). Instead of calling it an immigration prevention program, the CBP began to reframe the debate to suggest that the fence was a way to prevent crime. Throughout the debate, the opposition agreed with Reyes that crime prevention was a positive goal, especially

where the fence passed by the railroads. Chief Reyes also made a plea that being in Border Patrol was a dangerous job and the fence could help the safety of agents. Dunn (2009) explained that media help, Reyes and the CBP effectively changed their rhetoric to gain public support of the fence. Moreover, Dunn (2009) emphasized that CBP increased their credibility by actually consulting with local stakeholders.

Chavez (2012) argues that the CBP used the El Paso operation to communicate that deterrence was effective and should continue. CBP (1994) communicated this message in the *1994 Border Patrol National Strategy Guide and Beyond* emphasizing, “El Paso’s [prevention through deterrence] strategy has been successful....The national strategy builds on El Paso’s success through an infusion of permanent resources designed....[to] extend it throughout the sector” (p. 7). Congressional leaders and President Clinton agreed that the CBP strategy was successful so the CBP received more funding and resources. Between 1993 and 2001, 5000 new officers and 1500 new support staff were hired. The CBP budget increased by 3.5 billion dollars, and the government increased the use of military force to support the deterrence strategy (Ackleson, 2005; Fragomen, Jr., 1997; Hondagneu-Sotelo, et al., 2004; Legomsky, 1997; Rivera-Batiz, 2000).

Nevins (2002) explains that following the great success in El Paso, the San Diego sector commenced *Operation Gatekeeper* in 1994. The INS built the San Diego fence using brown steel landing mats the government used during the Vietnam War, so the fence was nicknamed *landing mat fence*. CBP received the landing mats free and used them on 60-80 miles of border wall prior to 2006, mostly to deter vehicle passage (Ehrman, 2007; Karaim, 2008, Nunez-Neto & Vina, 2006; Nunez-Neto & Garcia,

2009). San Diego also employed the *Sandia Secondary Fence* that was a much stronger, intimidating, and extremely expensive wall. Sandia is actually two fences with an access road in the middle for law enforcement surveillance (Nevins, 2002; Nunez-Neto & Vina, 2006; Nunez-Neto & Garcia, 2009). The government built overhanging angles on the ten-foot tall fences to discourage climbers Nunez-Neto and Vina (2006) described that Sandia cost around \$900,000 per mile to build and \$8000 per month, per mile, to maintain. Finally, the government would need to replace the Sandia fence every fifth year or sooner due to the fence receiving so much damage. Since 2006, the estimates for the Sandia fence increased to over a million dollars or more per mile to construct and maintain.

The San Diego sector also built and maintained a unique barrier. Ehrman (2007) illustrates, “At the Pacific Ocean....a steel I-beam barrier divides Imperial Beach, California, from Playas de Tijuana, Mexico, the last section of barrier lacks a top supporting beam. Some of its stakes....have rotted out completely or been removed” (p. 55). Pictures in the media show friends passing items between the beams, and families hugging. The I-beam fence is another communicative function suggesting that the border is not just a line on a map, but a very real tangible line the U.S. government believes “the other” should not try to cross illegally. Anderson and Gerber (2007) highlight another example of the burden of new walls in the San Diego sector, especially after 9/11. Anderson and Gerber (2007) describe how interconnected the cities of Jacumba, California and Jacume, Baja California have been historically because of cross border family relationships, other social connections and economic ties. Even after DHS built barriers in San Diego in the 1990s, people crossed with

relative ease, and CBP officers looked the other way as they saw no danger in what people were doing. Anderson and Gerber (2007) explain the consequences of post 9/11 federal policies:

No one was allowed to cross, even though Border Patrol agents personally knew many of the locals. To get to the other side, residents now must drive an hour west to the nearest official crossing in Tecate, wait in line, then drive east. Some of the residents of Jacume, Mexico, are U.S. citizens with jobs in and around Jacumba who choose to live in Jacume for a variety of reasons, including living costs and ties to their extended families. The commute to work is no longer a few minutes but has become hours in each direction....The store in Jacumba lost about 40 percent of its customers, and families and friends are no longer able to visit and socialize as they used to do regularly. (p. 58)

The militarization embedded in the U.S. after 9/11 fundamentally altered communication in both countries. The physical barriers are simply an outward symbol of that communication.

Regardless of the mounting evidence that wall building does nothing to deter, the U.S. government disregards that message. The national strategy guides for the CBP in 2004 and 2012 communicates that the 1994 El Paso deterrence strategy was highly successful. The government continues to show great interest in the deterrence strategy as illustrated by the huge increases in funding for such programs. The CBP and Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) operating budgets increased from nine billion dollars in 2005 to 17 billion dollars in 2013 (Immigration Policy Center, 2013). From 2006-2008, President Bush sent 6000 National Guard troops to the southern border to help CBP with engineering, aviation help (unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), helicopters, surveillance planes etc.), entry I.D. teams, and other types of technical, logistical, and administrative support. From 2010-2011, President Obama sent 1200

National Guard troops again to the border with the primary mission to deter drugs and provide intelligence to CBP (Mason, 2013).

The largest strategy change for the CBP to combat threats is from a resource-based approach in 2004 to a more risk based approach in 2012. With more than 700 miles of physical infrastructure completed, resources shifted to more intelligence driven priorities (Jones, 2012). The 2012 guide also suggests that the CBP is increasing international cooperation with Canada and Mexico, but at times, it is difficult due to the three countries policies on immigration. For example, the Mexican Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to migrate freely disregarding the U.S. concept that immigrants are illegal entities. Furthermore, the Mexican government repeatedly argues that they are concerned for their people, so when Mexican immigrants die in the borderlands due to lack of U.S. concern, cooperation becomes more difficult (Escobar, Martin, Schatzer, & Martin, 2003; Meyers 2003). Even though some problems exist, the Mexican and U.S. governments have seen increased cooperation, especially in the use of UAV's for intelligence gathering purposes. In 2009 when the battles between cartels in Ciudad Juarez intensified, President Obama helped President Calderon by increasing UAV flights in Mexican air space to collect intelligence on cartel targets (Priest, 2013).

In November 2013, I visited the border wall to see and understand what it means to militarize the border. The message of border walls and border patrols is easy to see and hear. Anyone can even touch the fence and talk to people on the other side. In the photographs below, this section of fencing was built just west of El Paso, along the New Mexico state border by DHS in the to curtail some of the violence from Ciudad Juarez. Railroad cars pass this particular stretch about every half hour. This section of the wall

has high traffic that is apparent as several CBP trucks make regular stops, and CBP helicopters routinely fly over the same areas.. The photographs demonstrate that about every 200 yards there are tall posts with cameras that maintain a 360-degree view. There is sand on the U.S. side of the fence so that when anyone jumps over, they leave footprints. CBP officials can identify and track where they have gone. The photographs also visualize mountains that act as natural barriers combined with the fences to deter illegal crossing.





Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System, the First Virtual Fence

Beyond the wall line itself, in the 1990s CBP began employing advanced technology to produce a *virtual wall*, which many authors also refer to as *smart borders*. Haddal (2010) explains that the CBP uses a network of remote video surveillance systems that connect to an integrated computer assisted detection database. When I visited the El Paso border sector, on a close inspection at the fence line I observed highly technical cameras about 30 feet apart, lining the top of the fences. Haddal (2010) describes that there are many underground sensors as well. When working properly,

both systems trip an alarm and send a message to a communication center where CBP agents decide what to do with the signal (p.8). The complex system was rolled out in 1997, and was ultimately labeled system the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS). In interviews with federal agents who are very familiar with the systems, Maril (2004, 2011a) finds that the technology is almost useless in helping officers enforce immigration laws. Maril (2004) describes the experience of seven-year veteran Border Patrol Agent Fernando Rodriguez. Agent Rodriguez says that anyone with a microchip and a little technical knowledge can hack CBP signals allowing for eavesdropping in CBP operational communication. Agent Rodriguez further complains that the underground sensors are worthless because “The sensors could not distinguish between a man carrying....marijuana....or a herd of grazing cattle....or farm workers, or whoever else might be there for whatever reason” (Maril, 2004, p. 30). Maril (2004) describes another experience from federal agent Noe Escondido. Typically, by the time the CBP gets the sensor signals at the command centers, if someone enters the country illegally, they are already gone before CBP gets there to do anything about it. Agent Escondido clarifies that some sensors are set up at least 10 miles from the communication centers so getting anywhere quickly is a problem.

The ISIS project lasted roughly eight years, covered about four percent of the entire border with 13,000 sensors, doing little to deter illegal activities at the border (Koslowski, 2011). Koslowski (2011) found that only 11,000 sensors were operative in 2000 and reported, “Many of the sensors proved difficult to maintain in a variety of weather conditions [and]....false alerts triggered by animals resulted in diverted and wasted patrol manpower” (p. 9). Maril (2011a) explains that the International

Microwave Corporation (IMC) received the federal contract of two million dollars on a “non-competitive” bid. Neither the IMC, nor the CBP management reviewed similar projects from the past to learn what they could do differently to make the ISIS system more effective. Companies do not have any strategic communication with experienced Border Patrol agents to understand where the walls could be more effective. Maril (2011a) also highlighted that the government faced an ethical dilemma in allowing Congressman’s Reyes son and daughter to work on the federal contract considering he was the person who lobbied for El Paso border issues in the first place. After firing two companies and spending over 200 million dollars, the government declared ISIS a failure.

Strategic Border Initiative, the Second Virtual Fence

In 2005 after DHS determined they would not or could not construct a virtual fence, they advertised a contract starting at two million dollars for a company to build the Strategic Border Initiative (SBI-Net) (Chavez, 2012). The General Accountability Office (GAO) defined SBI-Net as “fencing and vehicle barriers and other forms of tactical infrastructure and technology” (Stana & Hite, 2007, p. 1). Chavez (2012) suggested that even though political rhetoric linked to national security protection to the project, there were other subtle goals as well including stopping undocumented immigrants and protecting the environment. The first goal to curtail undocumented immigrants failed. Regarding environmental protection, Shellabarger et al. (2012) clarified, “increased traffic in remote regions has contributed to ecological degradation

of vulnerable ecosystems protected by federal parks, refuges, and forests through impacts of migrants and smugglers as well as border enforcement efforts” (p. 384).

The five largest defense contractors in the national security industry, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Ericsson, and Raytheon, all with numerous connections in Washington D.C. became the primary bidders to build the new virtual fence. Maril (2011a) explained that throughout the bidding process, the corporate teams were mostly concerned with profit margins from federal contracts because they typically last for years and produce a great deal of revenue for the managing companies. The fence and the virtual fence were never designed from the perspective of the people who would actually encounter the product such as CBP officials, or immigrants. Nor did the companies consider placing the fences in what CBP officials would consider a strategic way that could actually make them more effective in deterring illegal activities. In fact, when Maril (2011a) spoke with engineers and business people at Honeywell Technology Solutions prior to the fence going up, he found that none of the employees working on the fence project had ever been to the southern border. Furthermore, Maril noted that none of the new contracts accounted for the failures from the ISIS first smart border.

DHS announced in 2006 that Boeing would be the primary “systems integrator” for the SBI virtual fence (Maril, 2011a, 2011b). Stana and Hite (2007) found that Boeing received a portion of the five billion dollar contract for sensors, communication systems, information technology, and command/control systems to make SBI Net operational by 2009. While this was an aggressive goal, Boeing assured DHS that it was possible. DHS indicated that a measurable goal was to secure 6000 miles of the U.S.

border, but the Government Accountability Office disagreed with the DHS assessment. Stana and Hite (2007) stated that the DHS goal was vague. It did not include any specific goals on how DHS or Boeing intended to complete the SBI Net project in less than two years. Sullivan (2008) noted that through 2008, Boeing had received over one billion dollars of government money but had made little progress in their goals. Stana (2009) found that Boeing moved the original completion date from 2009 to 2016. Boeing only managed to complete portions of the SBI Net in four of the nine Border Patrol Sectors including the El Paso, Tucson, and Yuma. DHS and Boeing still had no measurable goals to demonstrate the project was functioning correctly or that they could meet the purposed time-periods. Finally, Stana (2009) found that CBP agents had to use outdated existing technologies such as cameras on towers that had intermittent signal problems and minimal maintenance support. Early in 2011, DHS Director Napolitano canceled the Boeing contract due to unmet expectations. Instead, DHS and CBP would use the contract money on previously developed technologies like Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV) to support the mission. Despite their failures, Boeing received contract money to maintain and repair antiquated technologies (Biesecker, 2011). Maril (2011b) indicated that agencies did not have to account for their expenditures and it was nearly impossible to narrow down how much money Boeing and DHS actually spent on building the fence.

Theoretical Considerations

ST Research Questions

RQ 1: Which agents created the security social structural that made the fence possible?

RQ 2: How can the duality of structure be visualized at a micro and macro level perspective, and what does the duality of structure reveal about the USMX Security Fence?

RQ 1: Which agents created the security social structural that made the fence possible?

The answer to RQ 1 can be summed up with one agent and its power, mainly, the U.S. Government. Prior to developing this analysis, my list of possible agents with intentions included immigrants, drug cartels, the Mexican government, state and local governments and organizations, think tanks, activists, businesses, and private entities. There are many voices in discussions all of which who wield some form of power or another even if they cannot make large overarching changes. For example, the most affected agents in the immigration social structure are immigrants. They do not have the resources of a federal government, but they do have the power to communicate their message with their feet by continuing to cross both sides of the border regardless of where the government builds walls. Gulasekaram (2012) states, “Knowledge of potential death or even knowing a friend or relative who has died in an unlawful entry has not stopped other migrants from undertaking the journey” (p. 156). For some immigrants, the peril of violence and death is as high or higher in their home country than risking the dangerous journey. In Ciudad Juarez Cartel violence increased exponentially since 2008. Many refugee families find that their only safe option is to

flee to the border ports of entry or attempt illegal entry (Garcia, 2011; Ruben Garcia, personal communication, November 9, 2013, Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011a; Petition for Mexican Nationals, 2014).

Even though there are many agents and diverse horizons, the U.S. government is the loudest voice wielding the most power in what happens in on the U.S. side of the borderlands. This is due in a large way to the legal framework that made the federal government responsible for national issues such as national security, border enforcement, the question of sovereignty, and immigration. In many cases, state governments or local communities tried to deal with immigration issues on their own but at times, DHS or other government entities minimize or overturn the work they complete.

For the U.S., one of the sovereign's most important functions is to create and/or appeal laws that in theory create equality for all people regardless of ethnic origin, or immigrant status. The federal government invokes national security concerns to ignore some laws so DHS can continue to build walls. Gulasekaram (2012) reveals, "the federal government....[is] literally moving mountains.... for a physical border barrier. Several state and private lands have been requisitioned....and the multiple....laws that would prevent such construction have been abrogated, pre-empted, and disregarded in the service of wall construction" (p. 152). This legal power is problematic when DHS circumvents all Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory standards (Maril, 2004; Roig-Franzia, 2007). In 2007, the Mexican government filed a 209-page report with Congress complaining that the walls devastate Mexican lands and wildlife, but U.S. politicians ignore such protests (Roig-Franzia, 2007). In 2009, the Supreme Court

upheld the power of the sovereign to make waivers on legislation to protect national security interests. This included waiving international statutes with Mexico such as the 1983 Conservation Agreement signed by President Reagan and Miguel de la Madrid that protected unique biodiversity systems (Jones, 2012, Roig-Franzia, 2007). In most cases, the DHS authority is unchallenged but at times local agents such as the UT-Brownsville college lawsuit were successful in altering how the government social structure worked on the fence (UTB/TSC, 2008). Of this and similar court battles, Maril (2011a) describes, “Steamrolling their way to gain access to private property....DHS treated everyone the same, whether poor landowner with a small herd of goats, [a large ranch owner], the superintendent of public schools, or a public university” (p. 76). Maril further claims that the DHS one size fits all-legal strategy does not expect resistance, especially from federal district judges in certain circumstances.

Giddens (1984) clarifies that usually agents have some access to resources that may include a social network, or physical resources like money and infrastructure, and resources are necessary to reproduce social structures. The DHS as the most influential agent has unparalleled access to several notable resources such as the resources it’s sub agencies receive to do their jobs (CBP, ICE, USCIS). DHS also has access to private corporations through federal contract funding. One of the fatal flaws of DHS is that they dismiss some of the most important resources that might help them communicate their needs in a way that could produce a reasonable settlement for all parties along the border. Maril (2004, 2011a, 2011b) claims that DHS rarely consults their own employees in the CBP or ICE offices, who have the most knowledge and experience dealing with borderland issues. If consulted, the officers of CBP and ICE are happy to

share their perspectives on what would be the most effective strategies to maintain border control. CBP officials explain that a fence is only a good idea if people are unfamiliar with the daily life and culture of the borderlands. What does it communicate about the DHS if they do not consult their own experts on the subject of the fence? It communicates, just like in the case of the politicians not visiting the border that the fence is much more about politics and symbolism than actually being of use as a physical deterrent.

Jones (2012) is even more critical of how DHS uses resources to construct the fence suggesting, “The builders of these barriers also sought to define who belongs within the state by creating and reifying boundaries both on the ground and in people’s minds” (p. 3). Jones explains that the barriers support institutional discrimination in two ways. First, when the sovereign builds a fence, this object is a physical expression of power to protect whom they wanted to stay in the country, while at the same time having the power to keep out those they deemed unworthy to be here. Second, the idea of the fence almost unconsciously increases support for exclusionary practices of ‘the other’. In an overly simplistic way, those unfamiliar with the USMX borderlands see news pictures of the fence, hear about the drug cartel stories, and continue to perpetuate the flawed assumptions that the U.S. is being overrun by illegal immigrants who are a detriment to the country (Aguilar, 2011; Coleman, 2008; Flores, 2003; Jones, 2012; Laurence, 2010; Rivera-Batiz 2000). Since 9/11, fears are still very real, which provides a political justification to support a bigger fence and continue the cycle of exclusion of perceived threats deemed ‘the other’ (Brown, 2010; Dunn, 2009; Gulasekaram, 2012;

Hayden, 2013; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2002, 2006; Nguyen, 2006; Rosas 2006b, 2007).


There are numerous other agents with power. ST is decidedly more theoretical than practical, opening the possibilities to share many perspectives. Future academic work could apply ST to other government or external agents and examine how they used their power to influence the social structure. I have noted throughout the dissertation where borderlands scholars are already conducting this research. Communication scholars have an opportunity to contribute their knowledge and theories to borderlands research.

RQ 2: How can the duality of structure be visualized at a micro and macro level and what does it reveal about the USMX Security Fence?

Researchers use the duality of structure in ST to identify agents, power, and choices in the micro and macro parts of the social structure. How do these different players in the social structure influence each other? What are the consequences of their interactions, or by not interacting together? Part of this project is finding ways to make ST practical or visually useful. Olufowote (2003) argues that Giddens provides theoretical concepts that are particularly useful in explaining communication concepts. However, Giddens and communication scholars have grappled with capturing all the complexities that ST has to offer. Following Olufowote's (2003) suggestions for future research, during the analytical phase of the project, I created some visual charts to represent ST principles found in the social structures I studied. This project offers two ways to visualize the duality of structure where micro and macro level actions help

build and maintain the USMX border walls. Table 14 is one way to visualize the “dimensions of the duality of structure” (Giddens, 1984, p. 29) in the latest security minded social structure. Each dimension with its accompanying term represents some aspect of the security social structure. The arrows reveal agents communicating through many channels at the micro level. At the macro level, all of the dimensions together represent the larger security social structure that makes up a part of American culture. Too often, many agents in the social structure do not seem to see the social structure in which they take part.


Table 14 – A Macro View of the Security Social Structure after 9/11 in America.



Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a second way to represent the duality of structure. SNA provides a picture of many interpersonal and systemic lines of communication that create the security social structure in which we live. Figure 1

confirms that there are many stakeholders with varying motives. Future communication research could analyze the communicative functions of other stakeholders and their relationship with the USMX Security Fence. I created the visual network using UCINET SNA software (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002), and Netdraw (Borgatti, 2002). Both programs are available at <https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home> (current as of January 12, 2014). The circle nodes denote agents, the square nodes signify affiliates with the agents, and the links between the nodes represent communication and some association with other agents in the network. The entire picture represents the security social structure we live in. Giddens (1984) argues that too often, we don't not recognize the routine of the structure that may be right in front of us.

Figure 1 - The Duality of Structure in a Security Culture Social System



There is an interesting juxtaposition happening between the Annunciation House (A-House) node and the Federal Law Enforcement (LEO) node in El Paso, Texas.

Undocumented immigrants make up a large portion of the poorest people in the El Paso area. Since they do not have documents, civil agencies can and do deny them with the most basic services such as food, shelter, clothes, medical attention, and legal help (A-House, 2013; Garcia 2011). A-House (2013) provides basic services to undocumented immigrants with a particular emphasis on refugees mostly fleeing from the violence in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, or other countries including Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Dunn (2009) explained that between 1993 and 2002, there was a greatly strained relationship between Federal LEO and social services groups. The official government policy was to take great care when dealing with *sensitive institutions* such as church's, social services, schools, and the like. Unfortunately, Dunn (2009) stated that some officers overlooked this policy in order to conduct raids and surveillance on some undocumented immigrants and the social services they used. This conflicting relationship came to a peak in 2003 when "A Border Patrol agent shot and killed an undocumented immigrant whom he and other agents had pursued from a local immigrant shelter and cornered in a confrontation that went horribly wrong" (Dunn, 2009, p. 173). Dunn (2009) described:

Nineteen-year-old Juan Patricio Peraza, an undocumented immigrant from Tijuana, took out the trash to a dumpster behind the building and was confronted by Border Patrol agents, from whom he fled. Very quickly additional agents arrived on the scene to assist....One agent shot Peraza, who agents claimed had first swung his pipe at them. A group of horrified shelter residents who witnessed the event from the roof of the shelter....claim Juan Patricio did no swing the pipe, but rather was holding it on his shoulder. (p. 173)

Following the death of Juan Patricio, thousands of protestors from organizations across El Paso worked with the local and federal LEO to make sure such an accident would not happen again (Dunn, 2009). Federal agents killed Juan just outside the A-House compound, only a few blocks from the El Paso border. Garcia, Director of A-House (2009) writes a commentary regarding the killing that sums up the wall of immigration policies that remain ineffective. Garcia (2009) states:

In El Paso, Juan Patricio [Peraza Quijada] has become the symbol of everything that is wrong with present immigration policy, the great need for just and humane comprehensive immigration reform, and the terrible consequences of the current enforcement-only immigration policy used by the US Government. Over the past decade, it is a policy that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of immigrants who have died in deserts, drowned in rivers or automobile accidents, or, like Juan Patricio, been killed by Border Patrol Agents. It is a policy that has resulted in the division of families when the undocumented members of a family are detected, detained and deported, forcing one part of the family to live in the US and the other part in another country....It is a policy that now regularly uses criminal prosecution with its corresponding prison sentences to punish undocumented individuals caught living and working in the US....By commemorating Juan Patricio's life and death, it is a way for a community to again state that this is not what immigrants deserve, that this is not acceptable immigration policy, and that deaths such as that of Juan Patricio contradict the core principles of justice and human rights to which the US aspires. (§ 1-4)

From 2003 to 2014, the A-House staff and other social service groups have reshaped their relationship with CBP and Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials. In fact, it is notable that CBP and ICE officials have referred undocumented immigrants to A-House to help them with basic needs rather than detain and deport them. Through open and cooperative communication channels, the relationship has become one of trust and help as opposed to past problems and violence (Aguilar, 2014; A-House, 2012, 2014; Davydenko, 2013; Ruben Garcia, personal communication, November 9, 2013). This relationship has become essential in 2014 in order for federal agencies and local volunteer operations to find living space for more than 52,000 young immigrants who

started crossing the border in October 2013 to flee from the violence mostly in Honduras (A-House, 2014; Church Strives, 2014; Valdez, 2014). This is only one of many examples where local nodes are communicating with national nodes to resolve issues created by restrictive immigration laws and the USMX wall that exists to enforce them.

Another node of interest is one discussed previously in this project. In 2007, DHS and the University of Texas at Brownville and Texas Southmost College (UTB/TSC) conflicted in court over how the USMX Security Fence would work on a college campus. President Garcia and the Board of Regents communicated in court the huge detrimental consequences the fence would cause on their campus. Even with a strained relationship, the two nodes found ways to cooperate on how the fence would be built (UTB/TSC, 2008; Maril, 2011). The network of the security social structure is very large. There are many ways to examine the duality of structure within the network.

DAD Research Question

RQ 1: What are the magic, mythic, and perspectival dimensions of the USMX Security Fence and how does that affect the communication about the security fence?

As early as the 1500's, Cortez introduced the xenophobic, white European hegemony that would come to dominate and subjugate the Aztec empire, and the people of Mesoamerica (Gebser, 1949/1985). Within 100 years, the colonists of New Spain annihilated the Aztec population of 1.5 million, and then proceeded to destroy over 95% of the indigenous Mexican people (Hamnett, 1999). Gebser (1949/1985) points to this massive extinction as an example of what has happened when magic and mental

consciousness structures collide. The USMX Security Fence represents magical, mythic, and perspectival consciousness structures that are comparable to South African apartheid history described in Chapter 5. American colonists long perceived that they had individual rights, the most important of which was property rights. The U.S. land expansion during the 1800's was part of the "Manifest Destiny" ideology, so annexing Texas from Mexico appeared to be a natural way of things (Hernandez, 2010). In the perspectival consciousness where personal freedom and individualism play the paramount role, the practice of claiming land as a personal possession that could be owned and protected would be seem normal since it is a "natural" right of U.S. citizen in the Declaration of Independence.

Magic Dimension and the Fence

Part of the definition of magic is that the world is full, whole, alive, where everything connects to everything else, including animals, the earth, and humans who are all equal in the ever-present universe (Kramer, 1997 & 2013). A magical culture that is a collective, whole, complete, living universe would not build a fence causing a separation or imbalance of that universe. Magic people would not build a physical wall to block them from movement, especially on lands they deem to be holy and where they bury their ancestors, who become part of the land. Building a wall would offend nature that has a spirit also. Building a wall could up upset the balance of the universe.

The O'odham Native American tribe is the most well-known example of a magic culture that the U.S. government severely interrupts with wall building across O'odham lands. Schlyer (2012) describes that the tribe resides between Arizona and the

Mexican state of Sonora. The O'odham oral histories suggest that this geographical area has been a sacred place for more than 6000 years. It was unthinkable that the two countries could separate the land, just as humans are not separate from their animal relatives. Schlyer (2012) explains that the O'odham people have a great respect for the circle of life; the Sonoran Desert has an influential role in their spiritual belief system. When the U.S. government annexed parts of Mexico in 1853, the new borders cut the O'odham Native American tribe in half on paper, but members of the tribe were still able to traverse each side of the border with minimal interruption. In the 1990's, the U.S. government separated tribal members from their people and sacred lands (Hendricks, 2010; Morse, 2012; Weber, 2011). There were several consequences for the magical culture of the O'odham tribe. Hendricks (2010) records that traditional tribal members are concerned that the metal barriers, comparable to metal knives, are stabbing Mother Earth and won't be removed. The metal fence permanently alters the balance of the universe causing chaos. Moreover, there are 11 burial sites dating back to the 12th century that the O'odham people had to remove and rebury. While the government was considerate in how they allowed the O'odham tribe to work with the burial sites, to traditional tribal members this is another offensive desecration of sacred ancient lands.

In addition to religious desecration, walls physically block O'odham members from movements between the U.S. and Mexico. Morse (2012) describes that every October, tribal members conduct a pilgrimage from Arizona to Sonora for the festival of St. Francis, but each year the passage is more difficult with increasing border militarization and enforcement. Weber (2011) suggests that one reason for the difficulties is that the O'odham people do not identify themselves as U.S. or Mexican

citizens, or if they do, it is secondary to their O’odham American identity. O’odham activist Ofelia Rivas is the founder of the *O’odham Voice against the Wall*, an organization she started on behalf of the tribal elders. Rivas travels on both sides of the fence to conduct religious ceremonies and work with other tribal members. Rivas explains that the Nations elders “are concerned about how the vehicle barrier being constructed at the U.S.-Mexico border is cutting off traditional routes across the Nation and disrupting the traditional O’odham way of life” (Weber, 2011, p. 182). The clash between the O’odham people and government is an example of what Gebser (1949/1985) calls a deficient system. Kramer (1997, 2013) explains that one of the consequences of the modern culture is that deficient systems cannot sustain themselves. Within an efficient social system, there is cooperation and shared communication about what both sides in the argument want. The magical culture has an equal voice at the table. The fence, if built at all, would be vastly different from what we have now in the current deficient system.

The O’odham are not the only people fighting for their lands and the magical culture they have lived in for thousands of years. Schlyer (2012) also relates the story of Eloisa Tamez who received her lands from the Lipan Apache and Basque settlers prior to 1767. When Tamez tried to fight the DHS for her land, she lost in court when the government cited they could use eminent domain, meaning they could annex the land for purposes that were in the public interest. The resulting wall cut Tamez off from her ancestral lands that included sacred riverfront areas (Schlyer, 2012, p. 172).

Mythic and Perspectival Dimensional Accrual and the Fence

From its inception, the USMX Security Fence maintains a combination of mythic and perspectival communication functions. Kramer (1997, 2013) identifies several characteristics that emerge in mythic cultures with an important distinction that entities separate into polar, cyclical relationships. In their polar relationships, humans are somewhat detached from nature or an overall god or life force that connects everything. This detachment causes some level of individualism allowing people to justify selfish needs. The separation also means that mythical communication allows symbolic or connotative meanings. In the perspectival dimension, that separation becomes arbitrary where there may or may not be any relationship to anything. Individualism is a paramount feature of the modern perspectival dimension.

From a mythical view, ancient empires used walls as political symbols that projected authority, power, and territory. They also served a defensive purpose for thousands of years. City walls divided “civilized” or cultured society from the “barbarians” who lived in the vast expanse of “un-governed”, “wild”, or other chaotic space. Kramer (1992) claims that from the earliest existence of the term culture, it is synonymous with civilization. In modernity, some scholars (Brown, 2010; Cisneros, 2014; Gulasekaram, 2012; Luke, 2013; Pusterla & Piccin, 2012) argue that the concept of the sovereign state is falling apart so nations build walls in a desperate attempt to save the nation-state philosophy. The USMX Security Fence is much more of a symbol of sovereignty than any kind of defense or barrier from anyone (Dunn, 2009; Jones, 2012; Nevins, 2002). A review of Internet videos demonstrates that young and old people alike can climb many parts of the border fence within minutes. Moreover, if people have intentions to cross the fence for nefarious purposes, they find many ways to

do so including tunneling underneath the fence, or placing vehicle tracks on top of the fences to drive over them. Gulasekaram (2012) suggests that the U.S. government is using the fence as a mythic political symbol to cover up its perspectival intentions:

By juxtaposing current border fortification with a time immemorial, a wall transcends our current political and historical moment....the border wall naturalizes the idea and existence of a national boundary, moving it beyond its politically contingent reality as the negotiated boundary between two nation-states, into primordial primacy. Insulating the border fence within a narrative of ancient cultures marginalizes the effect of contemporary policy debate regarding the efficacy or normative desirability of muscular border policy. (p. 178-179)

Beyond its mythic symbolism, the border wall has several perspectival characteristics that influence the message it sends to audiences in the U.S. and abroad. Kramer (1997, 2013) claims that in the perspectival culture, the meaning of land is arbitrary so people can divide and own it. Fragmentation is a trait of the perspectival world. The wall communicates that fragmentation is a reality, the government and individuals can own space, and people can control what happens in that space (Brown, 2010; Gulasekaram, 2012; Luke, 2013; Pusterla & Piccin, 2012). Jones (2012) argues that there is no place in the modern world for territories or space to remain “ungoverned”, “wild”, or “barbaric”. Within the context of counterterrorism in a post 9/11 world, ungoverned space is where terrorists have free reign to prepare themselves to fight so ungoverned spaces are undesirable (9/11 Commission, 2004; Kean & Hamilton, 2014).

Kramer (1997, 2013) claims that the modern dimension is not emotional. Rather, it is full of carelessness making actions arbitrary. A significant example of carelessness in the perspectival dimension is technology. In a technocratic world, Mumford (1934) reminds us that we often do not think about the negative consequences of new

technologies. The border wall is a devastating example of perspectival technology that the government uses without regard to human consequences. Schlyer (2012) relates the story of border ranchers that deal with the consequences of perspectival arbitrariness:

This family plot has weathered political storms that have blown in and out of the region, upending the concept of nationality on more than one occasion. From the Texas Rebellion, to the Mexican-American War, to the US Civil War and the Mexican Revolution, political disputes have long embattled this location. And today is no exception. Noel points north to the levy almost two miles away, where the US government plans to build a border wall, essentially taking all of the land between the levy and the spot on which he stands, by eminent domain. Construction of the wall— eighteen feet of concrete meant to stop immigrants from entering the country without permission— will turn Noel's family land into a no-man's-land between the actual US-Mexico border at the Rio Grande and the effective border two miles north at the wall. All access to the river will be cut off. *For the US government this spot holds little meaning other than as an enduring reminder of its failure to craft a workable relationship with Mexico. For Noel, it is a family treasure. Though he has fought a long battle against the seizure, before long he will lose, and the government will take his land* (italics added). (p. 171-172)

The wall technology is not only failing to stop criminals, terrorists, or immigrants, but it actually hurts people instead. In other sections of the dissertation, I argue that immigrants die due to poor geographic conditions or exploitation from human smugglers. Scholars claim that the number increased exponentially since Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper in the 1990's (Dunn, 2009; Nevins, 2002, 2006). Despite the arbitrary nature of the fence and government immigration policies, people demonstrate an extreme determination to make it into the states.

Beyond the physical structures that are in place, I also discuss the inadequacy of smart technologies along the border. In a perspectival world, the smart technologies that federal officers use at least in part remove some human emotion from patrolling the borderlands. On one hand an argument can be made that the use of smart technology (surveillance UAV's, fence cameras, and sensors) keeps officers safe and increases their

effective range of operations. For example, it is a good idea to put metal cages on patrol trucks to protect officers from people throwing rocks from the Mexican side of the wall. On the other hand, scholars and practitioners reveal many times that smart technologies are inadequate, broken, and/or create more problems than they solve. The government does not consult operations officers who could help make the smart technology strategically useful and more humane. In addition, Maril (2004, 2011a, 2011b) found that private corporations are filled with engineers who never see the border, but think they have great smart technology plans to solve the problem of border security. Certain corporations receive a great deal of profit for creating defective products while ignoring the consequences of wall building that threatens the lives of people at the border.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

Walls that divide nations are a reflection of how we communicate, how we see our fears, our ambitions, and ourselves. The purpose of this project was to utilize semiotics and hermeneutics to analyze, compare, and contrast the communicative functions of historic apartheid and the modern USMX Security Fence. Both artifacts have influential roles in social, political, cultural, economic, and globalization issues for their own countries, and for the world. I studied these artifacts for two reasons. First, fences are symbols of deeply engrained social structures or cultures that give the fences meaning. In order to comprehend the communicative functions of the two fences, it is necessary to understand the context of the history and cultures supporting them. The second reason to study fences is to add knowledge in the field of communication studies. Communication scholars rarely contribute to borderlands research, despite

several calls to do so. In this conclusion, I discuss two important similarities between apartheid and the USMX Security Fence. Then I discuss significant limitations in conducting this research effectively. Finally, I recommend future research to help advance borderlands scholarship for communication scholars and the Intelligence Community.

Discussion

I conducted the historical analysis and theoretical applications in chapters five and six. At this point, I highlight two of the most relevant similarities in the communicative functions of both artifacts. When this project started, I had pre-conceived notions that comparing these two artifacts would be like comparing apples and oranges because they were so different. Part of the hermeneutic challenge was to recognize I had a biased perspective to start from, and then the challenge was to find more information to see if apartheid and the USMX Security Fence had any related characteristics. A review of the chapters illustrates that in my hermeneutic and semiotics research, I found plenty of evidence that the two artifacts are indeed comparable for many reasons.

Language is a Critical Component in Building Fences

The first shared characteristic of both artifacts is that they had similar connotative and denotative underpinnings. In the methodology, I list at least 22 denotative meanings of walls. Six of those meanings apply directly to apartheid and the USMX fence. Apartheid and the USMX wall are intangible barriers. Both artifacts are a mental, ideological enclosure that leads to physical enclosures. Both artifacts are

comparable to other famous barriers in history. Both walls manifest institutional discrimination or racism. Both fences divide cultures. Finally, both fences force people to become desperate often resorting to violence to overcome the consequences made by the barriers. Politically, the USMX fence also served as a symbol of physical defense against intruders like terrorists or illegal aliens or drug smugglers. In addition to these meanings, apartheid and the USMX Security Fence also have comparable binary oppositions in their languages, and the use of language shapes the realities of both social structures. In both cases, people are separate or apart. There is a dichotomy between being civilized versus being native. The civilized or cultured versus native or natural dichotomy leads to other oppositions such as how to define whom land owners are or whether we should own it at all. There are similarities in the language of being individualistic or a collective.

Government leaders or colonist leaders wrote specific language into policies, regulations, and laws that created the social structures possible to build walls. For example, powerful foreign ‘aliens’, ‘stranger’, or ‘uitlanders’, invaded what they perceived as ungoverned space and then claimed to be the native or divine owners over the land. Laws like the Hottentot code of 1809, Law 3 in 1885, and the exclusion of the Chinese people in America in 1891 are all examples of where political leaders use language to push foreigners out of their lands. Later, laws include attempts to stop the spread of Communism in the U.S. and South Africa. Under the discursive ideology in each country, powerful governments created the social, political, and legal structures that would ultimately lead to the building and maintaining of walls. Indigenous peoples in South Africa and the U.S. suddenly became strangers, aliens, and foreigners, in their

own lands because they were not from ‘civilized society’. Governments or political leaders used labels as justification to forcefully remove and kill millions of indigenous peoples. Indeed, Saussure’s argument that language is the most important social system and the basis for all other systems is true. Language is the foundation system for the social structure necessary to build apartheid and the USMX Security Fence.

Powerful State Actors Shape Social Structures

It is not new or surprising information that powerful colonial agents with abundant resources and new military technologies forced cultural change on native societies. The Dutch and later the British foreigners colonized and dominated the tribal societies and the Boer, and then the Boer continued to enforce racist policies against tribal peoples until apartheid ended. In the U.S., American colonies became a sovereign nation. Under the ideology of the Manifest Destiny, Anglo-American settlers took over the rest of the U.S. at times with backdoor deals, or by raw brute force. Indigenous peoples in neither country had the capabilities to overcome the almost entire destruction of their people, language, and cultures by their foreign enemies. In each chapter, the historic semiotic analysis outlined specific types of oppression and the response from indigenous peoples (Khoi Khoi, Zulu, San Bushmen, Xhosa, the Native American O’odham tribe, and the native Mexican people under the rule of Spain). What continues to be problematic even in a current context is that too often, nation states continue to ignore the rights of indigenous peoples. The dominant agents must learn to give all stakeholders a place at the table when determining where or if they should draw borderlines and how it influences all affected all parties.

Another similarity about powerful actors was that they use symbols very effectively to shape the social structure into what they think society should be. Dissent was discouraged or outright punished. The Afrikaan Purified National Party and some people within the U.S. government use their respective walls as a symbol of political power. This is almost more important than implementing laws or protecting the southwest border physical wall. Both governments use mass media to manipulate the social structure, to send out their message, mainly that fences and separation are beneficial for protecting the people's way of life. The political strategy of D.F. Malan was the symbol of apartheid. When Malan won, he institutionalized apartheid under the new Purified National Party. Apartheid was the symbol of oppression in South Africa for 50 years. Likewise, protecting the southern border was mostly symbolic from the time immigration regulations became popular. The fences on the border are a symbolic extension of what has already been taking place with immigration policies for over 100 years.

Limitations & Future Research

I found some difficult obstacles in trying to conduct this project. First, one of the largest differences is the fact that the security fence is a border problem that involves two sovereign nations whereas Apartheid was an internal affair. Even though the oppression happened for half a century, internal political parties were able to overcome the minority party and take over the government. In the case of the U.S. Mexico border, there are two sovereign nations competing for resources that include everything from labor to environmental needs. There are international consequences on a much broader scale for two nations that share the largest land border in the world. While they share

some common ground, they come from very different horizons and have opposing versions of what to do about their borders.

A second limitation is that there are too many institutional constraints from academia and the government. There are controversial views between universities and their graduate students. There are even more conflicting relationships between universities and the U.S. Government where national security concerns exist. The government is in a tough position having to balance the needs of national security and privacy interests with what should be available to the public, the media, and university researchers. This problem will likely continue given the increasing number of terrorist threats and the inherent relationship between immigration and travel security concerns. Until some of these issues are resolved through more mutual trust and respect between university officials and government agencies, this research will always be difficult.

A third limitation is access to participants' stories. Practitioners and researchers must be able to access human subjects in alternative ways that protects the interests of both the subjects and the research. Until researchers are able to talk with and document the stories of undocumented immigrants, without the fear that federal officials will detain and deport them, it makes gathering their ideas through communication at best a difficult process. As the literature review claims, medical researchers are reviewing alternative consent methods in order to increase access to patients in the borderlands. If it is successful, communication scholars could utilize the same method to interview undocumented immigrants and other controversial subjects. Without ways of accessing human stories, the research on undocumented immigration and the consequences of the security fence will remain limited.

This project serves as the basis for many areas of potential borderlands research. The literature review briefly discusses communication functions in the areas language and metaphor, geopolitics, policy analysis, history, and other social sciences. Many countries are building security walls that have influential communication functions that society needs to grapple with. One specific area of interest that would greatly enhance borderlands research is tracing social networks of immigrants, their communication, and their needs. They are critical stakeholders in the debate about walls and government leaders, local leaders, and communities must hear them speak. Several interesting programs exist to conduct social network analysis. Researchers could continue combining ST with communication concepts to explain the activities of undocumented immigrants. We must be able to gather information from undocumented immigrants without them fearing legal consequences if they share. Until we can collect this kind of communication research, we are limited in the opportunities to participate in immigration studies in the U.S. and Mexico.

In conclusion, fences, walls, and barriers are social structures with communicative functions that reflect who we are. The analysis of apartheid and the USMX Security Fence using hermeneutics and semiotics illustrated how walls obtain their meaning through social structures. Now is the time for communication scholars and practitioners to contribute to borderlands research. In a globalizing world that is becoming smaller, and as more barriers continue to be built, there will be a greater necessity to understand what they communicate, and how to cooperate despite differences that may exist.

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